
Glass 
Book. 



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COPyRIGHT DEPOSkC 



THE CITIZEN'S LIBRARY 

OF 

ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND 
SOCIOLOGY 

EDITED BY 
RICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D., LL.D. 

DIRECTOR OF THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, 

POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND HISTORY, 

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 



WORLD POLITICS 



/ 

THE CITIZEN'S LIBRARY 






World Politics 

At the End of the Nineteenth Century 

AS INFLUENCED BY THE ORIENTAL 
SITUATION 

BY 

PAUL S. REINSCH, Ph.D., LL.B. 

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE 
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 



" La politique a toujours besoin de prevoir, pour 
ainsi dire, le present." — Turcot. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

LONDON : MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. 
1900 

All rights reserved 



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MAY 2 8 1900 

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Norwood Mass. U.S.A. 






PREFACE 

It has been the intention of the writer in the 
present volume to gather into a harmonious picture 
the multitude of facts and considerations that go 
to make up international politics at the present 
time. The treatment is of necessity suggestive 
rather than exhaustive, but it is believed that, 
while at present no complete historical judgment 
as to the great forces at work could be delivered, 
still the far-reaching importance and dramatic in- 
terest of present developments would justify the 
attempt to obtain a bird's-eye view. These con- 
siderations indicate the purpose as well as the 
necessary limitations of the present work. While 
the author has, in every case, sifted his evidence 
and attempted to found his judgments on unim- 
peachable testimony, the subject is so vast that 
only the paradoxical specialist in all fields could 
avoid just criticism. The author has, however, 
attempted to keep himself entirely free from a 
priori conceptions and prejudices, and to view 
the great drama of contemporary life as an unim- 
passioned beholder who forbears to censure or 
commend. 

The plan of the book may need a word of 
explanation. The first part is an introduction, 
and gives a general view of the forces at work, 



vi PREFACE 

covering the various elements of intellectual and 
economic life that influence modern politics. The 
second part treats of what the author considers 
the true centre of interest in present international 
politics, namely, the Chinese question : the conse- 
quences of the Chinese situation on European 
politics are traced in part third. The part de- 
voted to German imperial politics attempts to pre- 
sent in its completeness the well-considered poHcy 
of a great empire, while in the last part some 
necessarily fragmentary considerations upon the 
position of the United States as a world power are 
given. The whole material of the book, therefore, 
is focussed upon the Chinese problem. The docu- 
ments and works upon which the author bases his 
conclusions are cited at the end of each part. It 
was thought better to limit the number of page 
notes, and rather to give the sources of informa- 
tion in the above manner. 

Acknowledgments are due to Professor Richard 
T. Ely, the editor of this series. President Charles 
Kendall Adams, and Professors Frederick J. Tur- 
ner and Charles H. Haskins, of the University of 
Wisconsin, for helpful suggestions as to the subject- 
matter of these lectures. The author also received 
invaluable aid in the revision of the book and in 
proof-reading from Mr. George Ray Wicker, an 
honorary fellow in the University of Wisconsin. 

PAUL S. REINSCH. 
Madison, Wisconsin, 
April I, 1900. 



ANALYTICAL TABLE OF 
CONTENTS 

PART I 

NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

CHAPTER I 

The Transition from Nationalism to National Imperialism 
IN THE Nineteenth Century 

PAGE 

The danger of exaggerating the principle of nationalism . 6 

The complete change of social and political ideals since the 

beginning of the nineteenth century .... 7 
International rivalry leads to territorial expansion ... 9 
The moral basis upon which the justification of expansion is 

attempted ^^ 

The idea of world empire '2 

The idea of national imperialism I3 

Machiavelli as the philosopher of nationalism : the applica- 
bility of his methods to national imperialism . . -14 
The broader importance of Machiavellism : Machiavellian 

methods which are used in modern international politics i6 
The utilitarian aspects of national imperialism ... 20 
Attempts to raise the plane of competition among nations : 

the Peace Conference at The Hague .... 22 
The idea of world unity compared with the present state of 

international equilibrium 24 

CHAPTER II 

Political Methods of the New National Imperialism 

Tlie increased importance of sea power 27 

Changes in the functions of a navy 28 

vii 



viii CONTENTS 



The importance of sea communication .... 
The influence of missions in gaining entrance into new 

territory ...... 

The French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions 
The relations between commerce and political dominion 
The policy of Great Britain in regard to colonial trade 
The likelihood of a change in this policy considered 
Industrial undertakings in undeveloped regions 
The radical change in English economic life from industrialism' 

to capitalism 

The demand for policing the world 

Investments treated in the spirit of nationalism . '. 

The political importance of railway undertakings 

The formation of industrial and agricultural colonies . 



PACK 
31 

32 

33 
34 
37 
38 
40 

40 
41 
44 
45 
47 



CHAPTER III 
The Great Powers as Colonizers 
The success of Russia as a colonizing power 
Germany a nation with multitudes of colonists, but few colonies 
The efforts made by Germany to retain the political aUegiance 

of its colonists 

France a country with vast territorial possessions, but with few 

colonists ..... 
The success achieved by the Dutch in their government of 

Java 

The British manner of action with regard to colonization 

CHAPTER IV 

The Connection between Colonization and 
Imperialism 
The doctrine of universal protection of citizens ... 58 
The most radical method of imperial expansion, that of 

directly seizing territory ^ 

Spheres of influence and spheres of interest ..." 60 
The relative influence of individual initiative and unconscious 

social development ^ 



49 
50 

51 

52 

54 
55 



CONTENTS ix 

PAGE 

What British and French imperial expansion owes to indi- 
vidual initiative ........ 62 

The conception of far-reaching plans of national expansion 

more frequent of late 63 

Summary of the present position of the great powers . . 66 

CHAPTER V 
Consequences of the Policy of National Imperl^lism 

The phantom of world empire leading to mutual suspicions 

among the nations 68 

The importance of national solidarity in the present intensity 

of international competition ...... 70 

The reaction against the political and social doctrines of 

liberalism ......... 71 

Imperial expansion favoring the growth of one man power . 74 
The contention that the policy of expansion will advance the 

cause of good government at home .... 77 

The aristocratic reaction in the philosophy of the last half of 

the nineteenth century 78 

PART II 

THE OPENING OF CHINA 

|/<:HAPTER I 

Social and Political Characteristics 

Change in the opinion concerning the strength of Chinese 

civilization ......... 86 

The social and political organization of China ... 89 

The essence of Chinese morality reverence for the past . . 90 
The formalism and conservatism of Chinese society: saving 

appearances . . . . . . . . '91 

The Chinese class system . ' 92 

The examinations of the mandarinate : the nature of Chinese 

education 93 



CONTENTS 



favor 



Russian political influence in Manchuria: the garrison and 
fiscal administration ..... 

Position of Germany in regard to a partition of China 

The political purposes of France .... 

The plans of the Russo-French alliance in central China 

Character of French colonial policy in Indo-China 

Non-alienation promises in favor of France . 

The loss of British prestige at the Chinese capital , 

The lease of Wai-hai-wei : non-alienation promises in 
of Great Britain 

The official expressions of the British government with n 
to the Yangtse region . . . , , 

The present colonial and foreign policy of Italy 

The interest of Japan in Chinese affairs . 

Secretary Hay and the " open-door " policy . 

Important international agreements virith regard to China 

The relations between Great Britain and Japan 

The attempted Chino-Japanese alliance . 



egard 



i6i 

164 

165 
166 
167 
168 
169 

170 

172 
173 
174 
176 
178 
180 
181 



j/t:HAPTER IV 

Summary of the Actual Condition of Affairs in 

China 



Views on the strength and weakness of China . . . 182 
The industrial revolution impending in China, and the con- 
sequences thereof with regard to foreign influence . .185 
Brigandage and piracy as existing in a large portion of the 

Chinese territory 187 

The condition of the private law, and its administration . . 188 
The desire of Chinese merchants for settled legal conditions . 189 
The central and local organs of government compared with 

regard to their efficiency as agents of reform . . . 190 
Difficulties in the way of acquiring political control by force . 193 
Regulations for mines and railways in China . , . .199 



CONTENTS xiii 



PART III 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OPENING OP 
CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS 

CHAPTER I 

Russian Imperial Politics 

PAGE 

The three stages of Russian expansion, with Constantinople, 

Afghanistan, and China as their objective points . . 206 

The importance of Manchuria to Russian expansion . . 207 

Reasons for the Russian peace policy 208 

Russia as a naval power ........ 209 

Tendency in the Russian Empire towards an Oriental character 21 1 

The strengthening of autocracy by the recent developments . 211 
The attitude of Russian imperialism toward Western civili- 
zation : Pobedonostseff : Slavophile tendencies . .212 

The importance of religion and cult in Russian politics . . 214 
Plans for the defence of the southern frontier of the Russian 

Empire 216 

The policy of fostering the merchant marine .... 218 

The methods of Russian manufacturers 219 

The influence of lack of competition on Russian industry . 220 
The true nature of Russian expansion in Asia . . .221 

CHAPTER n 

The Influence of the Oriental Situation on the 
Western European Powers 

The choice between Cobdenism and a policy of imperial 

protective federation 223 

The friendly understanding between Great Britain and the 

United States; between Great Britain and Germany . 225 
The nature of English anti- Russian politics radically changed 226 
Germany's recent entry upon a conscious policy of imperial 

expansion 227 

Withdrawal of Russian attention from the Balkan states 

and its effect upon the fears of Austria . . . 227 



xvi CONTENTS 

PAGE 

The industrial and strategical importance of Syria . . . 278 
Germany's attempt to retain the political allegiance of her 

colonists 279 

CHAPTER III 

German Colonization in South America 

The nature of German colonization in South America: its 

commercial basis ........ 281 

The advance of German commerce in South America . . 282 

The political aspects of commercial expansion . . . 283 
The Monroe Doctrine as an expression of American policy in 

South America 284 

Its moral basis in the light of recent events .... 285 
The claim that the Monroe Doctrine can only be respected 

as an expression of actual material interests . . . 285 

CHAPTER IV 

General Characteristics of German Imperial 

Politics 

Protection of German citizens abroad : the case of Hayti . 287 

German expansion is still chiefly commercial .... 288 

The policy of Germany self-centred, but friendly relations 

with the other great powers fostered .... 289 

The present relations between France and Germany . . 290 
Customs unions : imperial protective federation . . .291 

The idea of a Central European league ..... 292 

The position of Germany as a naval power .... 294 

The merchant marine ........ 295 

Technical education ........ 296 

The methods of German manufacturers ..... 296 

CHAPTER V 

The Influence of Imperialism on Domestic Politics 

The growi;h of one man power ...... 298 

The emperor's plea against party differences . . . 298 

The emperor's concept of his office ..... 300 

The decrease of the parties of moderation .... 302 



CONTENTS xvii 



PART V 

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE POSITION OF THE 
UNITED STATES AS A FACTOR IN ORIENTAL 
POLITICS 

CHAPTER I 

The Interests of the United States in the Far 
Orient 

PAGE 

Change in the attitude of popular opinion toward international 

questions 309 

The probable share of the United States in the development 

of Chinese resources ...... 

The present state of American trade with China 

The weakness of the American merchant marine . 

American products which are used in China . 

Siberia an important market for machinery and manufactured 

goods 

Russia inclined to encourage friendly commercial relations 

with the United States 

The trade of the United States with the Philippine Islands 
The future importance of Manila as a commercial entrepot 
The development of natural resources in the Philippines 
The needs of communication and transportation 
The labor question in the Philippines .... 
The American protective system and the Philippines 
The importance of trade routes ..... 
The policy of the United States with regard to the Asiatic 

mainland 



313 
314 
314 
315 

317 

318 
319 
320 
321 
321 
322 
323 
324 



325 



CHAPTER II 

The Influence of International Politics on the 
Party System 

The importance of the existence of two great parties . . 327 
Impossibility of making questions of foreign policy effective 

subjects of party controversy ...... 328 

The party system in Germany and France .... 329 



xviii CONTENTS 



In Great Britain the party system most successful in the 

period of domestic reform ...... 331 

The degeneracy of party government 332 

Extent of influence on party government of the increased 

interest taken in foreign affairs ..... 333 

The necessity for unanimous action in external matters . . 334 

CHAPTER III 

The Increased Importance of the Executive 

Germany and Russia as examples of increased power of the 

executive ......... 337 

The increased difficulty of the questions of American politics 339 
The method of selection of American statesmen . . . 340 
The methods of selection and training in the English gov- 
ernment .......... 341 

The dramatic character of English parliamentary life . . 343 
Tendencies and developments that should be encouraged in 

American public life .... . . 345 

CHAPTER IV 

The Influence of Imperialism on Home Affairs in 

the United States 347 

CHAPTER V 

International Relations in the United States 

The judgment of European nations as affected by the results 

of the late war ........ 356 

The understanding between Great Britain and America . '357 
The relations of the United States with Germany . . . 358 
The attitude of Prussia toward the United States . , . 359 



PART I 
NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 



WORLD POLITICS AT THE END OF 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 

CHAPTER I 

The Transition from Nationalism to National 
Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century 

When we view the historical development of the 
world since the Renaissance, we find that the one 
principle about which the wealth of facts can be 
harmoniously grouped is that of nationalism. Ever 
since the world-state ideals of the Middle Ages 
were left behind, this principle has been the touch- 
stone of true statesmanship. The reputation of a 
statesman, as well as his permanent influence on 
human affairs, depends on his power to under- 
stand and aid the historical evolution, from out the 
medieval chaos, of strong national states. Genius 
could not countervail this law of development. 
Even Napoleon was unsuccessful whenever his 
policy opposed the innate strength of national- 
ism. As we enumerate the great statesmen whose 
personalities have left a permanent impress on 
the institutions of their countries, such as Louis 
XL, Wolsey, Elizabeth, Richelieu, Henry IV., 

3 



WORLD POLITICS 

Cromwell, Chatham, Cavour, and Bismarck, we 
find that their title to greatness rests upon the 
manner in which they aided a national state 
in realizing its independence and developing its 
character. 

Especially during the nineteenth century has 
nationalism been a conscious influence in political 
life. The nations that, at its beginning, had partly 
achieved their independent political existence, 
have since been striving for the attainment of 
completely self-sufficing life ; while those races 
that regard themselves as unjustly held in bondage 
by others have been engaged in a stern struggle 
to obtain national independence. Success has 
not been the equal portion of the striving races. 
Germany and Italy, which have most nearly ap- 
proached their ideal, are still looking yearningly 
toward the completion of their work by the addi- 
tion of Austria and Trieste ^ to the national states 
to which they respectively belong. The Hunga- 
rians, whose nationalism is most violently enthusi- 
astic, have carried their nativistic policy so far as 
to destroy the economic resources of other parts 
of the Austrian Empire, as, for instance, the 
forests of Dalmatia, in order to protect their own 
economic existence. Other races have been less 
successful, either from a lack of political genius or 
from the overpowering strength of their political 
superiors. An aid to the successful, the principle 

1 In Italian political literature Trieste is usually called irredenta, 
the unredeemed. 

4 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

of nationalism has been turned against the less 
fortunate. Under its influence attempts are con- 
stantly being made to force races like the Irish, 
the Poles,^ and the Finns into unwilling assimila- 
tion with nations that are politically organized and 
superior in strength. For it is necessary to dis- 
tinguish the spirit of nationalism from that of 
particularism just as sharply as from that of 
the world state of the Middle Ages ; it does not 
look with favor upon local peculiarities and varia- 
ations, but rather stands for a thoroughgoing 
assimilation of all the component parts of the 
nation. 

It has thus come about that the successful 
nations have developed a clearly marked individu- 
ality. The cosmopolitanism of the Middle Ages 
and of the Renaissance, the dreams of world unity, 
have been replaced by a set of narrower national 
ideals concerning customs, laws, literature, and 
art, — by a community of independent states, each 
striving to realize to the fullest its individual apti- 
tudes and characteristics. It is not necessary to 
infer from this a universal reign of chauvinism. 
The idea of the general solidarity of mankind 
is still strong enough to restrain national action 
in some measure. In ordinary times there is 
a healthy competition between the members of 
the international commonwealth, — a competition 
sharpened by the knowledge that temporary 
weakness may mean loss of national existence. 

1 See Brandcs, Polen, for a description of Russian methods. 

5 



WORLD POLITICS 

y 

Meanwhile international law holds a balance be- 
tween the states by preventing any of the stronger 
members from unjustly oppressing the smaller 
civilized nations. Under these conditions, too 
great uniformity of civilization is avoided, and 
humanity is given an opportunity to develop its 
varying characteristics. Thus the ideal of the 
period is as far removed from the dead uniformity 
of a world empire on the one hand, as it is on the 
other from the distracting anarchy of a regime of 
mere local custom. ' The world community idea of 
the great founders of international law, Grotius 
and Suarez, and of philosophers of eternal peace, 
like Saint-Pierre and Kant, is reconcilable with 
the existence of national states, if it is understood 
to imply, not political union, but the active coop- 
eration of all nations in the common work of 
mankind. 

It will, however, be difficult to preserve a bal- 
ance of this kind, as the nationalistic principle 
bears within it the possible source of its own de- 
struction, and unless carefully guarded against 
exaggeration, will of itself lead to a disturbance 
of the equilibrium upon which the diversity of our 
civilization depends. Within the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, nationahsm has been thus 
exaggerated ; going beyond a healthy desire to 
express the true native characteristics of a people, 
it has come, in some quarters, to mean the decry- 
ing, as barbarous or decadent, of everything origi- 
nating outside of the national boundary. Within 

6 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

the state itself, there is a growing tendency to 
enforce, by custom and law, absolute uniformity of 
characteristics. Languages and literatures pecu- 
liar to smaller communities are not encouraged, 
the effort being rather made to replace them by 
the national language. In international politics the 
motives of foreign nations are being constantly 
misunderstood. Each nation looks upon itself as 
the bearer of the only true civilization. France 
makes wars as a herald of progress; and when 
Germany is victorious, she, in turn, announces a 
triumph for civilization. Even in art and science, 
perhaps the most cosmopolitan of all pursuits, this 
nationalizing tendency has left its mark. In 
order to give to a work of art a national tinge, 
idiosyncrasies are emphasized, while the broad, 
human way of looking at things, the art that 
speaks to all ages, is neglected. Historical writers 
are especially prone to yield to national prejudices, 
and even scientists may be found who import the 
" national equation " into their work. Chauvinism 
is not confined to politics. It is to be found in 
contemporary art and science as well. 

There has been a complete change of ideals dur- 
ing the past hundred years. The century opened 
with a broad humanitarianism, with a belief in the 
saving power of general culture, and the main 
characteristic of the time was a rationalistic opti- 
mism which saw in reason the guiding influence in 
human affairs. This age of reason, of which Kant, 
Jefferson, the Humboldts, and Rousseau are the 

7 



L 



WORLD POLITICS 

most prominent and distinctive exponents, was 
followed by what may be called the age of force. 
Napoleon's career destroyed much of the first 
optimism of the Revolution ; but it was the period 
of 1848 that finally disappointed the hopes with 
which the century had begun. An age of pessi- 
mism then dawned, in which it was recognized 
that humanity is swayed, not so much by reason, 
as by the blind and passionate forces of the will. 
Schopenhauer's great work, which had lain un- 
noticed on the publishers' shelves for thirty years, 
now suddenly attracted widespread attention and 
became the mirror of the times. It is only within 
the last decade that this pessimism has been in 
turn replaced by a new optimism, the optimism of 
force, which sees in triumphant energy the sole 
condition of happy existence.^ The serenely quiet 
and completely harmonious balance of an existence 
such as Goethe's, reflected in his whole art, has 
given way to a rush of wild spirits that fight 
their way through storms of passions where only 
the strongest will, the most violent energy, can 
prevail. 

This general character of the age is written 
plainly in the records of contemporary political 
life. The nations, having passed through their 
historical evolution, stand now, with fully devel- 
oped individualities, face to face. Their competi- 
tion in all the fields of human activity has taken 
on tremendous dimensions. On the same over- 

1 Of this tendency Friedrich Nietzsche is the main exponent. 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

whelming scale as that of their armaments for 
war do they now exert their energies in all direc- 
tions. It is true that in this way they develop 
greater vitality and ability than could ever be 
brought about in a condition of world peace ; but 
their rivalry may become suicidal. At present 
many of them are finding their territorial basis 
too limited. Expansion in population necessi- 
tates expansion in territory, and so to nationalism 
they add imperialism, — a desire to control as 
large a portion of the earth's surface as their 
energy and opportunities will permit. This atti- 
tude in international politics has become para- 
mount only within the last decades. During the 
middle period of the nineteenth century, colonial 
possessions were undervalued by the continental 
states of Europe.^ 

It was the example of England that led other 
states to look beyond the sea for a reenforcement 
of national power and resources. The first to 
develop the principle of nationalism, and to estab- 
lish an autonomous state, in entire independence 
of the Roman imperial idea, England has also 
taken the lead in building up a national empire. 
Before it was too late, she ceased to look upon her 
colonies as mere latifiindia from which vast in- 
comes might be drawn by absentee lords; and, as 

1 Even in England a large section of public opinion was indiffer- 
ent to colonial affairs. This is especially true of the leaders of the 
Manchester school. See, for instance, John Bright's speeches on 
Canada. 



WORLD POLITICS 

a result, she was the first of all nations, by her 
wise administration and lasting settlement, to make 
her possessions truly a part of her national exis- 
tence. Now, as the European nations look about 
them and find their territorial basis too limited, as 
they see their citizens leaving home only to be- 
come naturalized in English-speaking lands and 
thus to lose their former characteristics, they raise 
the cry of "selfish, grasping England." There is 
some truth in Alfred Austin's expression, " the en- 
vious nations," although, of course, adverse criti- 
cism of England is not by any means always 
inspired by the particular feeling charged in the 
laureate's epithet. When a realization of the 
state of affairs had fully dawned upon the conti- 
nental nations, there began a fierce general scram- 
ble for those portions of the earth's surface which 
were still unoccupied ; and especially since it has 
become apparent that, sooner or later, the vast and 
wealthy realm of China may become a prey to for- 
eign invaders, has this international competition 
become intense, and ominous of serious strife. 

Various motives prevail with the different gov- 
ernments and nations, and the different classes 
among the respective peoples, in the matter of ter- 
ritorial expansion. Often the value attached to 
extended dominion is purely sentimental, inasmuch 
as many of the colonies hastily acquired by Euro- 
pean nations will never make a material return to 
the people as a whole, for the outlay involved in 
their administration. Thus, while a policy of colo- 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

nial expansion may be acceptable to individual 
capitalists as a means of profitable investment, to 
the common people, who are always swayed by the 
imaginary side of politics, it appeals as an exten- 
sion of national prestige. Nothing will arouse 
greater enthusiasm in a popular meeting than an 
assurance that the national flag has been unfurled 
upon a distant island, where, perhaps, unregener- 
ate savagery prevails ; nor, on the other hand, 
can any crime exceed in enormity the act of haul- 
ing down the flag where it has once been raised. 

The moral basis on which expansion is justified 
by its advocates is the claim that large portions of 
the earth's surface are in the hands of nations 
or tribes who are guilty of an under-development 
of their natural resources. As the world becomes 
more and more densely populated, — so runs the 
argument, — the natural wealth of the remoter 
regions must be utilized for the benefit of man- 
kind, and if any nation or tribe, by the use of anti- 
quated methods of production, or by total neglect 
of certain parts of its resources, such as mines or 
forests, stands in the way of this great need, that 
nation or tribe must pass under the political power 
or tutelage of a nation that will draw from the earth 
the utmost quantity of produce. At any rate, the 
world must be policed, so that in every part of it 
investments of capital may be made securely, and 
so that industrial works may be carried on without 
annoyance or molestation from the natives. Few 
nations, however, stop with this demand. Most of 

II 



WORLD POLITICS 

them frankly regard the world as the inheritance of 
the most powerful races, which have a right to re- 
place those that are more barbarous or less well 
endowed with force of mind and character. An 
advocate of radical methods of colonization says, 
" It is an inexorable law of progress that inferior 
races are made for the purpose of serving the 
superior; and if they refuse to serve, they are 
fatally condemned to disappear."^ 

Unhappily, there is considerable danger that 
national expansion, if animated by such principles, 
may lead to dreams of world empire. The seed 
sown by the Romans, from which they themselves 
harvested great power and influence, and from 
which the Germans of the Middle Ages reaped 
both romantic fame and deep sorrow, is still sleep- 
ing in the thought of the modern world, and is 
likely to spring up again unless overweening 
national ambitions are bridled. The fear is often 
expressed that, when the nations shall have appro- 
priated the surface of the earth and shall stand 
fully armed, facing each other, the elemental 
force that compels expansion will not then down, 
but will bring about among the strongest a great 
final struggle for dominion. Often those who 
talk most of peace have an arriere pensde that 

1 William Harvey Brown, On the South Africaft Frontier. Lead- 
ing German historians, like Mommsen, Sybel, Ranke, and Von 
Hoist, uphold the theory that the superior nations have the mission 
to civilize the inferior, if necessary, by force. See Von Hoist, Con- 
stitutional History of the United States, Vol. IH., pp. 269-272; 
also Treitschke, Politik, § 4. 

12 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

through the particular peace which they favor — 
that between France and Russia, for instance — 
their nation may become great enough to impose 
upon the world the pax Roniana} It is paradoxi- 
cal but true that the very accentuation of national- 
ism may lead, and if carried out to its ultimate 
conclusions must inevitably lead, to a revival of 
the Roman idea of imperialism ; so that from out 
the group of struggling nationalities there may 
again arise a leader who will enforce upon the 
world that great peace within which there is no 
progress, but only stagnation. At the present 
time the national state is, indeed, as its advocates 
claim, a necessary condition of progress ; but if it 
shall exaggerate its na.tionalism, it will ultimately 
defeat the very purpose by which its adherents 
justify its existence. 

We should here distinguish between the spirit of 
modern national imperialism and that which ani- 
mated the Roman Empire. The cardinal differ- 
ence between the two is that the ideal of the 
latter was the comprehension of all civilized 
nations under the sway of a world empire, while 
the former recognizes the separate existence of 
national states. Orbis tcrranim and iinperiwn 
were convertible terms to the Romans ; there was 
only one empire, which embraced the world, or 
at least its desirable parts. Separate nationalism 
was not respected ; in the words of Ihering, " The 
spiritual substance of Rome is an acid which, 

^ See Leo Tolstoi, Patriotism and Christianity, Ch. II. 



\y 



WORLD POLITICS 

when brought in contact with the living organ- 
ism of a nationaHty, acts as an irritant and dissolv- 
ent." National imperialism, on the other hand, 
takes as its basis a national state and is not in- 
consistent with respect for the political existence 
of other nationalities ; it endeavors to increase the 
resources of the national state through the absorp- 
tion or exploitation of undeveloped regions and 
inferior races, but does not attempt to impose 
political control upon highly civilized nations. 
Napoleon, indeed, strove to revive the Roman 
form of imperialism, but the rising spirit of na- 
tionalism was too strong for him ; against the 
forces of historical development his genius was 
of no avail. 

The nineteenth century has been an age of 
nationalism. The twentieth is to be the age of 
national imperialism. The treatment of Machia- 
velli at the hands of modern historians and lit- 
erary critics fitly illustrates the pohtical temper 
of the present era. The philosopher and guide 
of the great statesmen who with firm and un- 
scrupulous hand moulded the national state in 
its first beginnings, Machiavelli was thereafter 
long decried as the spokesman of the evil one, an 
advocatus diaboli, even by a Machiavellian of the 
consummate craft of Frederick the Great. Within 
the past century, however, his character as the 
apostle of nationalism has won recognition ; and 
especially in those countries that have been strug- 
gling for a realization of national existence, — 

14 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Germany and Italy, — his fame has risen so high 
that, as a political philosopher, he ranks second 
only to Aristotle.^ His main doctrine — that in 
great historical developments, as at the birth of 
nations, ordinary rules of morality cannot be held 
binding upon a statesman, whose sole duty is to 
secure the existence of a state within which 
morality and civilization can thrive — has again 
become the guiding influence of politics. 

As the founders of nationalistic policy looked to 
Machiavelli as the best exponent of their ambitions 
and methods, so the statesmen of the present re- 
gime of national imperialism could also find many 
lineaments of their political personality mirrored 
in the pages of the great Italian of the Renais- 
sancc.2 When the philosophic optimism of Rous- 
seau and Hegel had passed for the time, real- 
ism and a realistic policy {Realpolitik) came into 
favor. Such ideas as that of a world peace, of 
justice to a hostile nation, of development of civil- 
ization by the united efforts of humanity, were 
looked upon as mirages of optimism. The state 
is founded, not on reason, but on the will, and 
those dark, half-understood forces that sway man- 
kind, expressing themselves in the prejudices 
and customs of nations, are of more importance 

1 Cf. Treitschke's PoHHk, § 3; Lord Acton's introduction to 
Burd's edition of Machiavelli's Prince. 

2 Greenwood, " Machiavelli in Modern Politics," in Cosmopolis, 
August, 1897 ; "The Law of the Beast," Nineteenth Century, Octo- 
ber, 1897; Frederic Harrison, "The Modern Machiavelli," ibidem, 
September, 1897. 

15 



WORLD POLITICS 

to the statesman than are the rational systems of 
philosophers.^ The idea of a serene equilibrium 
maintained unchangeably, a balance of power, 
under which everybody can live in ease and peace, 
has given place to the conception of a great 
struggle among warring forces. A people is no 
longer satisfied with mere security and with a 
moderately wealthy national existence. Only in ex- 
ercising its powers to the utmost, in " living itself 
out," does a nation find satisfaction.^ So, in the 
birth struggle of national imperialism, just as cen- 
turies ago in the birth struggle of nationalism, 
Machiavellian thought and Machiavellian means 
are characteristic of political action. 

We must not in all this attribute to Machiavel- 
lism any narrow meaning. It does not neces- 
sarily imply poison and crude prevarication. Its 
main thought is rather the old Greek concep- 
tion that the state is the ultimate good to which 
everything else is to be sacrificed, since outside of 
the state no civilized existence is possible ; that it 
is the state which protects morality, the civilized 
arts, and all the higher pursuits of man, and that 
only within the state can the family and other 
forms of human association thrive and be pro- 
tected ; that, therefore, with the death or decadence 
of the state, all that makes life endurable is swept 
away. It follows that for the preservation and 

1 Cf. Ferdinand Brunetiere's sneers at the intellectuels in Apres 
ie Proces. 

2 Like the modern man of Ibsen's dramas. 

i6 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

strengthening of this first condition of civilized life 
any means are allowable. This extreme doctrine 
of the state as the ultimate aim of existence recog- 
nizes no mutual duties among the various states. 
On the contrary, according to that view, hostile 
nations face each other with the vicious cruelty 
and cunning of wild beasts. Force rules, manip- 
ulated by art and craft. That force, indeed, 
need not be mere brutality. Everything that 
makes a nation strong, its knowledge, its me- 
chanical skill, its industrial capacity, will con- 
tribute to its force. 

To Machiavellism the philosophers of the mod- 
ern state are prone to superadd a finalism derived 
from Hegel and the theory of evolution. Force, 
with them, is regarded as the index or measure of 
fitness : as the strongest, the most resourceful, sur- 
vive, these must be the true agents of civiHzation 
— through them the human spirit realizes itself.^ 
From the Egyptian to the Greek, from the Greek 
to the Roman, the torch of civilization was passed 
along to be grasped at last by the hand of the 
vigorous Germanic races. To Hegel, it is the 
Prussian state which is the ultimate representative 
of civilization. Other nations argue very logically 
that if civilization has changed its agents in the 
past, it may do so in the time to come. Thus the 
Russians predict the greatness and civilizing mis- 

1 See opinions of eminent historians and philosophers, cited by 
Lord Acton, in his introduction to Burd's edition of Machiavelli's 
Prittce. 

c 17 



WORLD POLITICS 

sion of their northern empire in the not too distant 
future. 

It would be unwise to take too gloomy a view of 
things, but we must notice, unless we allow our- 
selves to be duped by appearances and profes- 
sions, that the methods of Louis XL and Thomas 
Cromwell, of Elizabeth and Richelieu, are again 
used to-day, with only such differences as are occa- 
sioned by the changes of time and circumstance. 
What those monarchs and ministers did to found 
the national state, modern statesmen are doing 
to found the national empire. Of this there is no 
lack of illustration. Thus, the most momentous 
political actions and reprisals are based upon 
claims that would hardly justify more than a 
demand for indemnity. Under the pretext of 
exacting satisfaction for the murder of mission- 
aries, Germany enters the territory of China and 
obtains there a permanent foothold and most 
valuable concessions. Britain, desirous of securing 
its paramount control in Southern Africa, seizes 
upon the pretext of Uitlander grievances to make 
the Boers of the Transvaal acknowledge their 
dependence on the empire, and to interfere in 
the internal organization of their government, 
contrary to the international rules governing the 
relations of the two countries. 

Friendship on the surface too often goes with 
concealed enmity and the employment of under- 
handed, treacherous means. Though Russia, 
France, and England are nominally on terms of 

i8 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

friendship, the former two countries, through their 
governments, recently rendered aid to a movement 
in which the fierce barbarian tribes of the Soudan 
were attempting to overthrow English control along 
the Upper Nile. With similar disregard for ac- 
cepted rules of international conduct, Mr. Rhodes, 
the leader of the imperial policy in South Africa, 
organized a raid for the purpose of gaining polit- 
ical control over a country nominally on the most 
friendly footing with Great Britain. Published 
treaties are supplemented, and often rendered nu- 
gatory, by secret engagements with other powers. 
Thus Germany, nominally the ally of Austria, 
concludes a secret engagement with Russia, sup- 
posedly their common foe. The assurances of 
Russian diplomacy, especially with regard to af- 
fairs in the far Orient, are taken by all diplomats 
to be a mere means of concealing the real inten- 
tion of that povver.^ Even the peace programme 
of Russia, while perhaps emanating from the 
really humanitarian ideals of the Czar, was sup- 
ported by his ministry from very different motives. 
Peace in order to gain strength for the execution 
of ambitious projects in Asia is a very different 
matter from peace for the common benefit of 
humanity. The manner in which the cry of 
" humanity, liberty, and civilization " is abused, is 
another modern instance of Machiavellism. No 
matter how obvious and patent the motive of mere 

^ See Rawlinson, England and Rttssia in the East, p, 317; also 
Krausse, A'ussia in Asia. 

19 



WORLD POLITICS 

material gain may be, the claim that savages are 
to be civilized, and that humanity is to be spread, 
never comes amiss. That the promised civiliza- 
tion often consists in a speedy eradication of the 
savages from the face of the earth must be read 
between the lines. 

The manner in which all considerations are 
subordinated to what is believed to foster the 
greatness and strength of the nation or its peculiar 
interests is very clearly shown by the incidents of 
the Dreyfus trial, and by the fact that a nation 
priding itself on its liberal principles, nevertheless 
concluded an alliance with Russia, and became 
almost frantically enthusiastic at the prospect of 
added strength which that arrangement opened 
up. Even on this side of the Atlantic, reports of 
the suffering of weavers in Saxony and Silesia, 
occasioned by the closing of the American mar- 
kets through protective tariffs, have been received 
with joy and acclamation as a proof of the efficacy 
of a national industrial policy. The older ideas of 
the solidarity of humanity, of universal brother- 
hood, have largely lost their force, and have been 
replaced by a narrow national patriotism. Thus, 
a prominent member of the American Peace Com- 
mission of 1898 stated during the proceedings at 
Paris that "the will of the conqueror is the treaty." 

The utilitarian aspect of national imperialism is 
very clearly stated by Professor Edward Dicey, 
when in the following language he explains his 
position as an expansionist: — 

20 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

" In every part of the world, where British interests are at 
stake, I am in favor of advancing and upholding these inter- 
ests, even at the cost of annexation and at the risk of war. 
The only qualification I admit, is that the country we desire 
to annex or take under our protection, the claims we choose 
to assert, and the cause we decide to espouse, should be cal- 
culated to confer a tangible advantage upon the British 
Empire." ^ 

Using the case of Venezuela as an illustration, 
Professor Dicey expresses the belief that the claims 
of that republic were utterly unjust, and that the 
intervention of the United States was legally and 
morally indefensible ; but that, as the territory in 
question would have been of no material value to 
the British Empire, it was wise not to enforce 
the claim. This really amounts to saying that no 
matter how good the right of a nation may be, it 
is folly to insist upon the enforcement of that right 
unless it will "pay." Or, perhaps, it would be 
more just to state the proposition in this manner : 
The statesmen to whom the welfare of a nation is 
intrusted are not warranted in spending its blood 
and treasure for any merely sentimental, idealistic 
purposes, no matter how inspiring they may 
be ; the aim of statesmanship must always rather 
be to further the real, vital, material interests 
of a people, and only where these can clearly 
be advanced is a sacrifice of national resources 
justifiable. 

^ Edward Dicey, " Peace and War in South Africa," Nineteenth 
Century, September, 1899. 

21 



WORLD POLITICS 

As we glance over the incidents that shed light 
upon the present tendency of politics and seem to 
mark it as narrow and selfish, we are likely to 
overlook the fact that along with the increased 
intensity of rivalry there has come also an honest 
desire to raise the level of competition among 
nations. Most statesmen to-day would rather em- 
ploy honest and humane means ; and just so far 
as they are assured by international agreement 
that other nations are bound to the same condition, 
they will gladly relinquish the use of the instru- 
ments of Machiavellian politics. 

The recent Peace Conference at The Hague has 
marked a stage of real progress in this respect. 
Although the disarmament proposals were from 
the first doomed to failure, because no nation will 
allow its military strength to be limited from with- 
out ; still, there was a real cooperation among 
civilized powers for the better adjustment of in- 
ternational difficulties. The arbitration tribunal 
for which the Conference made provision is by 
many regarded as a merely nugatory institution, 
which may serve to inspire sentimentalists with 
hope, but which can be of no real use in practical 
politics. But it must be remembered that all 
ordered jural relations have had their origin in 
informal arbitration. By the Conference, the sys- 
tem of arbitration has been given a settled form, 
and even though no effective sanction has as yet 
been established, the habitual regularity of inter- 
national relations has certainly been promoted. 

22 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Article 27 of The Hague Convention even allows 
friendly nations to use their moral influence to 
induce neighbors whose interests are conflicting 
to submit to arbitration. How effective this article 
is considered, though it does not provide for ob- 
ligatory arbitration, is evidenced by the strong 
objections which are made to it by the German 
nationalists, who hold that it savors too much of 
gratuitous intervention in the affairs of other 
nations.^ 

Another very important institution created by 
the Convention is the Commission of Inquiry. 
Too often national conflicts are the result of mis- 
understanding. If time be taken to investigate 
and clear up the facts, the difficulties generally 
disappear of themselves. These Commissions of 
Inquiry have been instituted to afford a regular 
means of obtaining light on intricate international 
questions, and their use has been recommended 
to civilized nations in the hope of promoting a 
better understanding among them. 

Of course, from these results to the effective 
establishment of a world peace is a far cry. 
World unity may be approached by either of two 
systems : by federation, gradually growing into 
compact solidarity ; or by unrestricted competition, 
with the final preponderance of one great power, 
which shall absorb and assimilate all the rest. 

^ This is the ground of criticism taken by Professor von Stengel, 
a German member of the Conference, in his public discussions of its 
results. See also his Der ewige Friede. 

23 



WORLD POLITICS 

It is undoubtedly the former ideal for the gradual 
realization of which most men are hoping, but its 
time has not yet come. The world is not, as a 
matter of fact, a community with complete, con- 
scious solidarity of interests and ideals.^ 

It is, however, very doubtful whether political 
world unity is in any case desirable. Our imagi- 
nation instinctively shrinks from the thought of 
a regime of dead uniformity throughout all the 
countries of the globe : whether it be imposed by 
the harsh will of a despotic, conquering race, or 
reached by the gradual assimilation of all nation- 
alities, such a prospect is equally uninviting. We 
should ponder this well before we express a wish 
even for the gradually increased paramountcy of 
our own civilization ; for even that would mean in 
the end a deadening uniformity. 

Far preferable is the present state of interna- 
tional equilibrium, with the intense rivalry among 
peoples that brings out their strongest character- 
istics. Even with its occasional discords, the pres- 
ent general harmony of the concert of nations 
is to be preferred to the dead monotone of 
a world state. Each nationality is in this com- 
petition given an opportunity to develop its 
characteristics freely, and to enrich the general 

1 The procrastination of the Delagoa Bay Arbitration Commission 
has just at present given rise to some doubts as to the efficiency of 
arbitration. The proceedings extended over nine years (1891- 
igcxj). It may, however, be confidently expected that under the 
new organization such delays would be avoided. 

24 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

life of the civilized world with its distinctive 
literature, art, music, and moral ideals. The rapid 
social progress since the Renaissance is certainly 
due in great measure to this rivalry of independent 
nations, constantly invited to self-criticism by the 
successes and failures of their neighbors. At 
present, civilization has the benefit of the constant 
mutual criticisms among nations, by which an 
intelligent and real public opinion of the world is 
created ; in this manner the individual bent of 
a particular nation is restrained from becoming 
exaggerated into a vice or engendering a danger 
to the general welfare. 

The rivalry among nations is sharp, and calls 
for the constant exercise of all their intellectual, 
moral, and physical powers, in order to avoid the 
decadence that would lose them their position in 
the family of nations. So fierce does this struggle 
at times become that to men of pessimistic mood 
a great world warfare seems inevitable within 
the near future. We should, however, avoid the 
temper of mind that constantly engenders suspi- 
cions and exaggerated fears. Thus far, happily, 
no nation has acquired enough preponderance to 
threaten really and effectively the political exis- 
tence of its neighbors. Most of the mutual fear 
and mistrust that mar the harmony of nations 
is founded on misunderstanding. There is, it is 
true, a great danger to civilization in this constant 
misinterpretation of motives ; and it were well if 
people would set about it to study seriously the 

25 



WORLD POLITICS 

political ideals, motives, and aims of other nations, 
rather than seize upon every pretext to scent a 
trace of bitter enmity. Thus, though the expan- 
sion of Russian influence in Asia is undoubtedly a 
serious matter, and may entail very grave conse- 
quences on Western civilization, that gross mis- 
representation of every act, motive, and impulse 
of the northern empire and its government, with 
which we are constantly meeting, tends to obscure 
the clear vision of actual political facts, and at the 
same time is likely to engender deep resentment 
among the Russian people. It is in the interest 
of civilization that nations should watch each other 
carefully, and that they should not permit any 
one power to obtain undue advantages over others ; 
it is equally important that this be done in a spirit 
of mutual understanding and amity, without sow- 
ing the seed of hatred and unending dissensions. 



26 



CHAPTER II 

Political Methods of the New National 
Imperialism 

After these more general considerations, it may 
be in place to review briefly the specific conse- 
quences of the new spirit in world politics, and 
the methods adopted by the various nations to 
meet the new contingencies. 

With the recent developments in imperialism, 
attention has been directed to the great impor- 
tance of sea power. The struggles among the 
continental nations of Europe have to be fought 
out chiefly on land, and therefore huge armaments 
are still considered necessary. When imperialism 
is superadded to nationalism, strong navies also 
become a condition of existence, since they alone 
can protect transoceanic possessions and ward off 
invasion. Among imperial powers holding trans- 
oceanic possessions, naval warfare rather than land 
warfare will, in many cases, be decisive in the 
future, and an empire that does not maintain a 
navy will be shorn of its dependencies, as was 
Spain by the United States. After the middle of 
the present century, the navy was for a time 

27 



WORLD POLITICS 

neglected in England ; but with the growth of 
imperialism since the time of Beaconsfield, there 
has been a remarkable revival of interest in naval 
power. This has been taken as an omen, a por- 
tent, by the continental nations, who follow the 
lead of England as rapidly as they can.^ 

While navies are highly important for the pro- 
tection of colonies and sea-borne commerce, their 
efficiency in attacks upon the mainland coast de- 
fences has diminished. The protection of oceanic 
communication is, therefore, the chief function 
of modern navies. Formerly, navies exerted an 
important influence by attacking the coastwise 
trade of an enemy. Pressure of this sort can 
no longer be exercised to the same extent, since 
railways can now be used to transport merchan- 
dise between the different parts of a national 
realm and neutral ports. Thus, in case of a war 
with a continental nation, the naval position of 
England as an assailant would, in this respect, not 
be so strong as at the beginning of this century. 
However, nations of the first class are no longer 
confined to the mainland of a single continent, 
and hence the importance of navies has been 
increased, while the number of their functions has 
diminished. 

1 The actual increase at present planned and contemplated in 
Russia and Germany will be considered in a later chapter. The 
importance of navies as protective agencies will be realized when 
we consider that at present seventy per cent of the total trade 
between the ten leading nations is sea-borne. 

28 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

The effect on future warfare of this increased 
importance of navies must not be overlooked. 
War will be waged by means of carefully con- 
structed machines, and the importance of engi- 
neering skill and marksmanship is constantly being 
enhanced. Decisive battles will be fought with 
less loss of life, with less suffering, carnage, and 
rapine. At the battle of Santiago, when the 
engines of war had been demolished, the object 
of warfare had been gained, and the victorious 
fleet could devote itself to saving the lives of the 
vanquished. By surrounding himself with a co- 
lossal floating armament, man can exert to the 
utmost his ingenuity and skill. Intellect is pro- 
tected, and the most revolting accessories of war- 
fare are avoided. Ships suffer, while lives are 
spared. The pride which nations take in their 
majestic battleships is, therefore, justifiable, since 
all the industrial and intellectual energies of the 
nation can typify themselves in these instruments. 
Of course, wars of extermination between two 
powers are still possible ; but as conditions will be 
in the next century, a power, after the complete 
destruction of its navy and commerce, may realize 
that further resistance is futile, and thus the terri- 
ble sufferings of land warfare may be avoided. 
To a modern empire, therefore, a strong navy is 
of as great importance as a strong standing army.^ 

1 On account of the compactness of the Russian dominions and 
their geographical situation, the above considerations do not apply 
with the same force to Russia as to other powers. 

29 



WORLD POLITICS 

Navies are by some deemed especially compati- 
ble with democracy, while standing armies are 
always regarded as aristocratic or monarchical 
institutions, — aristocratic, because fostering an 
official military caste ; monarchical, because re- 
quiring the single and permanent headship which 
is best afforded in a strong monarchy.^ The 
social organization favored by a strong army is 
thoroughly opposed to democracy; an artificial 
code of caste honor, special privileges for a 
military aristocracy, subordination of all interests 
to those of the army, are almost inevitable results 
of militarism. 

The navy, on the other hand, cannot exert such 
a deep and immediate influence on the internal 
social and political hfe of the nation. Without 
laying too much stress on the fact that Athens, 
Holland, and Great Britain, the greatest naval 
powers of the ancient and modern world, were 
popular repubhcs, and that no admiral has ever 
overturned his country's hberties, we may justify 
the belief that large navies are safer instruments 
of power for democratic states than standing 
armies, from the very nature and character of the 
two. The navy does not come into such direct 
contact with the life of the people as to influence 
social organization in accordance with its own 
system of official aristocracy and popular subordi- 
nation. Moreover, the life on board a man-of-war, 
among officers and men, is more democratic, has 

1 See Treitschke's Politik, Vol. II., p. 356. 
30 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

more of camaraderie, than is the case in a land 
army. 

In this connection, the growing importance of 
sea communications, protected trade routes, and 
naval stations, claims our attention. Modern im- 
perialism is more vitally interested in commercial 
expansion than in territorial acquisition ; the great 
nations are becoming more and more dependent 
on transoceanic markets. To obtain these and to 
secure their future accessibility and development, 
the trade routes leading to them must be protected; 
and to this end, navies, as well as coaling stations 
and trade entrepots, are indispensable. 

Recent history can be correctly and fully under- 
stood only when read in the light of this necessity 
of safe and uninterrupted communication between 
the older nations and their markets and depen- 
dencies. This consideration has been at the basis 
of the English policy in the Orient and in Africa. 
Constantinople had to be protected from Russian 
encroachment, and Cyprus was virtually annexed, 
in order that the Mediterranean route to India 
might not be menaced ; on the same foundation 
rests the friendship between Great Britain and 
Italy and the occupation of Egypt, whose impor- 
tance as a station on the road to the far East 
Napoleon with the intuition of genius fully realized. 
Even South African politics ^are largely influenced 
by this same consideration. The Transvaal war is 
explained and defended on the ground that Great 
Britain must protect her position at the Cape, the 

31 



WORLD POLITICS 

most important station on the alternative route to 
India, against attacks from the rear, and that for 
that purpose she must extend her dominion as far 
as possible into the interior and break the separatist 
ambition of the Boers. To be sure, it is highly 
doubtful whether the Boers would have contem- 
plated an attack on the British power at the Cape, 
and, even so, whether the price paid in practically 
allowing Russia free hand for the time in Asia is 
not too heavy, even in return for a complete accom- 
plishment of English policy in South Africa. But 
in any event the truth remains, that the whole 
poHticai situation, from Constantinople to the Cape 
of Good Hope, has been influenced by England's 
need of protected communications. 

German imperial policy is also animated by the 
purpose of developing oceanic commerce and ac- 
quiring naval bases for its protection,^ while the 
recent developments of American expansion obtain 
their chief significance from the fact that Cuba, 
Hawaii, and Manila are important stations on 
great oceanic trade routes, — that of the Nicara- 
guan Canal, and that leading to China and India 
from our western coast. 

Coming now to the methods by which national 
expansion is effected, by which, in other words, 
entrance is gained to territory not yet appropriated 
by the great powers, we have to consider in the 
first place the influence of missions. There is a 
measure of truth in the saying that the flag follows 

1 See Part IV,, Ch. IV. 
32 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

the missionary and trade follows the flag, although 
the favorite example cited in Germany, — that 
of the same British ship taking out missionaries 
and cheaply manufactured idols, — may be slightly 
tinctured with international pleasantry. The im- 
portance attributed to this agency by the powers 
is well shown by the struggle between France and 
Germany for the right to protect the Roman 
Catholic missions of the Orient. France has been 
the traditional protector of Catholic Christians in 
the East. This monopoly it has been the constant 
effort of Germany to break down by using all the 
influence which the emperor could bring to bear 
at the Vatican. The emperor has asserted his 
right to the protectorate over certain German 
communities of missionaries. And we all know 
how a protectorate of this nature was utilized in 
China, the emperor demanding reparation for the 
murder of missionaries at Kiao-chow, and making 
the outrage a pretext for gaining a permanent 
foothold in the Celestial Empire. His exertions 
to gain from the Vatican a religious protectorate 
in Palestine and Syria have not been successful, 
but he has nevertheless declared it to be the right 
and the poHcy of the German Empire to protect 
German missionaries wherever found. ^ As the pri- 
ority of appearance of a nation on unappropriated 

^ See an article on " La Politique Allemande et le Protectorat des 
Missions Catholiques," Revue des Deux Mondes, September, 1898. 
Also Etienne Lamy, " La France du Levant," ibid., January, 1899. 
See further treatment in Part IV., Ch. IL 



WORLD POLITICS 

soil is of great importance under the doctrine of 
preoccupation, the emissaries of religion who begin 
the civilizing process are, under the present ex- 
aggerated conditions of competition, most valuable 
advance pickets of national expansion. 

The connection between expansion and com- 
merce has next to be considered. There has been 
much heated controversy as to the relation be- 
tween commerce and political protection. Does 
commerce really follow the flag .-' It is indeed true 
that the EngHsh have lost commerce relatively and 
even absolutely in a number of their possessions 
and protectorates, including Canada, Egypt, and 
even India, while Germany, without any political 
standing in these regions, is everywhere gaining 
heavily. 1 At the present time, when many nations 
are competing for the world's trade, it is not so 
easy as it formerly was to render a new colony 
commercially dependent. Thus, British trade is 
still most prominent in the older British colonies, 
and in possessions where it has long been estab- 
lished, as in India, Australia, and the Cape of Good 
Hope. The persistence of British- Australian trade 
relations is attributable to the fact that Australia 
was settled by true English colonists, who naturally 
continue to supply themselves with the manufac- 
tures of their mother country. The element of 
mutual needs, coupled with that of similarity of 

1 See Farrer, "Does Trade follow the Flag?" Contemporary Re- 
view, December, 1898; Von Brandt, " Indien," Deutsche Rundschau, 
August, 1899. 

34 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

tastes and habits, which characterizes the relations 
between manufacturing England and her agricul- 
tural colonies, is the most natural cause for perma- 
nent trade relations. As long as this mutual 
helpfulness continues, it will be difficult to divert 
trade from these channels. 

In Canada, the element of geographical situa- 
tion becomes prominent, that country taking only 
thirty-three per cent of its imports from the mother 
country, while Australia takes seventy-one per cent. 
The influence of geographical situation is also seen 
in the predominance of American trade in Cuba, 
and in the great volume of commerce transacted 
between Algiers and France. Naturally, with 
increasing facility of communication, the factor 
of geographical situation becomes steadily less 
important. 

It is also necessary to consider the mechanism 
of trade, — banking relations and the merchant 
marine. The conquest of South American trade 
by British and German merchants has been due 
entirely to these instrumentalities. Geographically 
and poHtically the United States would seem to 
have a decided advantage in the competition for 
this trade, but there are no direct banking relations 
and very few direct sea communications between 
North and South America. The old world, on 
the other hand, has established such means of 
commercial intercourse with the Latin republics, 
and an ascendency has thus been created which 
can only be replaced by the fostering of similar 

35 



WORLD POLITICS 

institutions to connect the various parts of the 
Western continent. 

The great strides which German commerce has 
made in the last two decades afford sufficient proof 
that commerce and industry can flourish in foreign 
lands without territorial annexation. The German 
merchants of South America have even been 
favored by the very fact of their abstention from 
politics. When we consider the other elements, — 
racial affinity, long-established trade connections, 
geographical situation, and efficient financial and 
transportational communications, — the bare fact 
of political supremacy seems to afford very little 
aid in the effectual or permanent fostering of com- 
mercial relations. 

The one advantage which political control clearly 
bestows upon its holder is a financial influence, by 
means of which many of the large contracts for 
internal improvements may be thrown into the 
hands of citizens of the controlling power. France 
has made the effort to use her political influence 
for this purpose in Indo-China,i but it will hardly 
be claimed that the vast amount of treasure 
which has been spent in acquiring and maintain- 
ing that control has as yet been justified by an 
adequate return. It is, therefore, very question- 
able whether a nation incurring large colonial 
expenditures can reasonably cherish the hope of 
reimbursing itself or its citizens by the exploitation 
of inland resources in backward colonies. 

1 See Part II., Ch. III. 
3^ 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

As affecting the true importance of the question 
just discussed, we must also consider the small vol- 
ume of the total colonial trade as compared 
with the commerce among independent nations. 
The highly civilized countries of Europe and 
America offer far better markets to each other 
than could ever be expected of the colonies. 
Great Britain is a specially rich and favorable 
market to the other nations; they would, there- 
fore, be involved in the suffering, should that 
empire, a marvellous political and economic organ- 
ism, be destroyed. Great Britain alone buys as 
much of Russia as do all the other leading conti- 
nental powers taken together. As to colonial 
trade, it has been computed that it amounts to 
only 9.5 per cent of the total exports and 11.6 
per cent of the total imports of all the commercial 
nations.^ 

When Great Britain was alone in the field of 
colonization and colonial commerce, it was quite 
true that trade followed the flag ; but with the 
growing competition, matters have changed : hence 
the free-trade principles of England, under which 
the whole British Empire has been so liberally 
thrown open to the world's commerce, have re- 
cently found many opponents at home. These 
protectionists point with apprehension to the pol- 
icy of Russia and France, who, as soon as they 
acquire new territories, erect about them a pro- 

1 See Flux, " The Flag and Trade," in the Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, September, 1 899. 

37 



WORLD POLITICS 

tective wall in the hope of exploiting them for the 
exclusive benefit of the home country. From this 
they argue that England must in self-defence 
adopt similar measures. It cannot be denied that 
a growth of protectionist feeling and policy is 
going hand in hand with the growth of imperial- 
ism. Germany and the United States are intensely 
protectionist at home, and there will of course be 
the strongest pressure brought to bear by the 
protected interests to induce them to extend 
these principles to their colonial possessions. In 
England herself, the stronghold of " Manchestri- 
anism," it is not unlikely that modifications will be 
made, which, to use the language of Chamberlain, 
"do not comport with old free-trade doctrines." 
In the last few decades the policy of England 
toward her self-governing colonies has been to 
allow them complete freedom of fiscal and rev- 
enue arrangements, and to grant to all countries 
the same treatment in these dependencies which 
she herself enjoys. In her protectionist colonies 
the mother country has paid the duties without ask- 
ing any favor on account of her position. This 
unusual liberality was guaranteed by the most 
favored nation clauses in the German and Belgian 
treaties with England. ^ In 1897 Canada, whose 
overtures for closer commercial relations with the 

1 The Belgian treaty of 1862, the German ZoUverein treaty 
of 1865. Article 5 of the latter declares that "any favor, privilege, 
or reduction in the tariff of duties which either of the contracting 
parties may concede to any third power, shall be extended immedi- 

38 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

United States had not received sufficient en- 
couragement, desired to give the mother country 
preferential treatment, and here it was that the 
traditional policy of England was for the first 
time abandoned. In 1898 the treaties with Ger- 
many and Belgium were rescinded, and the way 
was thus cleared for a preferential tariff in favor 
of Great Britain, which was soon passed by the 
Canadian Parliament.^ This is the first step 
toward the realization of Mr. Chamberlain's pro- 
ject of a great British Zollvcrcin, within which 
products are to be freely exchanged, but which is 
to be walled off from the outside world by pro- 
tective duties.^ 

The danger threatened in this growth of pro- 
tectionist sentiment is that of cutting up the world 
into a number of mutually exclusive spheres, 
making trade national, and accentuating still 
further the excessive antagonisms between various 
countries. It cannot be expected of Great Britain 
that she alone, of all powers, shall keep her pos- 

ately and ifnconclitionally to the other." Article 7 excludes dis- 
crimination in favor of the mother country by the British colonies 
as against the Zollvereiit. 

^ The preferential rates in favor of Great Britain, India, and 
New South Wales, are 25 per cent lovi^er than the general rates. 

2 He first definitely outlined his policy in a speech before the Con- 
gress of the Chambers of Commerce of the empire, on June 8, 
1896. Free trade is to be adopted throughout the empire, but the 
individual parts are to be left free to impose duties on foreign im- 
ports. Great Britain herself is to lay a tariff on agricultural pro- 
ducts, so as to favor her colonies against the rest of the world. 

39 



WORLD POLITICS 

sessions open to all the world, and at the same 
time submit to exclusion by hostile tariffs from the 
markets of Russia, Germany, France, and the 
United States. Russia and France are completely 
committed to an exclusive commercial policy. It 
remains then for the other three nations to main- 
tain in their new protectorates the policy of equal 
opportunity for all civilized nations. If the ex- 
pansion of trade, naturally cosmopolitan, is to be 
interfered with for the purpose of building up 
mutually exclusive national empires, commerce 
and industry will have to pay the cost of expan- 
sion, and the growth of the world's wealth will 
be infinitely retarded. 

Commercial intercourse with remote regions of 
the globe leads naturally to industrial undertak- 
ings, to the fostering of waterways, to the building 
of railways, to the mining of coal and metals, 
and finally to manufacturing enterprises. 

Within the last two decades there has been a 
radical change in English economic life. Up to 
the eighties, the tendency was to make England 
the industrial centre of the world. English manu- 
facturers, English workmen, and English exports 
were the chief consideration. But when English 
industry had been developed to its utmost capacity, 
and when inviting foreign fields beckoned the in- 
vestor. Great Britain had to become more and 
more capitalistic rather than industrial. Since 
hostile tariffs were keeping out from the American 
market the goods of England, the overflowing 

40 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

capital of that country founded huge manufactur- 
ing establishments in the " States," where the 
protected articles are now manufactured. So, 
too, in Asia, Africa, South America, — wher- 
ever natural wealth is waiting for develop- 
ment, — the British investor has been at hand. 
Vast returns are received by England in the 
form of dividends. The balance of trade is 
constantly against England, but almost one-third 
of the imports which she receives consists of re- 
turns on capital invested abroad and in the colonies. 
Hence has arisen the more modern conception of 
England as a financial centre from which the in- 
dustrial operations of the whole world are to be 
conducted, from which capital is to flow, and to 
which produce is to return again, — the concep- 
tion of another and a better Rome, drawing its 
sustenance from distant provinces.^ 

It is this development that causes the demand 
for policing the world. Governments in many parts 
of the world are too unstable, too corrupt, to admit 
of safe investments being made under them. Civil 
courts in these backward lands are often ruled by 
favoritism or bribery, so that the property of a 
foreigner is not secure. From this naturally 
arises the demand that stable, responsible govern- 

1 A development of economic life, similar to that above traced, 
is also going on, though on a smaller scale, in France and Germany. 
According to a report issued by the German government in March, 
1900, German capitalists have invested 7,500,000,000 marks in over- 
sea manufactures, trade, and agriculture. 

41 



WORLD POLITICS 

ment be established so as to make possible the 
development of resources, even against the will of 
the inhabitants, where they stubbornly oppose all 
industrial progress. 

In this way, the real needs of the expanding 
human race are united with the self-interest of 
capitalism to form a lever for expansion. Though 
true, it is a one-sided view that imperialism is the 
selfish policy of capital. Did it not represent the 
real demands of the human race, which is increas- 
ingly in want of available sources of sustenance, 
imperialism could not have become the force it is 
in modern politics. It is often difficult to distin- 
guish the narrow selfishness of individuals, craving 
fields of exploitation, from the real demands of 
human progress ; at all events, we must beware of 
a too easy optimism which forgets that often a 
harsh and cruel struggle for existence is really 
going on between superior races and the stubborn 
aborigines. 

The seriousness and sadness of this struggle 
cannot be hidden under optimistic cant. Even 
those who, like Miss Kingsley,i are most friendly 
to the savages, hold that they cannot be civilized 
according to European standards. There are but 
few who, like Robert Louis Stevenson,^ appreci- 
ate the real virtues of these humble members of 
the human family, sympathize with their inner 
life, and find there things as worthy of love as are 

1 Mary H. Kingsley, IVes^ African Studies, London, 1899. 

2 Robert Louis Stevenson, Vailiina Letters. 

42 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

the more vaunted virtues of a higher civilization. 
The men who, as civilization pushes forward its 
outposts, come in contact with the savages, usually 
have no ability or desire to understand them. Cruel 
methods of conquest and subjection are pursued, 
and most of these races would be happier if they 
had never seen their civilizers.^ It is well, then, to 
look the facts clearly in the face and to recognize 
that it is a serious and sad duty which the white 
race is performing in making way for its own fur- 
ther expansion. The white man has burden 
enough of his own to carry, and too often his 
interference makes the existence of the inferior 
races yet more toilsome and weary.^ 

The mere supplying of capital, however, is only 
the first stage of industrial expansion. In many 
regions, there is no local material which can be 
utilized in building up the managing personnel, 
and works have, therefore, to be constructed and 
industries organized by Europeans. Adherents of 
modern national imperialism urge it as a duty which 

1 Bryce, Impressions of South Africa ; as to forced labor, p. 370. 
Isabelle Massieu, on Burma and the Shan States, in the Revue des 
Deux Mondes, for 1899. 

2 Discussions in the German Reichstag have brought out many 
instances of great cruelty against natives on the part of colonial 
officials. Herr Bebel, a socialist deputy, has repeatedly called the 
attention of the government to such outrages, notably in the case 
of Dr. Carl Peters, the noted explorer, and of a certain Prince of 
Arenberg, both of whom were guilty of gross cruelty and wanton 
disregard of life in the African colonies. Mutate coelo mores mu- 
tantur. Men often change their moral principles with the climate. 
See ^ifzV/i^A?^ Debates, February, 1900. 

43 



WORLD POLITICS 

capitalists owe to their country not to furnish means 
for the construction of works by alien entrepre- 
neurs, but to use all the resources at their disposal 
for industries organized by their own countrymen. 
" High finance " {la haute finance) itself is thus be- 
coming nationalized. Cosmopolitan as it essen- 
tially is, it has nevertheless been made the servant 
of patriotic ambitions. The "high finance" of 
Germany originally invested in foreign state paper 
and railway bonds. Thus Servia became one of 
the greatest debtors of Germany, borrowing money 
to be used in industries marshalled by Belgians 
and Frenchmen. The Germans received only the 
interest on their bonds; the others, all the industrial 
and economic advantages connected with the con- 
struction of extensive public works. Governor von 
Wissmann declared that the non-participation of 
German capital was a chief hindrance to the 
development of German East Africa. After hav- 
ing been backward so long, German capital has 
suddenly changed its policy, and is now rivalling 
Great Britain in the direct development of trans- 
oceanic industry. German mining enterprises and 
factories are becoming common in China and in 
Asia Minor. South America counts three great 
German banks with a capital of over two mil- 
lion dollars each, besides numerous lesser banking 
firms, through whose instrumentahty commercial 
relations with Germany are facilitated and vast 
industrial undertakings are marshalled. 

In their bearing upon political power, the most 
44 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

important industrial undertakings are railways ; 
and for this reason railway concessions are most 
eagerly sought after and defended, even when 
their industrial value is not immediately apparent. 
In the first place, railways are necessary for the 
purpose of developing concessions in mining and 
forestry. The government that controls the rail- 
ways not only determines the opening of these 
resources, but also directs the entire intercourse 
of adjacent regions. 

This industrial control very readily passes into 
political control when disturbances of any kind 
occur. The political character of railways is per- 
haps most apparent in Manchuria, where the 
Russian army of occupation, now permanently 
stationed in that province, was brought in under 
the pretext of protecting and policing the Rus- 
sian railway leading to Port Arthur. But while 
this is the most striking example of the political 
use of railway concessions, very significant in- 
stances may be found elsewhere. Thus, in order 
to strengthen her hold on India, as well as to 
secure a paramount position in the states along 
the Persian Gulf, and also to counterpoise the ad- 
vantages derived by Russia from its Siberian rail- 
way. Great Britain has been planning a railway 
from Alexandria to Shanghai, which, following 
along the Gulf of Persia, is to pass through India 
and down the Yangtse Valley in China. The 
Indian railway system, comprising about two thou- 
sand miles already constructed, would be used as a 

45 



WORLD POLITICS 

part of this transcontinental line,^ which, however, 
Russian influence may seriously interfere with. 

The railways of Asia Minor and Syria are being 
constructed by German and French capital. The 
British railway plans for that region have been, 
at least temporarily, abandoned on account of the 
advantageous position at present held by German 
diplomacy in matters concerning Asia Minor. 
There are further railway undertakings planned 
in the Chinese Empire, some of which are already 
in the course of execution.^ Canton is to be con- 
nected with Peking by a trunk line. The north- 
ern portion of this concession, from Peking to 
Hankow, is in the hands of a Belgian syndicate, 
which is backed by Russian and French capital. 
The fact that this concession enters into the very 
heart of the Yangtse region may lead to serious 
political complications in case the Russian and 
French connection with the undertaking is kept 
up. The southern portion of the same line, lead- 
ing from Hankow to Canton and commercially 
more important than the northern section, is to be 
constructed by a syndicate which was originally 
American, but which is now also supported by 
British influence and capital. 

The political importance of railways in China 
was recognized by Germany when that country 
opposed the concession to the Anglo-American 

1 Cf. C. A. Moreing, " An All-British Railroad to China," Nine- 
teenth Century, September, 1899. 

2 Fur a fuller account of these, see Part IT., Ch. II. 

46 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

syndicate of the right to build a railway from 
Tientsin to Chingkiang across the province of 
Shantung. The compromise which was finally 
concluded with Great Britain in this matter ac- 
knowledges British control of industrial under- 
takings in the Yangtse region, while reserving to 
Germany the entire field within Shantung. That 
the politics of China are the politics of railways is 
a statement as extreme as it is epigrammatic, but 
it contains more than a grain of truth.^ 

Industrial undertakings of the kind just dis- 
cussed naturally lead to colonization. Whenever 
capital is applied on a nationalistic basis, the entre- 
preneurs and managers, the engineers and foremen, 
who undertake the development of resources, will 
belong to the same nation and will form an indus- 
trial settlement. It is becoming an article of 
nationalistic faith that the capitalists of a nation 
shall give preference to engineers and master 
workmen belonging also to that nation. This is 
the type of colonization especially fostered by Ger- 
many. The industrial colonization of Asia Minor 
and of South America is assuming very considera- 
ble proportions. Colonization by agricultural set- 
tlements is also at times encouraged, especially 
when it is probable that the colonists can be kept 
together and retained in allegiance to their mother 
country. 

1 Valentine Chirol, The Far Eastern Question, London, 1896. 



47 



CHAPTER III 

The Great Powers as Colonizers 

In considering the principal powers as colo- 
nizers, there appears a vast diversity of methods 
and ideas. Russian colonization has been almost 
entirely agricultural. In past centuries, spreading 
gradually from Little Russia over the plains and 
steppes to the north and east, Russian population 
advanced with an avalanche-like motion which 
continued even when the boundary of Asia was 
reached. And to-day, though the political methods 
of Russia have become more consciously system- 
atic, agricultural colonization is still the keystone 
of her expansion. Intensive farming has never 
been common in Russia, and vast tracts of new soil 
are therefore necessary to sustain the constantly 
expanding population. As the way to the west 
was barred by Germans, Poles, and Hungarians, 
the star of Russian empire has constantly moved 
toward the rising sun. 

In its latest phases, the character of Russian colo- 
nization has undergone significant changes. The 
original occupation of Central Asia by Russia was 

48 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

largely military in method, a fact due to the initia- 
tive and ambition of military officers stationed in 
that country. Thus, under the veil of punitive 
expeditions, tribe after tribe of the natives was con- 
quered and subdued, and a firm military adminis- 
tration introduced. The methods pursued by the 
Russians in these regions were at first harsh and 
relentless. By striking memorable blows, they 
terrified the population and deprived the people of 
their leaders. After these first steps, however, they 
adopted more suave methods. The surviving 
leaders they endowed with official appointments, 
and took them to the West to admire the power and 
splendor of the Czar. Russian industry and com- 
merce were gradually introduced and tracts of land 
hitherto unoccupied were settled by Russian colo- 
nists. There was no attempt to introduce religious 
uniformity by state action ; in Asia the empire has 
shown itself tolerant toward all beliefs. The nat- 
ural affability of Russian character was given an 
opportunity to bear fruit in the establishment of 
closer relations and a better understanding with 
the natives.^ 

Of all European powers, Russia is in some 
respects the most successful as a colonizer in Asia. 
Herself semi-Oriental, she is not so far above the 
various tribes of the Asiatic plains as to misunder- 
stand them. The Russians have an insinuating 
manner and great tact in diplomatic intercourse, 
and at the same time a political system the splen- 

^ See Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 
E 49 



WORLD POLITICS 

dor and concentrated majesty of which impress 
the Oriental mind far more than do the simple 
business methods of the Briton. They know when 
to use corruption, when to use force, and when to 
soothe with honors and decorations. Above all, 
their military and administrative officers fraternize 
with the leaders of the conquered peoples, and a 
feeling of solidarity between conquered and con- 
querors is the result. Indeed, many writers seri- 
ously question whether any other power can be 
permanently successful as a colonizer in Asia, 
when opposed by the craft and ability of Russia. 
Her perfect mastery of Oriental diplomacy, her 
ability to manage the most refractory materials, 
is proved by her recent unforeseen successes at 
Peking. It is by combining strength of purpose, 
irresistible will, and the show of great force, with 
the milder methods of corruption and official blan- 
dishment, that Russia is so successful in the Orient. 
Germany, though a great colonizer, has not thus 
far been prominent in the establishment of politi- 
cal dependencies, as up to the present decade most 
of her colonists have been lost to the nation. Going 
chiefly to North America, they have rapidly be- 
come Americanized, and even though they may 
continue to cherish German culture and literature, 
they have changed their political allegiance com- 
pletely. Like the Russians, the Germans have 
been very successful as agricultural colonists. In 
many portions of the United States, they have re- 
placed the Anglo-Americans and the Irish in the 

50 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

farming industry. Like the Dutch colonists in 
South Africa, the Germans are content to settle 
in a wilderness in the hope of turning it into an in- 
viting abode and making it their permanent home. 
They shun no hardships ; their regularity of work 
and their endurance assure them permanent success 
as agriculturists. 

In our day, Germany is making great efforts to 
retain the political allegiance of the many colonists 
who leave her borders ; she now endeavors to 
direct immigration to her own colonies and to Asia 
Minor, parts of which she hopes by ultimate polit- 
ical occupation to save for the German Empire. 
German agricultural and industrial colonies are 
also common in Brazil, in the Argentine Republic, 
and in Chile. In this connection, too, our attention 
may well be turned for a moment to the fact that 
the Germans have within the last decades developed 
remarkable ability as traders. The highly trained 
German clerks are to-day the admiration of the 
commercial world, and the German merchant 
colonies in places like Hongkong and Rio de 
Janeiro are rapidly gaining on the supremacy so 
long held by British commerce.^ 

In the political colonies and protectorates which 
Germany has estabhshed in East Africa and in the 
Cameroons, as well as in the Pacific Islands, 
real colonization has been slow to take root, be- 
cause, in addition to the disadvantageous climate, 

^ Cf. A. Bellessort, " Villes d'Extreme-Orient," Revue des Deux 
Mondes, July, 1899. 

51 



WORLD POLITICS 

the German administrative restrictions are unfavor- 
able. The governmental bureaucracy of Germany, 
not being so flexible and adaptive in its modes of 
procedure as are the commercial classes, tries to 
apply to new settlements in the wilderness the 
methods of the Prussian police sergeant, with the 
result of so hampering the movements and activi- 
ties of colonists that many prefer to settle in non- 
German territory. 

The colonies of France cover a vast territory, 
although large tracts of it are practically worthless. 
For various reasons the French are not good colo- 
nizers. In the first place, it may be noted that 
there is no over-population in France forcing fam- 
ilies to seek sustenance in foreign countries. Most 
important of all, perhaps, as a cause of failure in 
colonization is the fact that to Frenchmen the life of 
their home is too attractive to permit a thought of 
permanent residence elsewhere. As recent French 
writers have emphasized, there is too much attach- 
ment to the settled conditions of a civilized country, 
too little spirit of enterprise.^ Young men are sat- 
isfied with a moderate income from an official 
position which enables them to enjoy the advan- 
tages of social life in the mother country. Again, 
the equal distribution of family property among 
children deprives France of the large class of pen- 
niless but venturesome younger sons who carry 
on so much of the imperial work of Great Britain.^ 

1 Demolins, A qtioi Tient la Superiorite des Anglo-Saxons? 

2 Beaussire, Principes du Droit, p. 269. 

52 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

It is therefore remarked by all, that in French col- 
onies very few Frenchmen, outside of the official 
hierarchy, are to be found. Indeed, during the 
present century there has been very little true col- 
onization by Frenchmen in foreign lands. The 
French colonies in Canada, Louisiana, and South 
America have not been reinforced by accessions 
from the home country. Even in Algeria, which 
by its geographical situation is almost a province 
of France itself, there are only 318,000 French- 
men against 446,300 subjects of other states.^ 
The gospel of colonization preached by M. Jules 
Lemaitre has borne little fruit. 

On account of the rigid and illiberal colonial 
system introduced by the French bureaucracy, 
French colonies have very little attraction for for- 
eigners, who wish to be free from constant irrita- 
tion and interference by the administration. The 
French colonies, therefore, have been an expen- 
sive luxury, and they have not become a field for 
investment and industrial exploration to the same 
extent as have the colonies of other nations. By 
discouraging her colonies from entering into com- 
mercial and industrial relations with any but the 
mother country, France is really excluding from 
them the capital and men that alone could make 
them profitable. 

^ Figures from the Slatesman^s Year' Book, for 1899. Louis 
Bertrand's novel, Le Sang des Races, which portrays life in the 
Algiers of to-day, treats of Arabs, Spaniards, Englishmen, and Ger- 
mans, but not of Frenchmen. 

53 



WORLD POLITICS 

It may be well in this place to call attention to 
the remarkable success achieved by the Dutch in 
their government of Java.^ In the present period 
of great territorial expansion, we are likely to over- 
look the more modest colonial establishments of a 
country from which its mightier neighbors might 
learn many a lesson in colonial administration. 
The Dutch are free, on the one hand, from the 
rigid officialism and the formal routine which em- 
barrasses their continental neighbors ; and on the 
other, from the overbearing behavior {Hoogmoe- 
digkeit) that characterizes the English in their 
intercourse with other nations. The Dutch, there- 
fore, win the affection of their subject races, 
although by no means indiscriminately fraterniz- 
ing with them. Their flexible methods enable 
them to take account and make use of all the local 
native social institutions for the purposes of good 
government. By allowing the tribes to observe 
their traditional customs and by maintaining native 
dignitaries, the Dutch govern with very little fric- 
tion, retain the confidence and love of their 
subjects, and are enabled to exert far greater in- 
fluence than the use of harsher methods would 
permit. For the judicious management of native 
populations, and for the moulding of native institu- 
tions to the ends of a more enlightened policy, 
the Dutch colonial administration may serve as a 
model. Where, by untoward circumstances, the 

1 Alleyne Ireland, T7-opical Colonization, the chapter on " Forms 
of Government " ; Money, Java ; or How to Alanage a Colony. 

54 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Dutch have been compelled to use force and harsh 
measures, they have encountered great, almost in- 
superable, obstacles on the part of the Malay 
population ; such is the case in Acheen, where 
they have been warring unsuccessfully against 
revolt for almost twenty-five years.^ 

Compared with the colonizing methods of the 
other great powers, the English manner of action 
in regard to colonization is notable for its lack 
of rigid system. Sir George Goldie's advice to 
Americans, " In colonization there must be no 
precedents," is the first rule. More than any 
other nation, the English give free rein to the 
initiative of trusted individuals, and avoid em- 
barrassing their representatives with detailed in- 
structions, which would act as a brake on original 
enterprise. The home government uses its knowl- 
edge to warn its servants against dangerous 
measures of policy rather than to bind them to 
a settled system of action by minute anticipative 
directions. As a result, the financial confusion 
and general economic distress which had reigned 
in Egypt was in fifteen years, by the efforts of 
Lord Cromer, turned into marvellous prosperity 
and flourishing credit, and in the same manner 
a valuable industrial organization has been created 
in the forbidding Niger region, through the ef- 
forts of Sir George Goldie. Few administrative 
restrictions, equitable enforcement of a simple 

1 Hugh Clifford, " A Lesson from the Malay States," Atlantic 
Monthly, November, 1899. 

55 



WORLD POLITICS 

law, equal opportunities to all, unlimited trust 
in tried and proved character, — these are the 
principles which have made England the most 
successful colonizing nation of to-day, and which 
have constantly attracted to regions under her 
control the most enterprising and able coloniz- 
ing material. To her colonies flock the men who 
seek a free field for the development of their 
energies and capacities, and who at the same time 
desire an administration uninfluenced by the ordi- 
nary Oriental methods of corruption and favoritism. 
The motley gathering of races at Hongkong, — 
all of them thriving and carrying on prosperous 
business under English protection, — is perhaps 
the most remarkable instance of English suc- 
cess.^ 

In purely agricultural colonization, as small 
farmers, the English have not been so successful 
as have the Germans and Boers. Englishmen, it 
is true, own great ranches in Mexico, in South 
America, and in Africa, but the small homestead 
farms in these regions, so far as they are not the 
property of natives, are largely in the hands of 
others than the British. This condition lies at 
the centre of the South African controversy. The 
Boers, the small farmers of the region, naturally 
fear that by English enterprise and managerial 
genius, and by modern methods, they are to be 
forced out of their free and independent existence 
and into a more highly organized social system in 

^ See Bellessort, article cited above. 
56 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

which the special capacities of the English are 
bound to carry the day. 

In organizing and executing great industrial 
undertakings, such as railways, mines, and facto- 
ries, in arranging for commercial communication 
between various nations, and in buying up the 
produce of colonies and exchanging it for articles 
of European manufacture, the English are still the 
leading nation, though Germany and the United 
States are rapidly coming to rival their position. 



57 



CHAPTER IV 

The Connection between Colonization and 
Imperialism 

The connection between colonization and impe- 
rialism is intimate, although the two are by no 
means identical. Germany, for instance, as has 
been said, sent millions of emigrants to the new 
world before she thought of utilizing colonization 
for empire. With the present increase of interna- 
tional competition, efforts to produce such identity 
by using colonization as a means for the extension 
of political dominion are constantly made. Coloni- 
zation is now consciously directed toward the forma- 
tion of immediate or prospective possessions and 
protectorates for the mother country. Wherever 
industrial or agricultural colonies are formed, the 
mother country has already obtained a foothold. 
It is a characteristic mark of the new national im- 
periaUsm that the duty of protecting citizens wher- 
ever they may be is more emphatically asserted and 
more broadly interpreted to-day than ever before. 

The South African controversy affords a strik- 
ing illustration of this mode of action. When the 
Boers had " trekked " to their present home beyond 
the Vaal, they thought that they had found for 

58 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

themselves a home far enough from the influence 
of European powers to be secure from further 
interference. They tilled their soil faithfully, and 
adhered fondly to the customs of their fathers. 
Unfortunately for them, however, rich gold fields 
were discovered, which brought in a vast and con- 
glomerate population, among whom the British 
formed the chief element. The Boers, clinging 
tenaciously to their political rights, believed that 
they, the first and permanent settlers, were entitled 
to keep the actual control out of the hands of the 
transient population of the Rand country. But 
they counted without the protecting mother coun- 
try. The English Uitlanders, making the some- 
what paradoxical claim that the mother country 
should help them to become citizens of another 
state, called aloud for protection, and thus fur- 
nished the English government a welcome occa- 
sion for interference in the internal affairs of the 
Transvaal. Advocates of interference may urge 
that the Transvaal was never independent. But 
its independence in internal matters was solemnly 
assured in the two conventions of 1881 and 1884, 
and the suzerainty retained by Great Britain in 
the first convention must be interpreted with 
reference to the suzerain right explicitly reserved, 
namely, the right to give or refuse consent to 
foreign treaties.^ 

1 Mr. Chamberlain himself said in 1896, "We have recognized 
the South African Republic as a free and independent state as 
regards all its internal affairs not reached by that convention." 

59 



WORLD POLITICS 

German industrial and agricultural colonies are 
now being founded in Asia Minor and in South 
America, and the emperor has taken occasion to 
announce most ostentatiously that German citizens 
wherever found shall be assured of the protection 
of the German Empire. Should any of these colo- 
nies be disturbed by the neighboring population, 
or be aggrieved in any way by the political or 
civil legislation of the state within which it is 
founded, a plausible case for interference could 
very easily be made out; and if political conditions 
should be favorable, the emperor would not be 
slow in fulfilling his " moral duty " of protection. ^ 

The most radical method of imperial expansion 
is that of directly seizing territory or the control 
or protection thereof, without waiting for the nor- 
mal expansion of trade, industry, and colonization. 
The degree of control exercised over territory thus 
obtained varies from the diplomatic, veiled pro- 
tectorate exercised by England in Egypt and the 
imaginary " spheres of influence " delimited in 
China, through a long range of variations, to com- 
plete and direct government as exercised in the 
English crown colonies. The term sphere of 
influence or sphere of interest, has been given 
an extended meaning by recent developments. 

1 The emperor's words in a speech of the 1 8th of January, 1896, 
are to the effect that the German Empire has become a world em- 
pire; and that wherever Germans abroad are injured or in danger, 
formal constitutional and public law objections cannot hold against 
the right of intervention on the part of the German Empire. 

60 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Formerly, it was used to signify a region wherein 
a nation, through its citizens, had acquired com- 
mercial or industrial interests without having 
serted any political protectorate or suzerainty. 
To-day, as used in China and elsewhere, the term 
applies rather to a region preempted for further 
exploitation and possibly for political control. 
Thus in modern expansion the growth of interests 
is anticipated and provided for by the reservation 
of suitable territory and the exclusion therefrom 
of other political influences. 

Carried to an extreme, this policy of reserving 
spheres of influence must be very dangerous to 
the world's peace. It encourages a habit of look- 
ing upon the whole world as available territory for 
partition among civilized powers, and stimulates 
national ambitions unduly and unnaturally. The 
older method of advance by the gradual expansion 
of commerce and industry was far more natural 
and less liable to abuse, because under it any 
nation, before entering upon new territory, must 
prove by economic services, already rendered, its 
ability to benefit that region and its inhabitants ; 
while to-day a country like Russia, having as yet 
no important commercial or industrial relations 
with China, by mere dint of force and shrewd 
diplomacy, establishes a claim to a vast portion of 
that empire for future exploitation. 

The field of imperial expansion is one in which 
the relative influence of private individual initiative 
and unconscious social activity on human develop- 

6i 



WORLD POLITICS 

ment can be profitably studied. The question as 
to which is the more important element in human 
progress can perhaps not be settled definitely and 
ultimately, since social activity always includes that 
of individuals, and the respective value and effi- 
ciency of the two agencies is not easily determined. 
It is possible, however, in certain historic develop- 
ments to distinguish with considerable precision 
between these two factors. There is still a further 
mode of action, — conscious social and political 
activity, — which has become increasingly promi- 
nent in recent times, when states and governments 
systematically through decades plan a regular ad- 
vance and carefully adjust all their actions with a 
view to the gradual extension of their domiinion. 

Russia's advance to the East in former centuries, 
which has already been mentioned, might be char- 
acterized as an unconscious social progress, since 
no particular individual was exceptionally active in 
extending the boundaries inhabited by Russians, 
but rather the spontaneous social activity of many 
individuals brought about this result. In English 
colonization, and also in the Russian expansion 
of more recent times, the initiative of individ- 
uals has been a more prominent factor. By the 
word individuals we do not mean isolated persons 
alone, but also private trading corporations. Thus, 
the English empire in India is the fruit of individ- 
ual exertions, and especially of the genius of such 
men as Clive, Warren Hastings, and Wellesley. 
The advance of Russia into Turkestan and Central 

62 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Asia was largely due to the private initiative of am- 
bitious military officers stationed in those regions, 
who, on their o^ti responsibiiit}- and under the 
plea of necessit}', conducted expeditions against 
the natives which led to the annexation of new 
territories.^ The boundar}-, always threatened by 
neighboring natives, was constantly extended imder 
the plea of gainiug greater security. 

The manner in which indi%-idual men like Mr. 
Cecil Rhodes and Sir George Goldie have left their 
impress on imperial expansion in Africa is matter 
of most recent histor}-. Without any considerable 
encouragement from the authorities at home. Sir 
George Goldie has constructed a valuable colonial 
protectorate on the banks of the Niger, a region 
apparently most unfavorable to European enter- 
prise.- The rapid expansion of British influence 
toward the centre of Africa from the south is due 
primsuily to the initiative of that imperial plotter, 
Mr. Rhodes. French advance into the Soudan is 
also largely the work of ambitious indi\iduals. 
Following the lead set by General Faidherbe in the 
fifties, French officers have repeatedly undertaken 
exploring or punitive expeditions which, when 
their results were ratified by the home government, 
led to the constant extension of French dominion. 

1 George Corzon, Russia in Central Asia, The acqnisitioii of 
the Anmr territory bv Mnrariea in 1858 was also a maH-Pi- of indi- 
fidual intriat-i vp 

^ On the opposite side of the continent. Sir William IklacKinnon, 
Sir John Kirk, and the British East Africa Company were neii:-- iHe 
preparing the way iox British occnpancy. 

63 



WORLD POLITICS 

The unfortunate outcome of the last of these 
expeditions — that of Major Marchand — is well 
known ; but even this event illustrates the advan- 
tages of the system. The action of such officers, 
not having been authorized by the home govern- 
ment, or at least not having been openly sanctioned, 
may, as circumstances demand, be either approved 
and utilized or disavowed. When no powerful 
enemy seeks to prevent the expansion, the action 
will as a rule be ratified, — cases in which a nation 
has voluntarily withdrawn from a field once occu- 
pied are exceedingly rare, — but should a strong 
nation block the way and attempt to prevent the 
consummation of the plan, the action of the officer 
is ordinarily disavowed without difficulty. 

From a consideration of these facts it nmy be 
seen that imperial expansion has not ordinarily 
followed a system preconceived or thought out 
beforehand and executed according to well-devel- 
oped plans. Either individuals act in an isolated 
manner, by their own impulses and on their own 
responsibility, or national advance is impelled by 
the force of uncontrollable circumstances. The 
latter is well illustrated by the manner in which 
the United States has entered upon its policy of 
expansion in Asiatic regions. At the beginning 
of the war there was perhaps not a soul in the 
whole Republic who so much as thought of the 
possibility of his nation becoming a sovereign 
power in the Orient. 

Recently, however, there have been conceived 
64 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

far-reaching and systematic plans of colonization 
and national expansion. This is especially true of 
the two powers which, on account of their strong 
monarchial government, are in a position to carry 
out a permanent and continuous policy through all 
the shifting changes of diplomacy. Germany and 
Russia to-day are both acting on a definite system. 
But in the conception of such ambitious plans the 
other great European nations, France and Great 
Britain, do not lag far behind. The construction 
of the Siberian railway and the creation of a large 
navy, the movement of armed forces and expres- 
sions by certain Russians who are high in author- 
ity, show that there has been going on careful and 
systematic planning to reach in Asia a rich coun- 
try, such as Manchuria, which possesses ice-free 
harbors, and which will become a radiating centre 
for the eastern expansion of the empire. Germany 
is likewise looking for available territory where its 
citizens may settle permanently without danger of 
becoming dissociated from their allegiance.^ As 
for Great Britain, we need only mention the Cape- 
to-Cairo railway scheme and its connection with 
the plans for a trunk line from Alexandria to the 
Yangtse Valley, which is to bind together the Asi- 
atic and African empires of Britain with a chain 
of iron. It is apparent that powers whose govern- 
ments are so continuous and highly concentrated 
as to allow of a consistent and permanent policy, 

1 The various elements of the German plan will be discussed in 
Part IV. 

F 65 



WORLD POLITICS 

which follows out definite traditions, have a great 
advantage in the recent developments of world 
politics. 

To sum up the general position of the great 
powers at present, it may be stated that all are 
straining every nerve to gain as large a share as 
possible of the unappropriated portions of the 
earth's surface. Wherever sharp methods of com- 
petition are necessary to accomplish this object, 
they will be employed. By rapid preemption the 
available area is becoming exceedingly limited, so 
that the eyes of the civilized world are already 
turned to the South American continent for further 
fields of exploitation. Already tracts far beyond 
their present assimilating capacity have been pre- 
empted by the nations, and in consequence col- 
onization is at present quite unprofitable to some 
of them, however valuable it may become after the 
due development of colonial resources. In this 
contest, Asia is the principal prize, because with 
its marvellous resources and its great laboring 
population it is bound to become the industrial 
centre of the future. 

Interest in the contest is increased when men 
become conscious that the questions to be solved 
involve not merely commerce and industry, but the 
deeper interests of civilization as well. The whole 
cast of thought that characterizes the West, its 
ideals and principles, may be modified by the inti- 
mate contact with the Orient into which it is now 
being brought by imperial expansion. On account 

66 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

of her mediating position between the Orient and 
the West, the character and policy of Russia are 
at present of the greatest importance to the world. 
Her civilizing capacity, her true aims and ideals, 
her attitude toward Oriental and Western civiliza- 
tion, the scope of the means at her disposal, are 
matters of supreme importance to every thoughtful 
man. 



67 



CHAPTER V 

Consequences of the Policy of National 
Imperialism 

Having now discussed the methods employed 
in imperial expansion, let us next turn to a con- 
sideration of some of the consequences — already 
apparent — which can be attributed to the more 
recent developments. The phantom of world 
empire is again beginning to fill men's minds with 
vague fears and imaginings, and is everywhere 
a most potent agency for the creation of inter- 
national animosities. The continental nations as- 
cribe to Great Britain the desire to Anglicize the 
world, while Russia is by her rivals looked upon 
as the relentless plotter for imperial power over 
all. It is true that the Russian Empire considers 
itself the lineal descendant of the Byzantine 
Roman Empire, and is therefore to-day the expo- 
nent of Roman traditions of imperiahsm.^ This is 
the sentimental side of the Russian desire to gain 

1 See W. D. Foulke, Slav or Saxon ? 

2 Russian writers compare their nation to Rome, while they find 
the counterpart of Great Britain in Rome's great rival, Carthage. 

68 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Constantinople. Some of the expressions of re- 
cent Russophiles, like Pobedonostseff, indicate not 
only contempt for Western civilization, but even a 
hatred of it strong enough to inspire a desire to 
subdue it by Russian effort and valor. On the 
other hand, even from the Anglo-Saxon side, we 
often encounter a beHef that the world would be 
better off if forced to adopt Anglo-Saxon methods 
of thought and government. The existence, side 
by side, of a group of virile and powerful nations 
happily renders impossible, for the present at least, 
the consummation of such schemes of despotic 
imperialism with all the dead monotony and uni- 
form decadence which it would entail. Still, if 
every act of a foreign nation, by which it desires 
reasonably to strengthen its vitality and to extend 
its sphere of usefulness, is to be interpreted as a 
deliberate attack on the liberty and civilization of 
other nations, far too much mutual suspicion and 
acrimony will be engendered in international life. 
This idea of world empire, therefore, though still 
a mere phantom, has nevertheless to be con- 
sidered, if only for the purpose of showing the 
absurdity of the thought of its realization at the 
present time. 

Should the unreasonable international competi- 
tion which is favored by many extremists carry the 
day, it would ultimately lead to a world conflict. 
To counteract this danger we must constantly em- 
phasize the thought that there is sufficient work for 
all nations in developing and civilizing primitive 

69 



WORLD POLITICS 

regions. Each one of the leading nationalities can 
fully develop its own character and impress its best 
elements on the civilization of the world, without 
desiring the downfall and ruin of other powers. 
Conflicts of interest may, to be sure, bring about 
great struggles ; but to interpret these as deliber- 
ate wars of extermination is to attribute to the 
whole human race a viciousness that actually exists 
only among the worst criminal classes. 

With the increasing intensity of competition, 
national solidarity is coming to be regarded as the 
first requirement for success in world politics. 
Russia, that nation of complete solidarity, in which 
religion, or at least cult, still acts as a firm bond of 
political union, where individualism is discounte- 
nanced and banished to Siberia unless exercised 
for the direct benefit of the government, — this 
nation has many advantages that arouse the 
envy of its competitors. Everything that weakens 
perfect solidarity is coming to be antagonized. 
Either alien races are forcibly assimilated, as is 
the case with the Poles in Germany and Russia, 
and with the Finns in the latter country ; or, where 
assimilation is impossible, the strong and bitter 
hostility is displayed that has so often been vis- 
ited upon the Jews. By centuries of isolation the 
Jews have been trained into individualism and 
cosmopolitanism ; they hold aloof from national 
life, and as a result are subjected to pitiless per- 
secution. 

Everywhere individualism is on the wane. 
70 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

Though theoretical sociaHsm, with its democratic 
manifestations, meets with strenuous opposition 
from every quarter, yet the internal social soli- 
darity which that theory demands is fostered by 
the nations with all their power. This is very 
clearly shown by the recent general reaction 
against the political doctrines of liberalism, which 
affects even English politics. When liberalism 
extended the suffrage to democracy, it was be- 
lieved that the permanent dominion of liberal 
ideas, of individualistic principles, was at last 
assured. But democracy in power shows a re- 
markable disregard for those checks on govern- 
ment and those merely structural elements of 
politics, which are so dear to Hberalism. Hence 
it is that in England interest in the question of 
reforming Parliament and the House of Lords, of 
Disestablishment, of Home Rule, of the Local 
Veto, of free competition in industries, and even 
of free trade, has entirely waned. The old liber- 
alism of Gladstone, which until 1886 reigned 
supreme, is now practically dead. The simple 
questions of national greatness and glory, and of. 
such social legislation as that of old-age pensions, 
are of greater interest to the new democracy, — 
and of these two, the former, with its constant 
appeals to patriotic feeUng, has the stronger 
hold on the masses. The Liberal party in Eng- 
land, which is certainly the true representative of 
the real interests of the masses of the people, lost 
its hold upon them on account of its weak foreign 

71 



WORLD POLITICS 

policy under Gladstone, — a policy of scrupulous 
justice, but not one of national glorification. ^ On 
the other hand, the hold on the people which 
the Conservative party has in large portions of 
England is readily explained by the manner in 
which it combines a programme of social reform 
with a strong foreign policy. Social reform alone, 
especially when proceeding from the upper classes, 
does not seem to attract the masses sufficiently, 
because they rather disdain the hand that deals 
out favors to them. 

In this connection we must also notice the 
impatience with any criticism of its policy or 
individual acts which is so often manifested by 
the party of expansion. The moderate and just 
speech of Sir Vernon Harcourt, in which he 
criticised both the Transvaal and Great Britain, 
— the one for demanding complete sovereignty, 
the other for asserting complete independence, — 
was immediately decried as treason ; the same 
epithet has been applied in our own country to the 
course of those who criticise the administration 
with respect to its policy in the Philippines. 

On the continent of Europe this repression of 
individual liberty in all matters where national 
passions are aroused is very common. We need 
only cite the discussions and recriminations con- 

1 The feeling is growing within the Liberal party that a strong, 
aggressive foreign policy is a sine qua non for success in English 
politics, and a reorganization of the party under the leadership of 
Lord Rosebery is at present much discussed. 

72 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

nected with the Dreyfus case in France, where any- 
one differing from the hall-marked patriotism was 
immediately stamped a traitor. Conditions in 
France are, by many writers, interpreted as fore- 
boding inevitable political reaction. The tyranny 
exercised by the army, the alleged influence 
wielded over the army by the clergy, the fact 
that the military organization is used as a means 
of propaganda for royalism, the vicious opposition 
on the part of the majority of the press to all 
truly liberal ideas and motives of action, the un- 
scrupulous distortion by the same press of all 
facts opposed to its own ideas of patriotism, — all 
these may be regarded as portents and symptoms 
of social retrogression. The strength of repub- 
lican feeling among the masses is on the wane. 
The reactionary daily press, vicious in its methods 
of personal attack, appealing to the coarsest form 
of so-called patriotism, is constantly gaining more 
influence among the lower classes.^ 

In Germany the political forces are coming to 
be divided between the camps of reactionary con- 
servatives and clericals on the one hand, and radi- 
cal socialists on the other, leaving the ideas of 
liberalism without considerable representation in 
the national councils. Moreover, the influence of 
the parliament is cut down by the increase in 

1 While Urbain Gohier, the author of many current writings on 
contemporary French poHtics, is certainly an extremist in his fears 
of a threatening reaction, he presents many facts that indicate the 
insinuating influences hostile to a liberal republic. 

73 



WORLD POLITICS 

standing appropriations and by the gradual with- 
drawal of important subjects from parliamentary 
discussion. 

The fact must also be emphasized that in the 
struggle for national greatness the existence of 
one-man power in a government gives a great 
advantage to a state. The two countries in which 
one-man power is most predominant — Russia and 
Germany — are at present executing the most 
systematic plans of national expansion. The 
supreme authority and permanence of rule of 
an imperial monarch gives to their national pol- 
icy a unity and continuity which is sought in 
vain by other nations. It is significant that 
Beaconsfield, the real founder of modern British 
imperialism, was also the statesman who carried 
one-man power farther than any other English 
minister of this century. On his own responsibil- 
ity he concluded treaties that involved the most 
vital interests of England, and brought colonial 
troops to Cyprus so as to be ready to strike 
decisive blows in Europe. 

A nation which engages in the perilous business 
of competing for transoceanic possessions must 
have a leader in whose judgment and discretion it 
can repose absolute confidence, — a leader in 
whom power and responsibility may safely be con- 
centrated. This becomes evident when it is re- 
membered that in such a national policy decisions 
involving the entire destiny of a colonial pos- 
session or of the nation itself have at times to 

74 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

be made rapidly and without preliminary discus- 
sion. When we consider what truly tremendous 
interests depend upon the action of Lord Salisbury 
and his colonial secretary, when we consider that 
the whole future of civilization may be conditioned 
by their policy with respect to China, we gain 
some insight into the high responsibilities and the 
far-reaching influence of their position. The 
cabinet system of England supplies the concentra- 
tion, if not the continuity, of absolute authority, in 
selecting as leaders men whose character and abili- 
ties have been subjected for years to a strenuous 
test ; statesmen who are familiar with all the ins 
and outs of legislation and administration at home 
and abroad ; who have proved their mastery in 
dealing with public affairs, not only on the floor of 
Parliament, but in the offices of the administration, 
and are finally by an informal but effective selec- 
tion designated for supreme leadership. As both 
parties aim to give continuity to the foreign policy 
of the country, and as the same men often remain 
for decades leaders of their parties, the English 
government, with all its advantages of freedom 
and popular representation, has also, to some 
extent, those characteristics of continuity and per- 
manence which are essential to success. 

The danger, in these recent developments, of 
an undue increase of one-man power must not be 
overlooked. It is certain that since the great suc- 
cess in colonial expansion of Russia and Germany, 
the imperial authority in both of these countries 

75 



WORLD POLITICS 

has been remarkably fortified. These nations, be- 
lieving that the sum total of national well-being is 
being increased by the initiative of the heads of 
the state, will not countenance any effective oppo- 
sition to the foreign policy decided upon by their 
emperors. 

The emperor of Germany, much to the disgust 
of the hberal element among his subjects, has 
shown himself anxious to rival the position of the 
Czar of Russia as a rehgious potentate, a vice- 
regent and representative of God. He has allowed 
no occasion to pass to add another ray to the illu- 
mination of sanctity by which he surrounds his 
house. Whenever he can associate himself with 
Divinity, he may be counted upon to do so. This 
habit may seem merely ridiculous, but as indicat- 
ing the frame of mind of the most powerful man 
in one of the most powerful governments, — a 
sentiment, moreover, which is very likely to influ- 
ence his domestic and foreign policy, — it becomes 
important enough to deserve attention. When in 
connection with it we consider the persecutions 
which in Russia have been directed against reli- 
gions that do not recognize the Czar as their head, 
and when we bear in mind the rigorous and fre- 
quent punishment of the offence of lese viajcste in 
Germany, it becomes clear that these vauntings of 
the emperor have a serious side. 

It is often affirmed that the policy of expansion 
tends to advance the cause of good government 
at home, and, as conclusive proof of this assertion, 

76 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

the reform in the English civil service is cited. 
This reform is looked upon by those making the 
argument as a result of the sense of national 
responsibility felt in consequence of the colonial 
expansion of the last century. We may better 
judge how colonial expansion affected English pol- 
itics from the expressions of Lord Chatham regard- 
ing the corruption caused by the free use of the 
wealth of rich colonial magnates.^ It must also be 
remembered that England had been a colonial 
power for two centuries and a half before her civil 
service was reformed, and that, during those centu- 
ries, there were periods characterized by such cor- 
ruption as that of the Cabal and Walpole. It is not 
safe, therefore, to draw optimistic conclusions from 
what seem to be the evident necessities of an 
expanding nation. Those whose prime interest is 
in pure, honest, and efficient government at home, 
will, in the future, have to be more careful and 
exert greater energy than ever. 

The tendency of politicians to secure an advan- 
tage from the withdrawal of public opinion from 
home affairs by an interesting foreign policy, is- 
shown by the efforts recently made in our own 
country for the abolition or restriction of civil ser- 
vice reform, — efforts which have, to a certain extent, 
been successful in influencing political action. The 
argument often heard that to succeed as a colonial 
power we need a pure administration, and that we 
shall consequently get it, seems, therefore, rather 

1 See Part V., Ch. IV. 
77 



WORLD POLITICS 

unsafe for the friends of reform and good govern- 
ment to rest upon. It would seem that, as national 
attention is centred on the acquisition of terri- 
tory and national glory abroad, less attention and 
energy is left for the rational regulation of home 
affairs, and that the cause of good government 
must therefore suffer. Moreover, there is little 
doubt that the exertions for social betterment, and 
for purer methods in politics, have already sus- 
tained an impairment from the exaggerated interest 
taken in imperialism. If energy is expended in 
one direction, other matters must wait in conse- 
quence. Every one who is familiar with the cur- 
rent thought and feelings in Europe knows that 
the governing classes are beginning to neglect 
true social reform in favor of the more ambitious 
branches of politics. National greatness to them 
lies in strong military and naval forces, in the 
strengthening of national industry and credit, and 
to these ends all other matters are subordinated. 

It may not be out of place to point out, in this 
connection, the aristocratic tendency of the phi- 
losophy of the last half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. The great leaders of continental European 
thought in this period, Schopenhauer and Renan, 
Comte and Nietzsche, are not at all favorable to 
the cherished ideas of liberalism and democracy. 
With them, the destiny of humanity is not found 
in the happiness of multitudes, but in the great- 
ness of rare and select individuals. The politi- 
cal machinery which liberalism has constructed 

78 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

for the protection of popular rights they do not 
value, but would rather replace by a less formal, 
more compact, social organization. There are 
many symptoms of a reversion to the symbolism 
and idealism of the Middle Ages, and with it of a 
return to the social ideas dominant at that time. 
The human intellect, wearied with long scientific 
exertions which have led merely to the amassing 
of a vast congeries of facts, is, according to these 
philosophers, yearning for new ideals, and a more 
mystical, emotional interpretation of life. 

As we turn from this consideration of certain 
drawbacks in the present political tendencies, the 
question suggests itself : Is humanity the helpless 
victim of historical forces, or can it consciously 
modify and control its destiny .'' Political fatalism 
is very common at present ; it is in fact the mental 
attitude created in many by the study of historic 
evolution. The manner in which the United States 
was drawn into Oriental politics and incurred far- 
reaching duties, without any clear recognition 
among the public, or even among statesmen, of a 
national purpose or policy, strengthens this feeling. 
Conscious purpose and reasoned action seems in- 
deed to have been but a small factor in these work- 
ings of " destiny." In a like manner, world politics 
appear to be entering a stage where grim, silent, 
passionate forces will hurry humanity along, like 
leaves in a torrent. But as the human will and 
intellect has tamed the fierce powers of the light- 
ning and the storm, can it not also master, in some 

79 



WORLD POLITICS 

measure at least, the tumultuous energies that are 
now stirring its own deeper nature and breaking 
forth into the battle cry of action, conquest, ex- 
pansion, glory, and might ? The forces that find 
triumphant expression in Kipling's song are not in 
need of encouragement from political theory ; it is 
the more modest and unromantic task of the pub- 
licist to analyze their nature and to point out the 
dangers that follow in their train. 

Bibliographical Note 

Andrews (Charles M.), Historical Development of Modern 

Europe. Vol. IL New York, 1898. 
Aubin (M. Eugene), Les Anglais aux Indes et en Egypte. 

Paris, 1899. 
Bloch (J. von), Der Krieg (translation from the Russian). 

6 vols. Berlin, 1899. 

Bluntschli (J. K.), The Theory of the State. Oxford, 1895. 

Brandes (George), Poleti (translated from the Danish). 
Munich, 1898. 

Bright (John), Speeches. London, 1869. 

Brown (William Harvey), On the South African Frontier. 
New York, 1898. 

Bryce (James), The Holy Roman Empire. New York, 1892. 

Impressions of South Africa. New York, 1896. 

Burd's edition of Machiavelli's Prince. Oxford, 1890. 
Burgess (John W.), Political Science and Constitutiotial Law. 
Boston, 1896. 

Caldecott (Alfred), English Colonization and Empire. Lon- 
don, 1891. 

Davidson (John), " England and her Colonies," in Political 
Science Quarter ly, March and June, 1899. 
80 



NATIONAL IMPERIALISM 

DemoHns, A quoi Tient la SuptrioriU des Anglo-Saxons? 
Paris, 1898. 

Faguet (Emile), Politiques et Moralistes. Paris, 1898. 

Questions Politiques. Paris, 1899. 

Funck-Brentano (Th.), Lm. Politique — Principes, CritiqueSy 
Reformes. Paris, 1893. 

Giddings (F. H.), Democracy and Empire. New York, 1900, 

Guilland (A.), VAllemagne Nouvelle et ses Historiens. Paris, 
1900. 

Hamelle (Paul), Homnies et Chases d''Outremer. Paris, 1899. 

Harrison (F.), "John Stuart Mill," Nineteenth Century, Sep- 
tember, 1896. 

Holland (Thomas Erskine), Studies in International Law. 
Oxford, 1898. 

Hyslop (James H.), Democracy. New York, 1899. 

Ireland (Alleyne), Tropical Colonization. New York, 1899. 

Kant (Immanuel), Der ewige Friede. 

Lecky (W. E. H.), Democracy and Liberty. New York, 1896. 

Leroy-Beaulieu (Pierre), De la Colonisation chez les Peuples 
Modernes. Paris, 1898. 

Lowell (A. L.)> Governments and Parties in Continental 
Europe. Boston, 1897. 

Lublinski (S.)> Litteratur und Gesellschaft im XIX. Jahr- 
Jmndert. Berlin, 1899. 

Mahan (Alfred T.), Lessons of the War with Spain. Boston, 
1899. 

Milner (Sir Alfred), Englattd in Egypt. London, 1892. 

Moore (J. Bassett), History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a 
Party. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1898. 

Morley (John), Machiavelli. London, 1897. 

Nietzsche (Friedrich), Unzeitgemdsse Betrachtungen. Leip- 
zig, 1895. 

G 81 



WORLD POLITICS 

Passy (Frederic), D Arbitrage International. Paris, 1892. 

Penfield (F. C), Preseni-Day Egypt. New York, 1899. 

Pollock (Sir Frederick), History of the Science of Politics. 
London, 1896. 

Rosebery (Lord), Appreciatiojts and Addresses. London, 
1898. 

Schmidt-Weissenfels, Das netmsehnte Jahrhundert. Berlin, 
1890. 

Scholes (Theophilus E. S.), TJie British Empire and Alli- 
ances. London, 1899. 

Schopenhauer (Arthur), Parerga nnd Paralipomena. Leip- 
zig, 1895. 

Seeley, The Expansion of England. London, 1896. 

Steffen (G. F.), England als Weltmacht und Kidttirstaat 
(translated from the Swedish). Stuttgart, 1899. 

Stengel (C. von), Der ewige Friede. 1899. 

Treitschke (Heinrich von), Politische Anfsdtze. Leipzig, 1 87 1 
Politik. Berlin, 1898. 

Tolstoi (Count Leo), Patriotism and Christianity. 

Villari (Pascale), Machiavelli and his Times. 

Zimmermann (Alfred), Die Kolonial-Politik Gross-Britan- 
nietis, Part IL Berlin, 1899. 



82 



PART II 
THE OPENING OF CHINA 



CHAPTER I 
Social and Political Characteristics of China 

The suddenness with which the entire perspec- 
tive of the political world has been changed by 
recent developments in China is unprecedented. 
That country, without question, has become the 
focal point of international politics. Vast interests 
are there under contention, — even the very com- 
position of the world civilization of the future is at 
stake upon the issue. Rarely have statesmen been 
under a graver responsibility than are the ministers 
in whose hands are the threads of Chinese politics, 
for they are in a position to determine the future 
course of history in such measure as they under- 
stand and intelligently influence the forces there 
at work. 

True, there are other important areas which are 
already the object of contest, or which may in 
future be fought for in diplomacy and war. The 
mineral and agricultural wealth of South Africa 
is at present the stake in an important struggle : 
Turkey in Asia affords a tempting field for coloni- 
zation, and South America, too, attracts the eager 

85 



WORLD POLITICS 

glances of expanding world powers. But China 
exceeds them all as a field for commercial expan- 
sion. More populous than all Europe, it contains 
provinces which singly have a wealth of natural 
resources that reduces European figures to in- 
significance. The one province of Szechuen, 
with its sixty-odd millions of inhabitants, its 
vast and apparently inexhaustible coal fields, its 
agricultural and mining wealth, is an empire in 
itself. 

(^There has been a marked change in opinion 
concerning China since the war between that 
country and Japan. Some thinkers, like Schopen- 
hauer^ and Renan,2 ^^ jg ^-j-y^^ foresaw the down- 
fall of China as an inevitable consequence of its 
pedantic civiHzation ; but others, and prominently 
among them. General Wolseley,^ were at the same 
time predicting for it an increasing strength. The 
latter were even frightened at a vision of a " Yel- 
low Terror," which was to sweep the older civiliza- 
tions from the globe when the full possibilities of 
the Chinese race should come to be realized. The 
empire was looked upon as difficult for European 
powers to deal with in matters of international 
moment, and as bound, therefore, to pursue for an 
indefinite time its own destiny, free from outside 
interference. Since the war, however, opinion has 
passed to the other extreme. Hopeless corruption 

^ Parerga und Paralipome7ia, Vol. II., § 124. 

2 Essais de Morale et de Critique (1859), p. 42. 

' Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in i8bo. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

and stubborn conservatism on the part of the 
rulers, accompanied by unmanly cowardice and 
lack of all patriotism on the part of the masses, 
are now believed to make the empire an easy prey 
for the powers, who have only to color the map of 
China to bring about its dissolution. ] There is 
reason in both views ; but, being extreme, they are 
distorted. There are, to be sure, in the Chinese 
people elements of strength which, if coordinated 
and developed, will make China and the Chinese 
nation the centre of the industrial world. The 
present weakness of the empire is due not to the 
degeneracy of individuals, but to a disorganized 
political system and to false pohtical ideals. 

It is not, perhaps, remarkable that, in a matter 
about which so little is known, there should be so 
many mistaken generalizations. At the present 
time theories about China, about its partition, 
about the alliances of the powers, and about 
spheres of influence, are both abundant and flour- 
ishing ; but most of them lack the solid foundation 
of fact. It is therefore necessary, in order to 
understand the forces at work, to set clearly before- 
our minds the actual conditions in China and the 
leading facts with regard to the present situation. 
We must know the characteristics of Chinese gov- 
ernment and society, the philosophy on which its 
social system rests, the nature and distribution of 
its resources, the accessibility and security of the 
various parts of the empire, the reforms which 
have been attempted as well as the reforms which 

87 



WORLD POLITICS 

are possible, the attitude assumed by the inhab- 
itants in dealing with strangers and with enter- 
prises managed by foreigners, and the inroads 
already made by foreign political and economic 
influence. 

It is a complex situation which no one for- 
mula can explain. Even in a homogeneous state, 
political life is of an intricate nature ; in a vast 
empire wherein all the leading nations of the 
world are struggling for a foothold, and whither 
all are bringing with them their traditional pol- 
icies and ideas, the complexity of the situation 
assumes bewildering proportions. Details, appar- 
ently insignificant, and to the Occidental mind 
puerile, must often be given delicate consideration, 
as in the matter of the prejudices of the people 
or their pecuhar methods of doing business, any 
neglect of which may lead to the failure of an 
important enterprise. The whole situation is 
fraught with fateful possibilities for mankind ; for 
whether the empire itself is destined to regain its 
strength and enter upon a marvellous career of 
industrial development ; or whether Russia is fated 
to gain the upper hand, and make of China the 
real seat and centre of her power ; or whether, 
finally, the European powers shall succeed in 
preserving a balance under which the forces now 
at work may develop without disturbance — in 
any event, the issue is bound to exert a radical 
influence on the civilization of the world. 

If a careful consideration of the powers engaged 
88 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

in the Chinese struggle, their poHcies and ten- 
dencies, is of the greatest necessity, it is not less 
a study of the most absorbing interest, for a drama 
is about to be enacted, the like of which the world 
has never seen. It dwarfs the conquests of Alex- 
ander ; compared with this titanic contest, the ex- 
ploits of Napoleon seem a passing diversion, and 
previous meetings between Orient and Occident 
seem the merest frontier skirmishes. Western 
spirit and Western enterprise are now penetrating 
to the very heart and stronghold of the Orient. 
The result only the future can reveal ; but to 
those who understand what is going on, the drama 
must be of engrossing interest. In the quiet years 
between 1870 and 1890, some of us may have felt 
at times that a little of that excitement which 
Caesar and Napoleon gave the world might prove 
a not unwelcome diversion. These late years have 
shown that the stage on which those actors played 
their part was after all but a small affair, com- 
pared with that on which the twentieth century 
drama is to be presented. 

When we consider the spirit and temper of 
Chinese society and civilization, we are struck first 
of all by its homogeneous character, its power of 
assimilation. The repeated conquests of China by 
foreign invaders have left little or no impression 
on her ancient morality and polity, the conquerors 
having fallen instead into Chinese ways and forms. 
Thus, the last conquerors — the Manchus — have 
become even ultraconservative of Chinese tradi- 

89 



WORLD POLITICS 

tions, while the true Celestials themselves are 
recruiting the reform parties. 

The chief characteristic of Chinese society and 
the essence of Chinese morality is reverence for 
the past. Noting the fact that the present 
state forms have existed practically for twenty- 
five hundred years, and that within this time and 
under these forms untold millions have been 
enabled to lead a civilized and peaceful life, we 
shall cease, perhaps, to wonder at the canoniza- 
tion and worship of the originators of the system. 
Thus, China still looks to the past for exemplars 
of perfection and for guidance. In the same 
way, the individual looks to the more immediate 
past, the principal tenet of private morality being 
reverence for ancestors. It is considered highly 
moral, for instance, for an individual to expose his 
children, in cases where such a course seems to 
him necessary in order to insure and safeguard 
the means for providing for his aged parents. To 
desecrate a grave is the greatest crime. As illus- 
trating the effect of Chinese tradition upon busi- 
ness relations, it may be noted here that all the 
present railway concessions specially provide that 
the feelings of the people regarding the sacred- 
ness of graves are not to be offended. 

The Chinese state has become remarkably 
formalized, and this formalization has reacted on 
the various parts of society within the empire. 
Conservatism and formalism naturally go together, 
and as the state form which was the original 

90 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

foundation is still in existence, there has been an 
overemphasizing of the external, and a desire to 
conform to the old ideals, at least in outward 
appearance, which have had the most disastrous 
effect upon Chinese politics. To save appearances 
is the first rule of the Chinese official. Thus, along 
with the constant outward profession of the moral 
platitudes of Confucius and Mencius, which are 
drilled into the mandarin from his youth up, there 
exists a very shrewd selfishness which seeks the 
greatest personal gain that can be reconciled with 
appearances. The manner in which public works 
are constructed illustrates this characteristic. Re- 
pairs in the walls of the capital or on the roads 
are executed in a manner so superficial as to be 
barely satisfactory even on immediate inspection. 
At times the inspection itself is only a blind, as 
was the case in one instance where an imperial 
command had ordered the investigation of a long 
tunnel. Several men were, in the inspectors' pres- 
ence, sent down into the tunnel ; within the tunnel 
and near the other end another party of men, simi- 
larly dressed, had already been stationed. When 
the party of inspection arrived at the lower end, 
the second group came out, and by that very fact 
proved the tunnel in perfect condition ! When- 
ever the emperor rides through the streets of his 
capital, they are carpeted in such a way as to shut 
out from his sight the refuse of ages which is 
there accumulated, and the gateways of the walls 
are whitewashed only to the height to which he 

91 



WORLD POLITICS 

can view them from beneath his baldachin. ^ These 
may be extreme examples, but they certainly 
testify to a characteristic which all observers have 
noted. The ridiculous frauds perpetrated by the 
Chinese in furnishing ammunition and army stores 
in their last war are familiar to all. Bombs filled 
with charcoal could in the matter of appearance 
pass upon inspection, and would thus satisfy the 
Chinese official. 

The general plan of organization of the Chi- 
nese state and society is well known. There are 
four regular classes, — the mandarins and literati, 
the agriculturists, the mechanics, and the mer- 
chants. The fact that farmers rank considerably 
above merchants is evidence of the ancient origin 
of this system.^ The military profession is not the 
most honored, military mandarins being considered 
inferior to the civil. To the same effect, a Chi- 
nese proverb says, ** You do not take good iron for 
a nail, nor a good man for a soldier." In some 
respects, and especially in having for its essential 
element government by an educated class, — the 
mandarins, — this social system is remarkably like 
the ideal system of Plato's Republic. The entire 
conservatism of China, with its effectual resistance 
to those ordinary fluctuations of historical forces 
which the Western world has undergone, is largely 

1 For other similar examples, see Leroy-Beaulieu's articles on 
China, in the Revue des Deux Alondes, 1898, 1899. 

2 Cf. the low estimate in which retail trade is held by Plato and 
Aristotle, 

92 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

due to this form of organization, which puts at the 
head of the state a cold, educated reason. 

The mandarinate is democratic in its origin, 
being regularly recruited from the masses of the 
people by a series of most rigid examinations. 
These examinations are attested to be generally 
fair and impartial, although the sons of the very 
highest officials are sometimes given a preference. 
Beginning with the district town {Jisicn) examina- 
tion, the candidate for governmental honors must 
pass through a series of rigid tests in his depart- 
ment, circuit, and province, until, if successful in 
all, he finally reaches the Peking or imperial ex- 
amination. This is held under the immediate 
supervision of the emperor, who, according to the 
doctrine of Confucius, is primarily a teacher. Thus 
the emperor's first official act is usually the giving 
of a set lesson in formal ethics to his ministers. 
/"The vast importance of these examinations is 
shown by the fact that the reform party and the Em- 
peror Kwang Su directed their first efforts toward 
a modification of their forrn^^,,! At the present time, 
the subjects in which candidates are examined are 
the Chinese classics, style, and calligraphy. The 
ancient Five Classics and the four books recording 
the doctrines of Confucianism, especially the trea- 
tise of Mencius, have to be memorized, and in addi- 
tion to this, the vast scholastic critical apparatus 
that has accumulated for centuries must be mas- 

1 Kang Yeu Wei, " The Reform of China,' ' Contemporary He- 
view, August, 1899. 

9Z 



WORLD POLITICS 

tered by the candidate for final graduation.^ The 
examination in style is chiefly a test in the use of 
unusual word signs, a fine style consisting in the 
ability to employ word signs which the ordinary 
man does not understand. The prime purpose of 
education in this field is therefore to fill the mind 
of the student with the largest possible number of 
word images. In order that the number of can- 
didates may be thinned out, the requirements are 
continually increased in severity. The numerous- 
ness of applicants may be judged from the fact that 
at a recent session in Shanghai at which 150 de- 
grees were to be given, 14,000 candidates appeared 
in the lists. 

The benumbing, stupefying effect of this educa- 
tion is apparent in the helplessness of vast num- 
bers of mandarins when they are confronted with 
anything like the problems of modern science. The 
ultraconservatism of the mandarins in general is 
also explained by the artificial nature of their train- 
ing. Any reform along Western lines would ren- 
der worthless the knowledge that gives prestige 
to the members of the present official class. 
Even the introduction of an alphabet would at one 
blow take away the raison d'etre of the promi- 
nence of thousands of them. The man of memory 

1 As specific examples, the following may be given. An essay is 
required to be written on the topic, " Heaven alone is grand, and 
Yao alone was worthy of it. How high was his virtue ! " (an ex- 
tract from Confucius). Questions like the following are asked: 
" Why is the written character signifying moon closed at the base, 
while that representing the sun is open ? " 

94 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

— even of phenomenal memory — is in modern 
times at a tremendous disadvantage when con- 
fronted with the man of trained powers of obser- 
vation and reasoning. But the whole system of 
Chinese education rests on memory ; and a radical 
change must therefore be effected in this system 
before reform can become general. No one has 
recognized this more fully than have the emperor 
and his chief reforming minister, Kang Yeu Wei. 
Even after a student has successfully passed 
the final examination at Peking, — its severity 
often costs the lives of many candidates, — he 
is not, by that fact alone, assured of a position, 
since, in China, the sale of offices is a recognized 
institution, accepted by every one as a matter of 
course. In order to secure an appointment, there- 
fore, the successful candidate must have financial 
backing. This backing is often provided by 
native syndicates, consisting of capitalists who, 
recognizing the ability and promise of a graduate, 
furnish him the necessary means wherewith to 
buy a position. As the salaries are ridiculously 
inadequate, the mandarin, after his appointment, is 
able to repay the syndicate and also to provide 
for his underlings, relatives, and friends, only by 
dint of continued and systematic exactions from 
those over whom he has been vested with 
authority. Very often the court party retains a 
lien on the income of an appointee who has been 
specially favored. Thus, a provincial governor- 
ship, which in no case has attached to it a salary 

95 



WORLD POLITICS 

exceeding five thousand dollars a year, is, never- 
theless, purchased at tenfold that amount. To 
mention another instance, the overseer of native 
customs at Canton, who is appointed for three 
years, and is able to make several millions by 
exactions, is bound to hand over by far the larger 
part of the proceeds to the palace favorites at 
Peking.^ The exactions take two forms : either 
money belonging to the government is retained 
under some pretext — usually only about one-tenth 
of the taxes levied ever reach the imperial treas- 
ury ; or, on the other hand, excessive impositions 
are laid wherever the resistance will not be too 
strong. As an instance of this latter form of 
exaction, it may be mentioned that the collectors 
of likin — the internal taxes levied on traffic along 
the rivers — usually make a special bargain with 
every carrier that passes their custom-house. 

Looking at Chinese government as a whole, we 
see in it a partial embodiment of the entrancing 
ideal which filled the mind of Plato and the 
medieval popes, the ideal of government by a 
carefully selected class of educated men. As this 
system has moderated the natural working of 
the more passionate political forces, it may be 
fairly concluded that the ultraconservatism of 
the Chinese government is primarily due to this 
form of organization. Should the system be 
abolished or even greatly modified, should China 

^ See Gundry, "The Yangtse Region," Fortnightly Review, Sep- 
tember, 1899. 

96 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

choose a less formal method of selecting her 
governors and leaders, the rigid stability of the 
empire would cease. The attack of the reform- 
ing emperor on the system of examinations, his 
attempt to substitute for it a modern, scientific 
test, therefore, looks not merely to an educa- 
tional reform, but would lead to a change in the 
vital character of the Chinese Empire. That with 
this government, purporting to be a government 
"of the best," selected without favor, there goes 
the most hopeless corruption and cynical indiffer- 
ence to public welfare, is a grave commentary on 
the dangers of a shallow, optimistic idealism. 
The system is, however, so firmly intrenched in 
the hearts of the people that a radical remodelling 
seems almost impossible. A whole province 
does honor to a successful graduate, and the 
humblest family knows that the day may come 
when one of its members will stand high in 
governmental power. It is this that makes it 
possible for such a system to exist without caus- 
ing great popular dissatisfaction. It is accepted 
calmly and as a matter of fact that those in office 
should provide for themselves and their relatives, 
while every group of relatives hopes in turn to be 
made happy by the preferment of one or more of 
its members. 

To conclude from the general cynical contempt 

of honesty which prevails in official circles that 

Chinese society lacks morality would be to fall 

into serious error. Whatever laxity Chinese 

H 97 



WORLD POLITICS 

morality may permit in official relations, from the 
working-man, the tradesman, and the servant it 
exacts most scrupulous honesty. That the Chi- 
nese merchant's word is as good as his bond, is 
fully attested by all who are familiar with East- 
ern commerce, and that as employees the Chinese 
are absolutely reliable, is an equally well-known 
truth. 

The character of the Chinese as soldiers has 
been a subject of much dispute. In considering 
this matter, it must be remembered first of all that 
the soldiers hired by the military mandarins are 
the merest rabble that can be gathered from the 
streets and highways ; for the mandarin, being 
paid a fixed sum for furnishing a certain contin- 
gent, is of course bent upon getting the cheapest 
material available. Another point which should 
be kept carefully in mind, in judging of the char- 
acter of the Chinese soldiery, is the treatment of 
the men by their superiors. Thus, it is known 
that at the end of the last war, the soldiers, 
although their pay was heavily in arrears, were 
dismissed with a dollar apiece, while their com- 
manders had from some source vast sums to invest 
in Shanghai real estate. It is not strange that the 
army, under such conditions, did not show any 
patriotism. 

As to the Chinese of the better classes, it is 
undoubtedly true, as Lord Wolseley holds, that 
they are magnificent material for soldiers. They 
have proved this when under efficient leadership, 

98 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

as in the campaign of Gordon against the Taiping 
rebels. Their whole view of life is favorable to 
a soldierly character ; for, like all Orientals, they 
hold individual existence cheap, and are impassive 
under physical pains that to a Westerner would 
be unendurable. Chinamen have been known to 
continue eating calmly, while the most horrible 
tortures were being inflicted upon them. The 
attitude of the Chinese as soldiers was well illus- 
trated in the French Tongking campaign of 1882, 
when, instead of holding out, they ran away and 
allowed themselves to be made prisoners, but yet 
preferred death to the doing of any act of menial 
service which conflicted with their inherited cus- 
toms and sense of dignity. Should the Chinese 
be disturbed in their long-cherished habits and 
prejudices by an invasion of foreign enterprise 
or political control, they would become fierce 
defenders of their local civilization. 

It is commonly believed that the Chinese are 
not patriotic ; that the idea of national patriotism 
is foreign to their minds. Indeed, all enthusiasms 
are inexplicable to the matter-of-fact, prosaic China- 
man. Thus, too, the Chinese are the only people 
whose native religion is free from all mysticism. 
Confucianism is a morality of common sense, deal- 
ing with the most obvious, the nearest relations 
of human life ; leaving out of consideration every- 
thing that is doubtful or mystical ; and based, in 
short, upon the words of Confucius, " Why should 
we have cares about a life beyond the grave when 

99 



WORLD POLITICS 

there are so many duties to fulfil to the living ? " 
Thus the Chinaman tries to excel in the punctili- 
ous observance of nearer duties, of the ceremonies 
and of the honor due to those immediately about 
him. He acknowledges no ideal suzerainty. If 
he is affected in the immediate, intimate relations 
of his life, — those of his family or village, — he 
is ready to sacrifice himself. But the ideal unity 
involved in the concept of a state, an idea which 
leads Western nations into frenzies of enthusiasm, 
leaves him quite cool and composed. All the 
patriotism of which the Chinese are capable is 
concentrated, therefore, on their immediate sur- 
roundings. Loyalty to a great society and to its 
civilization has never been inculcated into their 
minds. 

Nor is the reason for all this far to seek. 
Their isolation and long-continued freedom from 
contact with other forms of civiHzation have pre- 
vented the Chinese from forming the concept of 
national patriotism. If there were a world state, 
patriotism would lose its meaning ; but to the 
mind of the Chinese there has always been a 
world state, since to them their empire is the 
world — outside of it nothing is worthy of their 
notice. Any rude or careless interference by for- 
eign nations with the cherished ideas or institutions 
of the Chinese would start into life the notion of 
Chinese national individuality, and would immedi- 
ately bring forth a feeling of mutual relationship 
and dependence. Foreign statesmen will do well 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

to avoid the fatal error of looking upon the 
Chinese as mere helpless pawns to be moved 
about at the will of a European manipulator. 
The establishment by European nations of any 
real protectorate or sphere of control in China 
would require so delicate a perception and appre- 
ciation of national characteristics, so judicious a 
management, that even the complicated conditions 
in Egypt seem simple as compared with the com- 
plexities of such an undertaking. 

The alarming weakness, the total helplessness, 
of the Chinese Empire as revealed in the Japanese 
war astonished and disconcerted the natives as 
much as it did the Europeans. The accounts of 
the emperor's mental suffering as the reports of 
defeat after defeat came in, and especially when 
he was forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, are really pathetic. The emperor's 
father and adviser, Prince Chun, had already 
turned his attention to Western civilization, espe- 
cially in the matter of armaments and navies. The 
emperor himself looked to Western methods and 
Western knowledge for guidance out of the laby- 
rinth of troubles into which he had been driven. 
He was rather a student than a ruler, having been 
brought up in the artificial atmosphere of Chinese 
politics, in which the strong, relentless spirit of 
single-handed rule is not developed. Nevertheless, 
when he began his attempts at reforming the 
social order, he did not content himself with 
palliatives, but attacked the main centre of the 



WORLD POLITICS 

difficulty, the educational system. In pursuance 
of his policy, he provided himself with European 
treatises on government, industry, philosophy, and 
education, and drew about him the progressive 
elements among the younger Chinese scholars.^ 

The leader among these is Kang Yeu Wei, a 
man of very brilliant intellect, famous for his com- 
mentary on the Confucian classics, and thoroughly 
imbued with enthusiasm for Western progressive- 
ness. His article on "The Reform of China," in 
the Contempormy Review for August, 1899, is a 
striking presentation of the attitude of the Chinese 
reformers. It is naively enthusiastic, and reveals 
no technical mastery of Western civilization, but 
only a general blind faith that China's sole hope 
of salvation lies in studying Western books and in 
acquiring Western methods of government and 
industry. In reading his essay, and particularly 
that part of it which gives an account of the 
emperor's mental sufferings and thoughts of re- 
form, one is carried back in thought to the Con- 
fucian classics and their naive account of the 
doings of great men. 

Others who have sympathized with plans for 
reform are Chang Chi Tung, the great viceroy of 
Hankow ; Shang Yeu Hwan, former minister to 
the United States; and Weng Tung Ho, the em- 
peror's tutor. Although the empress, even after her 

1 A good account of this movement is given by George S. Owen, 
in his article, " Reform Policy of the Chinese Emperor," in the 
National Review, August, 1899. 

102 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

withdrawal from active government, still retained 
the power of appointment and the great seal, the 
emperor, nevertheless, succeeded in gathering 
about him a reform party, and, supported by them, 
he began to issue a series of edicts which were 
inspired by the new enthusiasm. So thoroughly 
had the defeats in the Japanese war discredited 
the conservative party that for a time it seemed 
as if the emperor would have a free hand in his 
reforms. True, the Manchus were against him 
from the first, as were most of the older influential 
officials. But there was a wave of popular enthu- 
siasm for reform. The masses expected better 
times. Then, too, the reformers identified them- 
selves with the Chinese as distinguished from the 
Manchu nationality.^ They celebrated the birth- 
day of Confucius. They went far enough herein 
to give the empress a pretext to look upon them 
as rebellious agitators whose cry was for China, 
but not for the Manchu dynasty. 

The active reform policy began with the issuance 
of the edict of January 29, 1898. This edict pro- 
vided for the holding of special examinations in' 
scientific and technical studies, and abolished the 
artificial essay system which up to that time had 
been a main element in the examinations. The 
Weng Chang — the literary essay of the govern- 
ment examination — is an artificial, inflated form 
of composition, which calls for the use of the 

1 The party of reform was really a party of nationalism in its 
beginnings. 

103 



WORLD POLITICS 

largest possible number of unusual words and ex- 
pressions ; it is divided into arbitrary sections, and 
is altogether so factitious and foreign to ordinary, 
rational ways of thought that it took the greater 
part of a student's course to acquire satisfactorily 
this literary method. The edict also ordered the 
establishment of schools on Western models in 
the district towns and prefectural cities, and of 
universities in the provincial capitals. To com- 
plete the system, a great imperial university with 
a faculty trained in modern science was to be 
established in Peking. Even in the lower parts 
of the curriculum, such studies as geography, his- 
tory, and science were introduced by the side of 
the old classics. 

While education was the principal matter with 
which the reform movement concerned itself, other 
progressive measures were not neglected. Railway 
building was urged, and a bureau of mines and 
railways established, as also an intelligence depart- 
ment for the translation of foreign technical and 
scientific literature. Inventions were to be encour- 
aged by the granting of patents. Extensive army 
reforms were planned. Thus, the old examination 
of the military mandarin, which consisted of a trial 
in accuracy with the bow and in lifting heavy 
weights, was replaced by more modern tests. 
Reform newspapers were everywhere established. 
In the granting of railway concessions to foreign 
corporations, it was always made a condition that 
schools for the practical training of the Chinese in 

104 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

railway engineering and mining should be estab- 
lished in connection with the works.^ 

It may be seen from this, therefore, that the 
Chinese reformers were by no means inclined to 
cast to the winds the old prominence of education 
in the empire, but that, on the contrary, they meant 
to use it as the most powerful lever of progress 
and reform. Of late it has become fashionable 
to jeer at the Chinese as unpractical pedants who 
have turned their empire into a school and their 
governors into schoolmasters, with all the weak- 
ness, conservatism, and lack of any practical 
character that some people so gladly attribute to 
that profession. But those who yield to this fash- 
ion of speaking forget or disregard the fact that 
in this very system the Chinese have a marvellous 
instrument for rapid progress. When once the 
leaders become convinced of the necessity of 
Western reform, the educational system can be 
utihzed to bring about a transformation in the 
methods of thought and work far more rapidly 
than that process could be effected in a Western 
nation. 

The emperor, after having taken these general 
measures, entered upon more detailed reforms by 
abolishing specific sinecures. Here great caution 
was necessary, because at once all office-holders 
began to tremble for their incumbencies, and out 
of their common fears it was easy to construct 
an ultraconservative party that would resist as 

1 See Consular Repoi-ts, September, 1899, p. 69. 



WORLD POLITICS 

dangerous any suggestion of reform. It was here 
that the emperor encountered resistance from the 
empress dowager. Caring more for persons than 
for principles, when she saw those from whose 
adherence she drew her power and prestige fall 
victims to the new movement, this imperious woman 
soon formed suspicions which were rapidly fanned 
into violent distrust of the emperor. It is quite 
probable that the emperor had been advised to 
gather into his own hands the full powers of the 
government ; but it is extremely doubtful whether 
any direct steps against the person of the empress 
had been contemplated. 

Her prompt decision and action are now matter 
of common knowledge. Gathering about her the 
many dissatisfied and disaffected elements, she 
seized again the reins of government, dismissed 
at once the reform cabinet, executed eight of its 
members^ and forced the others to flee for their 
lives. All this was most adroitly done in the name 
of the emperor. Upon second thought and deep 
consideration of the circumstances, so ran the 
imperial announcement, he had concluded that his 
reform advisers were not wishing him well ! The 
spirit of his reforms he desired to be carried out, 
but not so the letter ! The reform edicts were, 
therefore, practically revoked and the old methods 
of examination and administration were reintro- 
duced ; the new institutions created for the admin- 

1 They made a touching declaration that they were martyrs in a 
great cause, and that they died in trying to save their country. 

1 06 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

istration of mines and railways were, however, 
allowed to continue. The reform newspapers 
were suppressed, and all adherents of the reform- 
ing policy were subjected to petty persecution. 
The emperor, thus robbed of all authority, had 
nothing left to do but to write touching letters to 
his exiled minister, Kang Yeu Wei,^ imploring his 
sympathy. He has since been several times re- 
ported dead, and in February, 1900, it was an- 
nounced that he had resigned his office in favor 
of Prince Tuan, a nine-year-old child who is com- 
pletely under the control of the empress-dowager. 
At any rate, whether still alive or not, he has 
ceased to be a factor in Chinese politics. 

Various conclusions have been drawn from this 
reform episode. The most common view is that 
Chinese officialdom is corrupt to such a degree 
that reform from within has become impossible, 
unless there shall arise some great and powerful 
genius, with the inclination and the personal power 
to force the corrupt and decadent mandarins into 
a new policy. It is readily apparent that the 
emperor, while intelligent, patriotic, and well- 
meaning, lacked the personal force and strength 
of character necessary to accomplish a complete 
reform. By such as share this view it is there- 
fore concluded that China can best be saved by 
the tactful interference of foreign powers firmly 
pushing her along the path, of progress by the 

1 This reformer was early in 1900 engaged in fomenting a rebel- 
lion against the empress in southern China. 

107 



WORLD POLITICS 

establishment of new industries and new methods 
of education. 

Others see in the emperor's defeat only a tem- 
porary set-back to progress. The seed has been 
sown, as one of the eight martyrs said, and it is 
certain to bring forth fruit before long. The fact 
that railway concessions continue to be granted ; 
that Western industrial methods are more and 
more being adopted ; and that popular resistance 
to the exploring parties, or, in general, to the con- 
struction of railways and mining enterprises, is 
infrequent and confined to certain provinces,^ may 
be cited as a sufficient indication of the dawning of 
a new era. 

When all is considered, the emperor's attempts 
cannot be stigmatized as too radical. His inter- 
ference with the administration was narrowly 
limited. He addressed himself rather to the 
intelligence of the nation, hoping to accomplish 
the desired results by familiarizing that national 
intelligence with Western modes of thinking. The 
intense interest shown by all classes in the West- 
ern learning recently opened up to them is a guar- 
antee of a reform which no coalitions among the 
officials can long render nugatory. The party of 
progress may be silenced for a time, but the 
Chinese nation is too practical to have missed the 
lesson given it by the emperor. Manchu conser- 
vatism may for a time stand in the way of reform, 
but it cannot render futile this great movement. / 

1 Especially Shantung and Szechuen. 
1 08 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

One point is of special political importance in 
this connection. The Manchus, who are the con- 
servatives, are naturally allied with Russia and 
Russian interests, while the reformers look to 
Great Britain as the champion of their ideals. 
Nothing could, therefore, aid the cause of reform 
more surely than the effective display of British 
authority and power. It is conceded by all that 
Russia has obtained her numerous concessions 
through the fear she inspires in the mind of the 
Chinese. They have come to look upon the north- 
ern empire as the irresistible power, and all official- 
dom bows before the emissaries of the Czar. A 
strong, consistent, unwavering poHcy is necessary 
to impress the minds of these Orientals. 

Turning now to the resources of China, we find 
that their development has been retarded by the 
same ideas which we have seen dominating Chi- 
nese politics. The unequalled natural wealth of the 
empire has hardly been touched. The coal fields 
in one province, according to a geological author- 
ity,-^ could, at the present rate of consumption, pro- 
vide the world with coal for twenty centuries. In 
close proximity to this store of energy are found 
the minerals and ores in the extraction and indus- 
trial preparation of which it is destined to be 
employed. The reason that this wealth has not 
been more fully exploited lies in the fact that until 
very recent times agriculture was considered — as it 
was also by Aristotle and Plato — the only true and 

^ Baron von Richthofen, China. 
109 



WORLD POLITICS 

permissible wealth-producing activity. In the hier- 
archy of classes, the farmers rank immediately 
below the mandarins. Moreover, use of the soil 
in agriculture is not of such a nature as to disturb 
the spirits which, according to Chinese belief, 
inhabit the earth. This geomancy of China is 
still of great practical importance. Thus, because 
high towers would disturb the flight of the good 
spirits, there cannot be found in any of the cities 
of the empire towers exceeding a hundred feet in 
height. For the same reason, any penetration into 
the soil more than that wrought by the plow is 
believed to be an offence against the mystic pow- 
ers. It was on this ground — that subterranean 
dragons would suffer and be irritated by the har- 
rowing of the earth necessary for the construction 
of railways — that mandarins of the old school 
based their opposition to railway concessions. In 
the contract under which the great mining con- 
cession in Szechuen was granted last year to Mr. 
Pritchard Morgan, the attitude of the present gov- 
ernment in this matter is clearly indicated. One 
of the articles of the contract reads : " Let no one 
obstruct the work on the ground that it is injurious 
to Feng Shui (the earth spirit) as long as the gal- 
leries dug below the ground are not injurious to 
the soil above." ^ It would appear, therefore, from 
many recent occurrences that while geomancy is 
still a force to be reckoned with, its adherents are 
becoming the minority party. 

^ Consular Repo'ts, September, 1899, p. 69. 
1 10 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

The present work is not a fitting place in which 
to detail at length the varied resources of the 
Chinese provinces. For purposes of political treat- 
ment, it is sufficient to state the general conclusion 
reached by all who have investigated the matter. 
According to them, it may be predicted with abso- 
lute certainty that the coal and general mineral 
wealth of China, taken in connection with the vast 
and highly trained, frugal, and capable population, 
will, during the coming century, make China the 
industrial centre of the world, and the Pacific the 
chief theatre of commerce. 



CHAPTER II 

The Actual Nature of the Interests 

ACQUIRED BY FOREIGN NATIONS IN ChINA 

Having now considered the internal conditions 
of the Chinese Empire, we have arrived at a point 
where we can properly view the actual inroads 
made upon the empire by foreign powers. It is 
of the greatest importance to ascertain clearly what 
has actually been done ; what concessions and privi- 
leges have been obtained ; to what degree these 
concessions and privileges are purely industrial and 
commercial, and how far, on the other hand, they 
have a political bearing. It has become too com- 
mon to make rash and sweeping overstatements in 
this matter of concessions ; to say, for instance, 
that some government has obtained control of a 
province of China, when, as a matter of fact, the 
grant of some limited mining rights to a foreign 
corporation is the sole basis of the report. It is 
essential to see how much the Chinese government 
reserves to itself and to its subjects in making the 
different concessions, and also to note clearly the 
nature and extent of all differences in its treat- 
ment of the various European nations. 

112 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

The idea that China is the feeble, unresisting 
prey of European nations, who are at liberty to 
help themselves to any part of its territory and 
establish protectorates there, is preposterous — and 
almost ridiculous. The concessions so far obtained, 
with the exception of those in which the political 
nature and political origin were openly and in terms 
avowed,^ are strictly limited in scope. Before they 
could be turned into complete political control, great 
sacrifices of blood and treasure would have to be 
made, if indeed such control were at all possible. 

The terms sphere of interest and sphere of influ- 
ence are constantly being used as if they implied 
the exercise of actual political authority within the 
" sphere." It is for us to see how far such political 
interference is possible in China at the present 
time. The technical meaning of the term sphere 
of interest is an area or territory within which 
a nation claims the primary right of exploitation 
of commercial and natural resources. The term 
sphere of influence is by some thought to refer to 
a certain degree of pohtical control, however slight 
it may be ; but it is continually used interchange- 
ably with sphere of interest. The terms are 
therefore flexible. To mention an instance of 
one extreme in the meaning of the term, the veiled 
protectorate in Egypt might be called a sphere of 

^ Thus certain concessions to Russia, Germany, and France were 
confessedly of political origin, growing out of the interference of 
those countries in behalf of China, in matters consequent upon the 
Japanese war. 

I 113 



WORLD POLITICS 

influence. At the other extreme is the meaning 
of the term as applied in China at the present time, 
where it signifies a portion of territory wherein a 
nation has expressly or impliedly declared that it 
will permit no other nation to exert political influ- 
ence, and that itself will lead in the exploitation of 
natural resources. Of course, should a partition 
of China actually come about, these spheres of 
influence would be regarded as preemptions of 
Chinese territory ; but to regard them at present as 
anything other or more than spheres of influence 
for a priority of industrial exploitation, is to antici- 
pate history, or to imagine events that may neyer 
be realized. We must avoid allowing ourselves to 
be confused by the possibilities of the situation, 
and must endeavor rather to see clearly the actual 
character of the rights and concessions thus far 
acquired. 

If, then, we turn to an enumeration of the inter- 
ests and concessions thus far acquired in China by 
Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan, 
we shall, upon investigating them, have a firm basis 
upon which to rest our judgment of the immediate 
course of development of Chinese history. 

It will be best to study railway concessions first 
of all. It has been said that the politics of China 
are railway politics, and, as we have shown before 
the manner in which railways are used in modern 
imperial expansion gives considerable color to this 
assertion, though we do not grant to it the full 
force which some "have attributed to it. We must 

114 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

first rid our minds, however, of the idea that the 
railway concessions in China are in all cases made 
directly to European governments. In no instance 
have the Chinese parted with the ultimate property 
in the railway for which concessions have been 
granted. In the case of even the largest railways, 
concessions limited strictly to the right of construct- 
ing and exploiting the lines are granted to foreign 
capitalists, while property in the line and the larger 
share of the profits of operation are reserved to a 
Chinese corporation and the Chinese government.^ 

As the railway politics of China are considered 
of extreme importance with regard to the future of 
the country and the influence of European nations 
there, it will be well to speak a little more in detail 
about the various railway systems proposed and 
about those actually begun. Altogether, conces- 
sions covering about ten thousand kilometres of 
railway lines have so far been granted. There is 
now evident on the part of China a disposition to 
put a stop for the present to the policy of con- 
cessions, in order that the working of the present 
plan of operations may be tested before further 
undertakings are planned. 

Beginning at the north, we have first the Rus- 
sian system, operated as the " Railways of East 
China " by the Russian government. The con- 
cession was first obtained with the object of ex- 
tending the trans-Siberian railroad from the Baikal 

1 See Regulations fur Mines and Railways in China, at the end 
of this I'art. The Russian lines are an exception. 



WORLD POLITICS 

region through Manchuria directl}^ to Vladivostok. 
The line as now surveyed will pass through Bo- 
dune, and will be 1425 kilometres in length. 
After Port Arthur was acquired by the Russians, 
a spur, passing through Kirin and Moukden, and 
having a total length of 800 kilometres, was 
planned and begun. This, again, is connected 
with the important port of Newchwang. The con- 
cessions to Russia are the most liberal in their 
terms that have been granted to any country, 
giving to the Russian company, — which is simply 
a mask for the Russian government,^ — complete 
latitude in the matter of construction and exploi- 
tation. By the contract, the line is to revert to 
the Chinese government after eighty years, but 
there may be many a sHp before that reversion is 
enforced. 

Some writers are inclined to believe that the 
value of the entire Siberian system will be chiefly 
strategic, since, in their opinion, the population of 
the country through which the road passes is so 
sparse and the important towns so few that the 
freight and passenger traffic will hardly pay the 
expenses of the line. This view of the purely 
strategic character of the Siberian railway is, how- 
ever, already shown to be false, or at least one-sided, 
by the remarkable amount of traffic over the new 
route, so far as it has been completed. The num- 

1 For the organization of the company, see the extract from the 
Official Messenger of the Empire, cited in the Revue des Deux 
Mondes, Vol. CXLVIIL, p. 834. 

116 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

ber of passengers transported on the western 
and central division rose from 244,000 in 1896 
to 512,000 in 1897, and to 948,000 in 1898; while 
in the same period the amount of freight rose 
from 191,666 tons to 616,000 tons.^ As a result 
of this development, the prosperity of the caravan 
industry has been materially impaired, and it is 
believed that the burning of railway bridges is to 
be laid to the carriers, who have already suffered 
a loss of income. Travellers describe a veritable 
glut of merchandise on the Russo-Siberian fron- 
tier, waiting to be transported to the interior of 
Asia. It must be remembered also that the col- 
onization of Siberia is progressing with rapid 
strides; it is estimated that in 1898, 400,000 immi- 
grants entered Siberia. The country has shown 
itself well adapted to agricultural settlement, and 
its mineral wealth is amazing. It is also expected 
that, as soon as the line to Port Arthur shall be 
completed, a flood of immigrants will pour into 
Manchuria. Then, too, the time between western 
Europe and Shanghai will be reduced by six or 
seven days, so that not only mail, but also pas- 
senger traffic, will seek the Siberian line, at least 
until other and still more direct means of com- 
munication shall have been constructed. More- 
over, while it is doubtless true that the railway can 
never supersede sea navigation for the carriage of 
ordinary bulky freight from Europe to China, still 
the numerous new colonies that are now growing 

^ Consular Reports, November, 1899, p. 410. 
117 



WORLD POLITICS 

up along the line will assure to it a considerable 
amount of freight traffic. The Russian govern- 
ment itself did not foresee the rapid development 
of Siberia. Strategical purposes may therefore 
have been quite prominent when the construction 
of the railway was decided upon. The line has 
been built very economically ; it has steep grades, 
sharp curves, and a poor quality of roUing stock 
and stations ; all of these facts show how little 
traffic was originally expected. In fact, the line 
will practically have to be rebuilt to meet the re- 
quirements of a great transcontinental railway. 

Since the Russo-British agreement of April, 
1899, which was supposed to settle all questions 
of railway extension as between the two countries, 
Russia has asked for a new concession from New- 
chwang to Peking. As there is already connecting 
these two points a line which is partly in the hands 
of British capitalists, this act of the Russian gov- 
ernment has been interpreted as a political move, 
designed to gain control of the present Chinese 
seat of government. In this connection the ques- 
tion of road gauge has an important bearing. The 
Russian gauge is the "broad gauge," 1.52 metres, 
or 5 feet, in width, while the regular gauge used in 
western Europe, in America, and in the European 
systems of China, commonly known as the " stand- 
ard gauge," is 1.43 meters, or 4 feet 8 1-2 inches. 
The fact that rolling stock can therefore not pass 
from the Russian system to the other Chinese sys- 
tems, furnished a strong motive for the extension 

118 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

of the Russian line to the interior of China. In 
view of the remarkably rapid development of 
Siberia, this extension might be interpreted as 
a purely commercial measure, designed to facili- 
tate the transportation of freight from the centre 
of China through Siberia. On the other hand, a 
political purpose might also be understood, since 
in case of war it would be of exceedingly great 
importance to Russia to be able to transport her 
troops on her own lines to the very centre of 
China. Up to the present moment, however, 
Russia has contented herself with the assurance 
from China that she shall be offered the first 
chance, should a direct concession between Peking 
and Newchwang ever be granted. 

Manchuria, a province exceedingly rich in 
natural resources, is, as compared with other prov- 
inces, thinly populated, having only about eight 
million inhabitants, so that, more than any other 
part of China, it can be looked upon as a possible 
field of colonization. It will take some decades to 
begin the effective development of the vast re- 
sources of this province, but even if Russia should 
not extend her political influence beyond its bor- 
ders, she would none the less be in a position to 
build up a powerful empire in this extreme portion 
of her realm. The territory through which the 
Manchurian railway passes presents great difificulty 
on account of mountain ranges and marshes, and 
it is therefore not probable that the railway can be 
finished before 1905. Persons who are inclined to 
119 



WORLD POLITICS 

give a political interpretation to everything now 
passing in China say that that year marks the term 
of the lease of life granted to the Celestial Empire. 
Should she succeed in strengthening herself and in- 
itiating a reform before that date, her future, they 
say, need not be despaired of ; but otherwise, she 
will fall an easy prey to Russian power and intrigue. 
The next line to be considered is that between 
Shan-hai-kwan and Newchwang, a distance of 415 
kilometres. This line is an extension of the origi- 
nal Chinese railway from Tientsin to Shan-hai- 
kwan. It was planned by The British and Chinese 
Corporation, in which The Hongkong and Shang- 
hai Banking Corporation is interested, and was 
conceded to that company. It is constructed with 
the standard gauge, and, connecting two important 
ports, is of considerable commercial value. As the 
road was to be managed by British capital, its 
construction was opposed on political grounds by 
the Russian government, which claimed the ex- 
clusive right of exploitation north of the great 
wall, or beyond Shan-hai-kwan. An arrangement 
was finally made, however, by the terms of which 
the rights of foreclosure usually reserved by 
foreign capitalists as security for loans were not 
to apply to this line; the promoters and capitalists 
concerned in the construction and management 
were to have a lien simply on the income and not 
on the body of the line, so that the likelihood of 
its passing into the hands of foreigners was ex- 
cluded. Under this arrangement, Russia gave her 

120 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

consent to the construction of the road, the whole 
matter being settled in the Russo-British agree- 
ment of the spring of 1899. Political writers are 
inclined to look upon the acceptance of this con- 
cession by British capital as a mistake, because 
in case of war with Russia it would be extremely 
difficult to hold the railway. They even go so far 
as to urge an exchange of the British rights in 
the Newchwang railway for the concession which 
has been granted to the Russo-Chinese Bank of 
a line south of Peking in a region where English 
capital is already interested. ^ 

The lines in the province of Pechili are owned 
and managed by Chinese capitalists with the aid of 
European employees. The first permanent railway, 
— to which reference was made in the last para- 
graph, — was the one built by Li Hung Chang 
from Tientsin to his mines ; later extended to 
Shan-hai-kwan ; and then, after the war, to Peking. 
The personnel of the service is Chinese, except in 
the case of engineers, who are still mostly Euro- 
peans, but who are being gradually replaced by 
natives. The railway is exceedingly profitable, 
even though the rates are comparatively low — for 
instance, one cent per kilometre for first-class 
fare. It has been estimated that the Pechili system 
earned last year $1200 net profits per kilometre, 
the gross earnings being $6000 per kilometre. 

South of Peking and Tientsin extremely impor- 
tant railway concessions have been granted. Ger- 

1 See p. 133. 
121 



WORLD POLITICS 

many has obtained exclusive exploitation privileges, 
including the right to make railway concessions, in 
the province of Shantung. The gist of the indus- 
trial concessions made to Germany in that prov- 
ince is contained in the following paragraph of the 
agreement between the Chinese and German gov- 
ernments : ^ — 

" If the Chinese government or individual Chinese subjects 
should at any time have plans for the development of Shan- 
tung, for the execution of which foreign capital is required, 
they shall in the first place apply to the German capitalists for 
it. Similarly, in the event of machines or other material 
being required, German capitalists shall in the first instance 
be applied to. Only when German capitalists or manufacturers 
have refused their assistance, shall the Chinese be entitled to 
apply to other nations." 

On the strength of these concessions, a triangu- 
lar line connecting Kiao-chow with Tsinan on the 
Yellow River has been planned, surveyed, and work 
thereon begun. This triangle encloses the rich 
mining region of Shantung, making it accessible 
from all sides. Although mountainous. Shantung 
is one of the most populous agricultural provinces 
of China, having 220 inhabitants per square kilo- 
metre — 570 per square mile.^ Its coal and iron 

1 Published in the Peking Official Gazette, March 6, 1898. 

2 Compare with this the following figures representing the density 
of population of other parts of the world with which the reader is 
probably more familiar : — 

PKR SQ. M. 

Belgium (1897) 579- " 

England and Wales (1891) 497-4 

Rhode Island (1890) . . 318.4 

122 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

deposits are esteemed especially rich, and its prox- 
imity to the sea makes it the ideal manufacturing 
province of the empire. The line between Kiao- 
chow and Tsinan will be used to convey to the 
ocean the vast inland trafftc received from the rich 
provinces of Honan and Shanse. It is even stated 
that railway preemption rights along the whole 
valley of the Hoangho or Yellow River have been 
granted to Germany, in which case the British 
sphere of influence along the Yangtse River and 
the German sphere of influence along the Yellow 
River would extend side by side to the western 
confines of the empire. If the report of this con- 
cession is founded on fact, the danger of collision 
between Russia and England would be lessened, 
inasmuch as Germany practically thus inserts a 
wedge between the regions coveted by the other 
two powers. 

Coming now to the principal English concessions, 
we first note the line between Tientsin and Ching- 
kiang, near Nanking. This line follows the route 
of the old imperial canal, which has become so ob- 
structed that it can be used only for local service- 
and can offer little effective competition with the 
railway freight trafific. The line, as surveyed, 
passes through Tsinan, and, as it will connect the 
capital with the region of Shanghai, is bound to 
be one of the great trunk lines. By arrangement 
between German and English capitalists, the con- 
struction and exploitation of this line is to be 
divided territorially between the two nations. The 
123 



WORLD POLITICS 

northern portion, extending as far south as the 
boundary of Shantung, has been surveyed by 
German engineers, and is to be constructed by 
German capital. This region presents special dif- 
ficulty on account of the soft soil in the valley of 
the Yellow River. Fifty years ago that majestic 
stream suddenly changed its entire course, so that 
its mouth is, at the present time, three hundred 
miles north of where it formerly was ; and although 
this performance marked the extreme point in the 
erratic character of the stream, it is still by no 
means constant to any regular river bed, but often 
changes its course and causes heavy losses and 
frightful devastations by its frequent floods. The 
southern portion of the line, which is to be built by 
English capital and skill, is in territory more favor- 
able for construction. For commercial purposes, 
however, the entire extent of the line offers the 
most exceptional advantages. In the Yangtse 
River basin, The British and Chinese Corporation 
has obtained a concession for a line from Nanking 
to Shanghai and on to Ningpo by way of Hang- 
chow, measuring in all seven hundred kilometres. 
These railways, connecting, as they do, commercial 
centres of the empire, all promise to be exceed- 
ingly profitable. They are granted on the same 
basis as are the Hankow lines, which will next be 
discussed. 

The right to construct the great central trunk 
line of China, extending from Peking to Canton by 
way of Hankow, has been granted by the Chinese 
124 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

government in two concessions. The history of 
the northern concession, covering that part of the 
line which extends from Peking to Hankow and is 
called briefly the Lou Han line, is especially inter- 
esting. As far back as February, 1896, a Chinese 
company was formed for the building of a trunk 
line between the imperial capital and Canton. Only 
Chinamen were to be allowed to subscribe and own 
stock in this corporation, whose capital is fixed at 
thirty millions of taels.^ By October, 1896, the con- 
struction of both sections of the line was authorized, 
and the famous iron founderies that Chang Chi 
Tung erected near Hankow were then bought to 
assist in providing the material for construction. 

As the undertaking was managed by mandarins, 
Chinese capitalists were slow in subscribing, and 
it was impossible to raise sufficient money to war- 
rant the actual beginning of the enterprise. One 
of the purposes of Li Hung Chang on his trip 
around the world was to interest foreign capitalists 
in the industrial undertakings of his home. Vari- 
ous offers to provide the Chinese government and 
syndicate with the necessary funds were received, 
but finally that of a Belgian syndicate, called La 
Societe d' Etude des Chemins de fer en Chine, and 
having its seat at Brussels, was accepted. This 

^ The Chinese tael is the unit of the money of account, varying 
in value with the fluctuations in the price of silver and also from 
place to place. Thus, in January, 1900, the Shanghai tael was 
quoted at 63.1 cents (American gold), the Haikwan tael at 70.3 
cents. The latter (the Hk. tael) is the standard recognized by 
the customs authorities. 

125 



WORLD POLITICS 

syndicate was assisted at the Peking court by the 
ministries of France and Russia, and also by the 
influence of the Russo-Chinese Bank. In May, 
1897, it obtained the right of furnishing to the 
government a loan of twenty million dollars at five 
per cent interest, for which government bonds 
were issued at a discount of ten per cent. The 
syndicate also obtained the right to construct the 
line from Peking to Hankow. The engineering 
personnel for the building of the road and the 
materials of construction were to be furnished by 
Belgium. 

When the nature of this transaction became 
known to the ministries of England and Germany, 
they protested violently, basing their protest on 
"the most favored nation" clause of their respec- 
tive treaties. The influence of Russia, however, 
was at that time so strong, that despite all protests 
the Belgian syndicate was successful in obtain- 
ing the important contract. The imperial decree 
authorizing the construction of the line was not 
issued, however, until June, 1898. The transaction 
is looked upon as an important diplomatic victory 
for France and Russia, and it is not to be won- 
dered at that political importance is attached to 
the control of this hne, which will form a connect- 
ing link between the Russian and French spheres. 
The capital was actually furnished by French as 
well as Belgian financiers, the company now hav- 
ing seats both at Brussels and at Paris. 

As the English were in very bad humor over the 
126 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

capture of this valuable concession by their politi- 
cal opponents, it seemed expedient to the Chinese 
to make a sacrifice, in order to appease British 
displeasure. A victim was found in the person of 
Li Hung Chang, who was formally dismissed from 
some of his high offices. At that time it was 
openly stated that Li Hung Chang had counselled 
the Tsungli Yamen to make this grant because 
Russia was so much more formidable than Eng- 
land. The English government made the conces- 
sion a pretext for demanding from the Chinese 
government important privileges, and among 
others, the concession of the Tientsin-Chingkiang 
line, which was to some extent to counterbalance 
the advantages of the trunk line to Hankow. 

The English government was very emphatic in 
its remonstrances and demands. A naval demon- 
stration which was made in the Sea of China had 
the desired effect. The Tsungli Yamen promised 
all that was demanded, including concessions for 
English lines, which have been mentioned above, 
together with the permission to the Peking syndi- 
cate to construct its exploitation railways in Shanse 
and Honan. The same provisions were to be 
made with regard to interest, mortgage rights, and 
rights of exploitation as had been granted in the 
case of the Hankow line. 

Considering now the technical aspects of the 
Peking-Hankow line which has caused so much 
excitement and comment, we find that it passes 
through the very richest region of China. The 

127 



WORLD POLITICS 

soil of Honan — loess — which is soft and at least 
fifteen feet deep, is so inexhaustible that from the 
very beginnings of Chinese history it has been cul- 
tivated constantly without need of fertihzers. It 
supports a vast and well-to-do population. Those 
very qualities of the soil, however, which make it 
so valuable for agriculture, make railway construc- 
tion difficult. There is no rock within a reason- 
able distance of the projected line, and the soil is 
so soft that, especially near the Yellow River, it 
will not make a safe foundation for a railway. 
Opinions differ as to the difficulty of bridging the 
river at Kaifong. It was just below this point 
that the river changed its course in 185 1. Above 
Kaifong, the bed of the stream is more regular, 
and even at Kaifong engineers believe that the 
construction of a bridge is possible, although at an 
enormous expense. The construction of the line 
has been begun from the north, and as the nec- 
essary capital has already been furnished, its com- 
pletion may be looked for at a not distant date. 

The southern portion of the main trunk line — 
between Hankow and Canton — has been conceded 
to an American syndicate. The American China 
Development Company, on practically the same 
conditions as those obtained by the Belgian com- 
pany. Surveys for this line have been made, the 
large surveying party meeting with no opposition 
on the part of the natives at any place along the 
whole course. The conditions regarding loans, 
construction, and exploitation are practically the 
128 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

same as in the case of the Belgian syndicate.^ 
The main line will measure about 1650 kilome- 
tres, while branches will swell the total mileage 
to about 1850 kilometres. As the Peking-Hankow 
line has a length of 1300 kilometres, the entire 
railway will be about 3150 kilometres, or over 2000 
miles long. British capital is also extensively 
interested in this undertaking, in which several 
large American trusts, including the Standard Oil 
Company and the American Sugar Refining Com- 
pany, are participants. 

The territory through which this line passes is 
not so phenomenally rich as is the northern por- 
tion ; but, on the other hand, the construction will, 
it is beheved, be much easier, and the trade between 
Canton and Hankow promises even to exceed that 
on the northern division. Inasmuch as the conces- 
sions have been made to private individuals and 
corporations, and the capital has been furnished by 
them, it is hardly possible as yet to attribute to this 
line any political significance beyond the possibility 
of interference for protection. As considerable 
English capital is invested in the enterprise, the 
concession is ordinarily enumerated among the Brit- 
ish railways ; and yet, judging from its founders, 
— Senator Washburn, ex-Senator Gary, and the 
late Senator Brice, — the line belongs rather to 
America. 

Weighing the comparative probabilities of future 
success of the two branches of the central line, 

1 See p. 136. 
K 129 



WORLD POLITICS 

and their respective advantages and disadvantages, 
the balance seems to incline slightly in favor of the 
American concession. It is true, the northern sec- 
tion traverses a richer agricultural region, and it also 
opens up by its branch lines most extensive mining 
resources. Moreover, the provinces which it trav- 
erses are the most civilized in China, provinces in 
which unprovoked disturbances would hardly occur. 
The region is a' vast plain, without any topographi- 
cal difficulties in the way of mountains or ravines. 
On the other hand is to be counted the considera- 
tion already mentioned, that the soil of this region, 
wonderfully, even inexhaustibly fertile, affords no 
sound substructure for a railway embankment. 
Again, as has also been noted above, neither rock 
nor wood in sufficient quantities can be found within 
reasonable distance. Timber will have to be im- 
ported from Manchuria, or, perhaps, even from 
the American continent, while to procure rock will 
involve huge expense. 

Furthermore, to recall another consideration, the 
situation is rendered difficult by the frequent floods 
of the Yellow River, which would certainly destroy 
any embankment not built of the most solid mate- 
rial. English engineers have, therefore, advised 
placing the rails and ties immediately upon the 
soil without substructure, and abandoning the line 
during the flooded season after the method prac- 
tised in Egypt. The line, not offering any resist- 
ance to the floods, would thus remain undisturbed, 
and, after the flood had departed, it would only 

130 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

be necessary to remove the accumulated rubbish. 
Still another disadvantage affecting the financial 
success of the northern section is the fact that it 
will have to stand the competition of river naviga- 
tion and of other lines already projected, such as 
the Tientsin-Chingkiang line. Indeed, most of 
the products of the mines of Shanse and Shense 
could be transported down the Yellow River and 
the Hankiang. Thus, though the line will un- 
doubtedly be a paying undertaking, fabulous profits 
for the European investors can by no means be an- 
ticipated, especially as the Chinese government and 
corporation have reserved to themselves the larger 
portion of the net earnings. This seems to have 
been recognized by the commission sent by the 
Credit Lyoimais to investigate the situation. 

On the other hand, the southern section, the 
American concession, will pass through regions 
that are mountainous and desolate. For a part 
of its course, it will encounter the competition of 
navigation on the Siang and Kan rivers. More- 
over, the natives of the interior of Hoonan are said 
to be especially savage and hostile to foreign inva- 
sion, although the experiences of the surveying 
expedition did not include any disturbance or mol- 
estation by natives. The district, however, is one 
of the richest mining regions in China, Hoonan 
having about thirty thousand square miles of min- 
ing territory, while the agricultural resources of 
other sections of the route are similarly extensive. 
Though the region is mountainous, it does not 

131 



WORLD POLITICS 

offer any serious obstacles to construction, while, 
of course, rock for embankments is present in the 
desired quantities. There are no large rivers to 
bridge, no floods that will demolish bridges and 
embankments. The line joining Hankow — with 
its three million inhabitants — to Canton and Hong- 
kong, which together have an equal population, 
must, by the very nature of its termini, ultimately 
be a success. Once constructed, it can be looked 
upon as permanent, and the expenses for repair 
need not be excessive. To many engineers, there- 
fore, notwithstanding the fact that at first sight 
conditions along the northern line seem more ad- 
vantageous, the southern section seems to have a 
more assured future financially. 

The city of Hankow, at the middle point of this 
central trunk line, has perhaps a more brilliant 
future than that of any other city in the world. It 
is at the head of the deep-sea navigation on the 
Yangtse, and although it is five hundred miles 
from the Pacific, the largest vessels can penetrate 
to the Hankow wharves at most times of the year. 
With its adjacent towns, Hanyang and Wuchang, 
it has already three millions of inhabitants, a 
magnificent manufacturing population. The great 
iron works founded at Hanyang some years ago 
are now furnishing a large part of the rails for 
the central line, and the iron industry has there- 
fore taken a firm footing in this city. The great 
trunk lines of China and three mighty rivers, as 
well as the ocean, all aid therefore in concentrating 
132 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

trade and manufactures in this central town of 
China, which is surely destined to be the industrial 
capital of the empire. 

Some very important railway concessions have 
been granted in the rich mining provinces of 
Shanse and Shense, southwest of Peking. Much 
to the surprise and annoyance of England, the 
Russo-Chinese Bank has obtained^ the railway 
concessions from Chengting to Taiyuan, with a 
preemption of an extension to Singan, the capital 
of Shense. As Singan is the terminus of the 
trans-Asiatic caravan route, it is believed that this 
concession was obtained by Russia with the pur- 
pose of fixing her hold on the northern portion of 
China. A portion of this line has already been 
surveyed by the engineers of the Credit Lyonnais, 
while the French Compagnie de Fives-Lille is 
charged with the construction by the Russo- 
Chinese Bank, which, with French aid, furnishes 
the capital. When it is remembered that Singan, 
the ultimate objective point of this line, is an 
important town, — it had already been suggested 
that the Chinese capital be removed thither, in 
order to escape Russian influence, — it is evident 
that political significance may easily be attributed 
to this undertaking. Neither French nor Russian 
industry has any interests in this region at the 
present time. The line constitutes, therefore, a 
preemption on the future. 

The Peking syndicate, in which Italian and 
English capital is interested, and which has 



WORLD POLITICS 

valuable mining privileges in Honan and Shanse, 
has also obtained the right to build railways con- 
necting these mines with rivers and with the trunk 
lines. A railway between Lungan and Siang-yang 
has already been determined upon, and it is evident 
that the invasion of this territory by Russian lines 
will cause considerable irritation. 

Coming now to the projected railroads in the far 
south of China, we may first speak of the English 
proposal to connect the head of navigation of the 
Yangtse with the terminus of the Indo-Burmese 
line. From Kunlon ferry, in Burma, by way of 
Yunnan, to Loo, near the head of the Yangtse 
navigation, is a distance of about eight hundred 
miles. The line would meet with the most for- 
midable obstacles to construction, as its course 
is crossed by the high mountain ranges of the 
boundary, so that, as one engineer has said, the 
excavation of six or seven Mont Cenis tunnels 
would be necessary. A recent exploring party 
has, however, discovered a route which is con- 
sidered practicable. The commercial advantages 
of this route are small, inasmuch as Yunnan is 
sparsely populated, and, although possessed of 
considerable mineral wealth, is not adapted to 
manufactures. The strategical value of the road 
is, however, of the utmost importance, as a con- 
test for China, or for influence in China, would 
have to be decided chiefly on land, and access by 
rail to the centre of the empire is a necessary 
condition of continued political authority and 

134 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

influence. Though this line has been projected, 
and written about and talked about considerably, 
definite surveys have not yet been made, nor has 
any definite concession been granted. The con- 
struction of the line is, however, part of the 
declared policy of Great Britain in China.^ 

The extreme south of China is to be traversed 
by several French Hnes, parting from Hanoi, in 
Tongking. One line is to be constructed from 
Hanoi to Yunnan, and another to Nanning, a part 
of which, in Tongking territory, is already com- 
pleted. Nanning, again, is to be connected with 
the harbor of Pakhoi. The difficulties in the way 
of these lines are very considerable. The Yunnan 
line is to be of narrow gauge, — one metre. While 
it is hoped that the mining resources which it is to 
open up will ultimately make it a paying invest- 
ment, yet the aid which the French government 
so liberally accords to these undertakings is 
absolutely necessary to it, because no private 
capital could be enlisted in enterprises whose 
financial success is so problematical. In the last 
Indo-Chinese budget of the French Chambers, 
seventy million francs were set aside for the con- 
struction of these lines, which will be immediately 
pushed with vigor. Their importance seems to be 
rather strategical than commercial. 

There are some smaller lines, the concessions 

^ See the speech of the Right Honorable St. John Brodrick, 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Com- 
mons, June 9, 1899. 



WORLD POLITICS 

for which have already been granted, and projects 
for possible constructions are innumerable. As 
has been said, however, there seems to be a desire 
on the part of both the Chinese government and 
the foreign investors, to await the result of the 
opening of the present lines before any further 
great undertakings are planned or concessions 
granted. 

It might be in place at this point to state the 
outline of the general policy of the Chinese gov- 
ernment with regard to the more important rail- 
way concessions. The contracts, which may be 
taken as typical expressions of a matured policy,^ 
are made between the native Company of Chinese 
Railways and the foreign exploitation syndicates. 
The foreign syndicate furnishes the loan necessary 
for construction at an interest rate of five per cent, 
the loan being issued at ten per cent below par, 
payable in equal annual payments in the twenty 
years following 1909. Then the construction com- 
pany procures in the open market and at the 
best price all necessary materials and employs 
engineers and workmen. The land for the road 
is bought by the Chinese company and remains 
within its ownership. Government lands are in 
most cases given over to the Chinese company 
without other payment than the ordinary land tax. 
When the railway is completed, the Chinese com- 

1 The provisions here given are found both in the contract with 
the Belgian syndicate and in that with The American China Devel- 
opment Company, which may be taken as typical contracts. 

136 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

pany takes charge of the financial side of the 
administration, while the technical management 
remains in the hands of the foreign syndicate. 
Of the net profits, the syndicate receives twenty 
per cent, while the remainder is divided between 
the government and the Chinese corporation. 

From this it will be seen that the Chinese by no 
means make the liberal form of grant to which we 
have been accustomed in American politics, where 
whole empires have been granted along with the 
right to construct a line. In return for the risks 
of its loan, and for the labor of management, the 
construction company, under the terms of the con- 
cession just described, obtains only five per cent 
interest on the total cost of construction and 
twenty per cent of the net profits of operation. 
The Chinese ^exploitation company, on the other 
hand, whose only service has been the purchase 
of the land for the right of way, takes forty per 
cent of the profits; and the government, in addition 
to the reservation of the right to use the lines at 
half rates for transporting troops and ammunition, 
takes forty per cent of the net profits and has the 
final reversion of the lines. Although the rail- 
ways so far planned will doubtless be enormously 
profitable, on account of the wealth of the regions 
through which they are to pass, yet it may be 
noticed that the Chinese capitalists and govern- 
ment have reserved for themselves the lion's share 
of the income. Despite all the natural advantages, 
therefore, which China possesses, European capital 

137 



WORLD POLITICS 

has been rather backward about enlisting in the 
work of Chinese railway building. Thus the Credit 
Lyonnais, after sending exploration parties through 
China, has recently refused to support exploitation 
on the above basis. 

It is an interesting fact that in railway construc- 
tion the Chinese government prefers trunk lines,^ 
which will bind the various parts of the nation 
together and afford means of rapid communication 
for troops and officials, while the merchants prefer 
branch lines, because these may be used for open- 
ing up industrial regions by connecting them with 
waterways. There is, therefore, a constant strug- 
gle between the commercial and political interests 
in China, and all forward movement is the result 
of compromise between the two. 

Turning now to the mining concessions that 
have so far been granted, we find that very little 
has yet been done from which one can form an 
estimate of the possible value to foreigners of such 
concessions. The question of residence outside of 
treaty ports has not yet been settled, and until for- 
eign industrial colonies can with safety be formed 
in the mining areas, a successful management of 
the exploitation of mines seems impossible. 

It will, however, be interesting and useful to 
consider the exact nature of the concessions thus 
far granted. Russia and Germany have obtained 
exclusive concessions within Manchuria and Shan- 

^ See memorial approved by the Chinese emperor, in Consular 
Reports, May, 1899, p. 66. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

tiing respectively. By this it is to be understood 
that the governments of these nations are author- 
ized to grant mining concessions without further 
appeal to the Peking government, and that Rus- 
sian and German capital, respectively, is to be 
given rights of priority in exploitation. So far 
as has yet become known, only one development 
company has been formed in Shantung. Outside 
of these exclusive concessions, we may mention 
the engagement of the Chinese government to 
treat French and English alike in the two prov- 
inces of Yunnan and Szechuen.^ 

It remains now to consider the direct grants by 
the Chinese government to foreign private corpora- 
tions, two characteristic examples of which are 
the concessions to the Peking company and to the 
syndicate founded by Mr. Pritchard Morgan. The 
Peking syndicate, composed chiefly of English 
capitalists, but founded by an Italian, has a capi- 
tal of ;^6,ooo,ooo. It has been granted the right 
to exploit the iron and coal mines of Honan and 
of Shanse for sixty years and to build all neces- 
sary railways. The mining district of Shanse, 
extending in a southerly direction, is 230 miles in 
length by 30 miles in width. According to the 
German geologist, von Richthofen, it is the richest 
mining region in the world, being able to furnish 
coal and iron for the world's manufactures, at the 
present rate of consumption, for two thousand 
years. The Chinese government reserves to itself 

^ By the Siam Convention of January 15, 1896. 



WORLD POLITICS 

twenty-five per cent of the net receipts, and the 
reversion, at the end of sixty years, of all the 
mines, railways, and machinery of the company. 
The manner in which the undertaking will be 
organized and conducted has not as yet been 
determined. 

The other important concession is the one in 
Szechuen which has been granted to Mr. Pritchard 
Morgan. The text of the contract for this under- 
taking has been published in extenso, and from 
it we can gain a clear conception of what the 
Chinese policy of mining exploitation is. As we 
have seen above in the case of railways, so in the 
matter of mining, two companies are formed, the 
Hua Yi company and the Hui Tung company. 
The former, with a capital of one million taels, is 
exclusively Chinese and is organized for the pur- 
chase of the land. It is to buy and own all the 
mining lands which the exploiting company may 
wish to work, and is to carry on all negotiations. 
The shares of the Hui Tung company, which has 
a capital of ten million taels, are to be held half by 
Chinese, half by foreigners. The one corporation 
might be called the landlord company; the other, 
the exploitation company. In the first place, the 
exploitation company will send out engineering 
expeditions to determine what lands are promising, 
what mines are worth opening. Mines thus 
selected will thereupon be bought by the landlord 
company for a reasonable price. The exploitation 
company is to pay as rent five per cent of the 

140 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

value of the output. A further five per cent is 
to be paid to the Chinese government as a tax. 
An export duty must also be paid according to a 
tariff now in existence. The contract goes on to 
say: — 

"The area of Szechuen is very extensive, and all sorts of 
mines exist. Chinese who work on their own property are 
only required to obtain the necessary permission, pay the 
necessary taxes according to the rules in force, and they are 
in no way restrained. But if foreign merchants undertake to 
work the mines, their operations must be limited in some 
way or other. They must confine their operations to certain 
intendancies, prefectures, or districts, and not take the whole 
province as their sphere of work. Work must be started in 
the interior first and at the boundaries afterward. The Hui 
Tung company shall send engineers to find out first where 
are mines to be opened and what mines they are. If the 
same be in districts apportioned to savages, the Hui Tung 
must wait till they can find out whether the advantages 
will be greater than the injury, and devise other means to 
open them. The Hui Tung company in such event cannot 
compel the Hua Yi company to buy the lands quickly and hand 
them over for working. Any possible cause of disturbance 
must be avoided." 



*' If, after mines are opened, cemeteries or mortuary shrines 
are met with, some plans must be devised to avoid them. If 
the owners do not like to remove them for money given, no 
excavation will be allowed. In excavating, as long as the 
galleries dug below the ground are not injurious to the soil 
above, rascals are not allowed to obstruct the work on the 
ground that it is injurious to Feng Shui (the earth spirit). 
Local authorities must be applied to for protection." ^ 

1 See Consular Reports, September, 1899, p. 67. 
141 



WORLD POLITICS 

It is further stipulated that the exploitation 
company shall establish a school of mining 
and railway engineering, in some convenient 
locality in the mining district, so that Chinese 
youths may there obtain the necessary technical 
education. This same requirement is also gener- 
ally attached to railway concessions made to for- 
eign corporations.^ The Chinese never omit the 
educational view of an undertaking. The exploita- 
tion company is to have control of every mine for 
a period of fifty years, reckoning from the date on 
which the mine is opened. At the expiration of 
that time the mines, with all the plant, machinery, 
buildings, and roads, are to be handed over to the 
Chinese government without compensation. The 
capital employed is to receive interest at six per 
cent. Ten per cent of the profits is to be set aside 
as a sinking fund for the repayment of capital. 
Of the remaining profits, twenty-five per cent goes 
to the Chinese government, and the rest to the 
exploitation company. It will be seen that here, 
as well as in the case of railways, the Chinese 
government has reserved to itself an important 
share in the earnings as well as the ultimate rever- 
sion of the entire property. Financial journals do 
not look with much favor on investments in mining 
undertakings to be conducted under such conces- 
sions as Mr. Pritchard Morgan's. The data as to 
difficulties of exploitation and local security are in- 
conclusive. It is only where a strong government 

1 See Note 2, at the end of this Part. 
142 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

practically guarantees security of investment, as 
is the case with Germany in Shantung, that in- 
vestments are viewed with favor, or great and 
certain returns are expected. 

The efforts of the Chinese government to cen- 
tralize the administration of mining undertakings 
are witnessed by the following extract from a 
despatch of the Tsungli Yamen, communicated to 
the various governments in 1898 :^ — 

" In view of the undeveloped state of the mineral resources 
of the various provinces of the empire and the initial stage 
in the construction of trunk and branch lines of railroads, it 
has been this Yamen's policy to allow foreign capital to be 
used for these purposes, to the end that both Chinese and 
foreigners may derive advantages therefrom. But, in order to 
obtain good results, affairs must be well managed and money 
must be economically expended. It is feared that there may 
be unscrupulous Chinese persons who, claiming with fraud- 
ulent intent to be concessionnaires of this road or that mine, 
may enter into private agreements with foreign capitalists for 
the purpose of obtaining money under false pretences, and 
that foreign capitalists may become unwitting victims of such 
fraud, and waste their substance to no purpose. This certainly 
is not the object of our government in developing the re- 
sources of the empire, by opening mines and constructing 
railroads for the mutual benefit of Chinese and foreigners. 
Now, this government desires to give it the widest publicity, 
that all contracts for foreign loans to be expended for the 
opening of mines and construction of railroads in China, in 
order to be valid, must be certified and approved by the de- 
partment of mining and railroads, and that all agreements 
privately entered into with foreign capitalists without the 
certification and approval of the department, no matter how 

^ See Consular Reports, April, 1899, p. 559. 

143 



WORLD POLITICS 

large the amount of subscribed capital may be for the purpose 
of opening mines and constructing railroads, shall be deemed 
null and void, so as to put a stop to all fraud and deception 
and encourage fair and honest dealing." 

By many writers, all these industrial concessions 
are immediately given a political meaning. Be- 
cause an English syndicate has obtained conces- 
sions in Shanse or Szechuen, they add these 
provinces to the British sphere of influence. It 
may be proper to repeat here that the only direct 
interest which a government has on account of 
such a concession is the duty of protecting its citi- 
zens in the section in which the concessionary 
privileges have been granted, a duty which may, 
of course, eventually lead to interference, and may 
possibly even bring about foreign occupation. But 
this is a far road to travel, and the prom.pt attribu- 
tion of political importance to all mining conces- 
sions leads only to confusion. 

It is certain that China offers the most promis- 
ing, the most marvellously remunerative field for in- 
dustrial exploitation, but whether the conditions are 
such that European capital can safely risk invest- 
ment without the strong and interested backing of 
a home government remains doubtful. The fact 
that the terms which the Chinese government 
makes to investors are apparently not liberal 
enough to invite the taking of great risks leads 
many writers to believe that unless an investment 
corporation has political backing which assures it 
financial support by its home government or which 

144 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

promises effectual protection, investments will not 
be made. 

That capital is, however, in some countries 
enthusiastic concerning Chinese development, is 
shown by the fact that the first issue of the Peking- 
Hankow railway loan was subscribed for twice 
over,i while the first issue of the loan raised by 
the French government for Indo-Chinese develop- 
ments, including the railways in southern China, 
— a loan of two hundred million francs in shares 
of five hundred francs, — was subscribed for thirty- 
six times over in one day.^ The fact that there 
were 110,000 single-share subscriptions shows that 
the middle classes in France are taking a very 
active interest in Chinese development. 

It is unfortunate that political interference is 
constantly being invited in China on account of the 
insecurity which capital, unsupported by govern- 
mental backing, must necessarily feel. On the one 
hand, the possibility of such intervention leads 
large syndicates into political intrigues ; on the 
other hand, it induces most writers to take a 
political view of all commercial undertakings, 
and thus tends to prevent an open and frank policy 
of international development and exploitation of 
China, with equal chances for all, and to substitute 
for such a policy a system of suspicions, secret 
negotiations, and mutual recriminations. Thus, in 

1 A. A. Fauvel, " Le Transsinien et les Chemins de Fer Chinois," 
Revue Poliliqiie et Parlenientaire, Vol. XXI., p. 473. 

2 Consular Reports, April, 1899, p. 563. 

L 145 



WORLD POLITICS 

China, commerce and industry, which might be and 
which should be the harmonious work of civiHzed 
nations, are turned instead into an instrument for 
sharpening international animosities which were 
already too sharp, and for increasing hostilities 
which were already only too intense. 

In connection with this topic, it is also of interest 
to inquire what missionaries are worth to European 
nations, industrially and commercially. France 
and Germany have made especially successful use 
of claims for damages for injury done to mission- 
aries and missions. Never before, perhaps, has 
so much material value been attached to ministers 
of the Gospel in foreign lands, and the manner in 
which, after their death, they are used to spread 
civilization is somewhat foreign to our older 
ideas of the functions of the bearers of spiritual 
blessings. 

Thus, the French consul at Choongking, who is 
famous for his expansionist intrigues, demanded 
as compensation for damages inflicted on French 
missions, mining rights in six districts of Szechuen, 
extending over six degrees of longitude, together 
with an indemnity of 1,200,000 taels.^ In May, 
1898, Pere Berthollet, a French missionary in 
Quangsi, was murdered. Among other compen- 
sations for this outrage, the French government 
obtained the right to build a railway from Pakhoi to 
Nanning. This concession was sought mainly in 

^ See Gundry, "The Yangtse Region," Fortnightly Review, Sep- 
tember, 1899. 

146 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

order to prevent a grant of the concession to Great 
Britain. The manner in which religious, indus- 
trial, and political considerations are combined in 
this case produces a somewhat incongruous result. 
The far-reaching and immensely valuable conces- 
sions obtained by Germany for the murder of two 
missionaries in Shantung are now a matter of com- 
mon knowledge and illustrate the same political 
method. 

Small wonder that the empress dowager in a re- 
cent decree ^ enjoined all officials of the empire to 
give missionaries and churches special protection ! 
The murder of a European missionary is one of 
the most expensive indulgences the Chinaman can 
nowadays permit himself. The empress dowager 
says, in the characteristically naive language of 
Chinese state papers: "There have been several 
cases of riot in Szechuen which have not been 
settled. The stupid and ignorant people who 
circulate rumors and stir up strife, proceeding from 
light to grave offences, are most truly to be de- 
tested." Then follow instructions to the officers 
to afford careful protection to Christians. 

It will be profitable to consider at some length' 
the general commercial advantages enjoyed by all 
of the foreign nations under "the favored nation 
clause." Up to the present time, twenty-four treaty 
ports have been opened by the Chinese govern- 
ment. In these, foreigners may reside and carry 
on business. In addition, about fourteen custom- 

1 The decree appeared in the Peking Gazette, October 6, 1898. 
147 



WORLD POLITICS 



houses have been established at other places for 
the reception of foreign goods. Since the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, the right of foreigners to establish 
manufactures in the treaty ports has also been con- 
ceded, and a marvellous advance in Chinese industry 
has already been brought about by this concession. 
The manufactures of Shanghai are especially pro- 
ductive and prosperous.^ 

^ Following are the lists of treaty ports in the order of the value 
of their foreign imports, given in the Consular Reports, 1 899 : — 

1896. 1898. 



I. 


Shanghai. 




I. 


Tientsin. 


2. 


Tientsin. 




2. 


Shanghai. 


3- 


Hankow. 




3- 


Hankow. 


4- 


Chingkiang. 




4- 


Chefoo. 


5- 


Canton. 




5- 


Swatow. 


6. 


Chefoo. 




6. 


Chingkiang. 


7- 


Ningpo. 




7- 


Canton. 


8. 


Swatow. 




8. 


Newchwang. 


9- 


Newchwang (Manchuria). 


9- 


Ningpo. 


10. 


Amoy. 




10. 


Choongking. 


II. 


Choongking. 




II. 


Amoy. 


12. 


Kiukiang. 




12. 


Kiukiang. 


13- 


Foochow. 




13- 


Foochow. 


14. 


Wuhu. 




14. 


Wuhu. 


15- 


Pakhoi. 




15- 


Woochow. 


16. 


Kiungchow, 




16. 


Hangchow. 


17- 


Ichang. 




17- 


Pakhoi. 


18. 


Wenchow. 




18. 


Kiungchow. 


19- 


Hangchow. 




19. 


Sanshui. 


20. 


Shashe. 




20. 


Kongmoon. 


21. 


Soochow, 




21. 

22. 

23- 

24. 


Wenchow. 
Soochow. 
Ichang. 
Shashe. 


See the map 


for the chief 


treaty ports and custom-houses. 
148 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

Since the administration of the foreign mari- 
time customs has been systematized and regulated 
under the excellent management of Sir Robert 
Hart, trade with the seaports has been freed from 
the inconveniences which formerly attended the 
irregular custom-house examinations. A further 
advance was made in 1899, when the administra- 
tion of the likin,^ the inland customs revenue in 
the Yangtse region, — was placed under the direc- 
tion of the administration of the imperial customs. 
Before that time, special likin had to be paid in 
every district through which imported goods 
passed. At every custom-house endless bargain- 
ing and haggling was necessary to secure reason- 
able terms, and even then the accumulated taxes 
were so great as to prohibit importation to points 
far inland. The origin of this most recent re- 
form was in connection with the Anglo-German 
loan, contracted in 1898. Some sufficient security 
was needed, — the maritime customs being already 
fully pledged to European nations and to Japan, 
the likin had to be resorted to, and the Yangtse 
inland customs were pledged for the loan.^ This 
systematized administration will not only be a great 
gain to the Chinese government in preventing the 
immense leakage that formerly took place, when 
more than two-thirds of the entire tax was wont to 

1 It is interesting to note that the connection between finance 
and reform, so characteristic of English history, may also to some 
extent be traced in China. Thus in the reform of the inland likin a 
fiscal need was made the lever of an important commercial reform. 

149 



WORLD POLITICS 

disappear into the pockets of officials, without ever 
reaching the treasury, but will also render possible 
a profitable commerce with the inland provinces. 

The system of river passes which was used for 
some time and which was especially enforced by 
Sir George MacDonald, British ambassador, — a 
system by which foreign vessels were given the 
right of paying the complete duties at the final 
place of landing the goods, — did not prove satis- 
factory under the old regime. With the new form 
of administration, the system of giving river passes 
will be continued, but a strict supervision will ren- 
der impossible the petty exactions to which mer- 
chants have always been subjected at the various 
inland custom-houses. 

Early in 1898, river navigation was opened in 
all provinces that have treaty ports, — that is, in 
practically the entire empire, with the exception of 
some inland regions,^ On its face, this seems to 
be a far-reaching and important concession. Its 
importance, however, is greatly lessened by the 
fact that with the concession there have not been 
designated any additional localities where foreign- 
ers may reside, and where they may carry on 
business and have depots and warehouses. With- 
out such an additional concession, foreign com- 
merce will be at the mercy of native tradesmen, 
and it is therefore generally believed that it cannot 
be carried on profitably away from the treaty ports. 

The new Yangtse River regulations designate, 

^ See Consular Reports, July, 1898. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

in addition to the eight treaty ports along the river, 
five other towns where goods may be landed. 
When we consider that the navigable portion of 
this river is over twelve hundred miles long, the 
real meagreness of the concession becomes evident. 
Shipment or discharge of cargoes at other points 
is prohibited, and it is required that the system of 
river passes be used by all vessels bound for treaty 
ports. Chinese merchants have become intensely 
dissatisfied with the system of river passes, because 
under the new form of administration, there has 
come to be an actual differential advantage in favor 
of the foreign merchants. A complete remodelling 
of the inland customs system, including the native 
Chinese trade, may, therefore, be looked for, 
because the Chinese are anxious to adopt reforms, 
wherever a practical advantage, measurable in 
dollars and cents, may be gained by the change. 
A study of the interests of the various nations 
in Chinese commerce is also important, because it 
casts a strange light on the political pretensions 
of some of them. In considering Chinese trade 
statistics, it must be remembered that many for- 
eign imports, although originally brought from 
continental countries or from America, are entered 
as British, because they come immediately from 
British possessions. Thus, the entire Hongkong 
trade with China, amounting to $120,000,000 a 
year, is usually reckoned as British, although over 
one-third of it is composed of American, French, 
and German imports. 

151 



WORLD POLITICS 

Following are the figures giving the value of 
the trade of various countries with China during 
the year 1 897 : ^ — 



Countries. 


Imports into China. 


Exports from 
China. 


Total. 




Hk.taeh. 




Hk. taels. 




Hk. taels. 




Great Britain . . 


40,015,587 


$29,571,519 


12,945,229 


$9,566,524 


52,960,816 


$39,138,043 


United States . . 


12,440,302 


9,193.383 


17,828,406 


13,875,192 


30,268,708 


22,358,574 


Continent of Europe 














(Russia excepted) 


8,565,807 


6,330,131 


25,878,118 


19,123,929 34,443,925 


25,454,061 


Japan (excluding 












Formosa) . . . 


17,564,284 


12,980,006 


15,832,034 


",719,873 33,396,318 


24,679,879 


All the Russias . . 


3,442,449 


2,542,971 


i6,4To,439 


12,127,314 19,852,888 


14,671,284 


Hongkong . . . 


90,125,887 


66,603,030 60,402,223 


44,637,243 150,528,109 


111,240,273 


All the rest of the 












world 


35,120,678 


26,954,181 13,410,206 


9,920,142 


48,530,884 


35,864,323 



In January, 1898, there were in all 11,660 
foreign residents in the open ports of China. The 
principal nations were represented as follows :^ — 



Nation. 


Number of 
Persons. 


Number of 
Firms. 


England 


4929 


374 


United States . 






1564 




Japan 






1 106 




Portugal . 






975 




Germany 






950 




France . 






698 




Norway and Sweden 






439 




Spain 






362 





1 From Commercial Relations of the United States, 1898, p. 127. 

2 Statesman'' s Year Book for 1899, p. 458. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

While the other countries show an increase, 
French population in China had fallen off from 
933 in 1896 to the 698 given in the table above 
for 1898. Another index of the relative com- 
mercial interests which the nations have in China 
is contained in the statistics of shipping. Dur- 
ing 1897, 44,500 vessels, registering 33,752,362 
tons (34,566 being steamers, registering 32,519,729 
tons), entered and cleared Chinese ports. Of these, 
21,140 (21,891,043 tons) were British; 18,889 
(7, 819,980 tons), Chinese; 1858 (1,658,094 tons), 
German; 653 (660,707 tons), Japanese; 333 
(269,780 tons), American; 464 (423,122 tons), 
French. 1 Statistics for steam vessels entering the 
port of Shanghai in 1898 show percentages even 
vastly more favorable to England. They are as 
follows: — 

Number of Stkam 
Ownership. Vessels entering 

Shanghai. 

English 3157 

Chinese 1470 

Swedish and Norwegian . . . 859 

German ....... 376 

Japanese 268 

French 112 

American 52 

Of the total tonnage of vessels entering and 
clearing Chinese ports in 1898, Great Britain had 
62 per cent, China 24 per cent, and all other 
nations 14 per cent.^ 

^ Statesman'' s Year Book for 1899, p. 466. 
2 Consular Reports for 1899. 



WORLD POLITICS 

Lack of security is the chief impediment to 
the development of the foreign trade in China. 
The British China Association, in a memorandum 
drawn up in response to a suggestion of Lord 
Charles Beresford, attributes the slow progress in 
the development of foreign trade with China to 
three principal causes : first, the entire absence of 
good faith on the part of China in the matter of 
treaty obligations ; secondly, the absence of secur- 
ity for the investment of foreign capital in China 
anywhere outside of the treaty ports ; thirdly, the 
general want of knowledge regarding Chinese 
affairs. The memorandum summarizes the situ- 
ation in the following words : — 

" We say then that the one thing needed for the develop- 
ment of trade, for the protection of capital, and for the exten- 
sion of enterprise in China, is security, and we say that such 
security must be sought in fiscal and administrative reform 
together, which can only be effected through pressure from 
without ; and we further say that the vast preponderance of 
British interests in China clearly demands that Great Britain 
shall lead and guide the movement. We attribute the 
hitherto neglect of the China question by our government to 
a policy of drift into which we have fallen, and a mistaken 
estimate of the strength of British prestige in the far East, 
coupled with a fallacious belief in the power of China herself. 
Other nations, newer in the field and comparatively unham- 
pered by traditions of the past, have seemingly been better 
able to interpret events in the light of common experience, 
and have found opportunity in our complaisance and inactivity 
to exploit the situation to our disadvantage. Great Britain's 
sphere of influence should be wherever British trade prepon- 
derates, with the door open for equal trading opportunity to 

154 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

all. This is an ideal which can never be reached without 
a resolute determination on the part of the British cabinet to 
lead and not to follow in Peking." ^ 

This extract clearly shows the connection be- 
tween politics and commerce in the far East, a 
connection which has become especially prominent 
of late. Thus, in 1896, Mr. Chamberlain said in 
a speech in Parliament : — 

" All the great offices of state are occupied with commercial 
affairs. The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office are 
chiefly engaged in finding new markets and in defending old 
ones. The War Office and the Admiralty are mostly occupied 
in preparations for the defence of these markets and for the 
protection of our commerce. The Boards of Agriculture and 
of Trade are entirely concerned with those two great branches 
of industry. Therefore, it is not too much to say that com- 
merce is the greatest of all political interests, and that that 
government deserves most the popular approval which does 
the most to increase our trade and to settle it on a firm foun- 
dation." 

Note. — The accompanying map shows the railway concessions 
and the principal treaty ports, custom-houses, and other towns, in 
the eighteen provinces of China, and in southern Manchuria. The 
names of treaty ports and custom-houses in China proper are under- 
lined. The spelling of Chinese names is a matter of as much dis- 
pute and uncertainty as is that of Shakespeare's name; all that an 
author can hope for, in this matter, is consistency. 

1 See Consular Reports, June, 1899. 



15s 



CHAPTER III 

The Political Influence of the Great 
Powers in China 

It is noted by all authorities familiar with affairs 
in the far Orient that political prestige is of the 
utmost importance commercially. Political pres- 
tige and the demonstration of a firm purpose have 
given to Russia and Germany the exceptional 
advantages which they enjoy in their respective 
portions of the Chinese Empire. Through her 
alliance with Russia, France has succeeded in 
securing similar advantages. The conclusion to 
be drawn from these facts is not that nations 
should use their political influence to grasp at 
exclusive concessions, but that at the present time 
political influence is essential for obtaining com- 
mercial advantages in China. The Chinese are 
willing to follow the lead of the strongest. They 
are willing to reform their institutions and methods, 
if a strong nation will aid them in meeting the 
consequences. Whether a nation in its dealings 
with China is engaged in a policy of narrow, self- 
ish exploitation, or in the broader policy of keep- 
ing vast markets open to international competition, 
in either case its object can be attained only by 

156 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

a diplomacy which is backed by demonstrated 
political strength and a firm purpose to use it. 

One very effective method by which the influ- 
ence of foreign powers in China has been extended 
has been the making of loans to the government 
Ordinarily, Chinese revenue is sufficient for the 
rather frugal requirements of the state. The 
nominal salaries of the officials are very small, and 
the general expenses of government comparatively 
low. Thus, although between fifty and seventy 
per cent of the total revenue collected disappears 
in the form of costs, or remains in the hands of 
the collectors, the imperial treasury has usually 
been able to meet its obligations without difficulty. 
The sources of revenue are a land tax, foreign 
marine customs duties, a salt duty, and the likin 
on merchandise. From, these sources, just before 
the Japanese war, an annual income of about 
89,000,000 taels was derived.^ Of this amount 
about 20,000,000 taels went to the metropoUtan 
administration and the imperial household, while 
36,000,000 taels went to the provincial adminis- 
tration, including the cost of the army. The re- 
mainder was divided among various branches of 
the central government. 

The debt before the Japanese war was com- 
paratively trifling. In 1887, a German loan of 
5,000,000 marks in gold was raised, followed in 
1894 by a foreign silver loan of ;!^i, 63 5, 000, and 

^ Report by Consul Jamieson, of Shanghai, cited in the States- 
man's Year Book, 1899, p. 460. 



WORLD POLITICS 

in 1895 by a gold loan of ^^5,000,000. The last 
two were secured by the foreign maritime customs 
revenue. With the Chino-Japanese war began the 
financial difficulties of the Chinese government, 
which have been used as a strong lever by foreign 
nations for obtaining influence in the councils of 
the empire. The war indemnity paid to Japan 
amounted to 200,000,000 taels, to which there was 
added as compensation for the retrocession of 
some territory occupied by the Japanese the sum 
of 30,000,000 taels. The European nations were 
at hand, and briskly competed for the privilege 
of supplying the needs of China. Russia and 
France were successful in placing the first loan 
of 400,000,000 francs ($77,200,000) in 1895. That 
Russia recognized the political advantage to be 
obtained from the position of a creditor of the 
Chinese Empire is shown by the fact that she her- 
self borrowed the money in order to lend it to China, 
a proceeding not common in public finance. 

In 1896, a loan of ^16,000,000 at five per cent 
was furnished by English and German capitalists. 
A further loan of ;^ 16,000,000 was furnished in 
1898 by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation and the DeiitscJi-AsiatiscJie Bank. 
The conclusion of this loan was part of the nego- 
tiations among Great Britain, Germany, and China 
with regard to the Tientsin-Chingkiang Railway. 
The total amount of Chinese foreign indebtedness 
for the year 1899 is given as ^{^53,021,840.^ This 

1 Consular Reports, October, 1899, p. 328. 
158 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

debt will entail, between the years 1899 and 1934, 
an annual payment of $12,474,605, principal and 
interest. Thereafter, the payments will be materi- 
ally reduced, and by 1942 the total remainder of the 
present debt will be only £799>^7S (1^3.889,343). 

When we consider the enormous resources of 
the Chinese Empire, the indebtedness will seem 
almost trifling, especially if we compare it with the 
national debts of European countries in 1899, as 
shown in the accompanying table.^ It will be seen 



Country. 


Debt. 


England 

France 


;^683,ooo,ooo 
1,284,000,000 


^3,323,819,500 
6,248,586,000 


Germany ..... 
Prussia. .... 
Bavaria .... 


107,717,015 

324,261,103 

70,919,205 


524,204,853 

1,578,016,666 

345,128,311 


Total .... 


502,897,323 


2,447,349,830 


Russia 


978,000,000 


4,759,437,000 


Austria- Hungary: 

Austria .... 
Hungary .... 
Common debt 


119,000,000 
181,000,000 
229,000,000 


579,113,500 

880,836,500 

1,114,428,500 


Total .... 


529,000,000 


2,574,378,500 


Italy 

Spain 


510,184,900 
369,645,700 


2,482,814,812 
1,798,880,799 


Grand total 


;^4,856,727,923 


^^23,635,266,441 



1 Table of the national debts of Europe in li 
ports, October, 1899. 



Consular Re- 



WORLD POLITICS 

from this table that the debt of England is twelve 
times that of China, while the debt of France is 
almost twice as large as that of Great Britain. 
This would seem to argue that the Chinese Empire 
could very well bear a much heavier indebtedness 
without at all putting itself in a position of em- 
barrassing dependence. On account of the general 
corruption and intense conservatism of the Chinese 
government, however, it is very difificult to increase 
the ordinary revenue, so that special needs of the 
Chinese state have to be satisfied by outside aid. 
This consideration, notwithstanding the great re- 
sources of China, renders the empire especially 
liable to foreign influence through the instrumen- 
tality of loans. 

As the railway loans, though guaranteed by the 
Chinese government, are not made directly to it, 
but are mostly secured by the property of the rail- 
ways themselves, and are to be paid out of the 
income of the latter, they have not here been con- 
sidered. In the event of corrupt and wasteful man- 
agement of these railways by the Chinese adminis- 
tration, it might, however, also become possible to 
turn these loans into instrumentalities for exerting 
pressure upon the government for political ends. 

In the code of regulations for mines and rail- 
ways which was issued in 1898, the imperial 
Chinese government declares : — 

" The mines and railways of Manchuria, Shantung, and 
Lungchow are affected by international relations, and there- 
fore will not be allowed to form precedents either for Chinese 
160 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

or foreigners. . . . Railway agreements giving mining rights 
along the route will not be allowed to form precedents in the 
future." ^ 

This declaration places in a separate category, 
governed by international — that is, political — 
considerations, the concessions given to Russia 
in Manchuria, to Germany in Shantung, and to 
France in Lungchow, and it specially provides 
that these exceptional political concessions are not 
to be made a precedent in the ordinary adminis- 
tration of mining and transportation grants in the 
empire. 

It will be well, therefore, to investigate the 
nature of the privileges granted to these three 
powers with a view to ascertaining whether they 
have obtained any rights of a purely political 
nature, and whether they have given to their 
industrial operations a character into which polit- 
ical purposes may be said to enter. We have 
already noted how important, in the present state 
of world politics, apparently insignificant conces- 
sions may be. A nation once obtaining a foothold, 
whether through missions, or railroads, or com- 
mercial concessions, cannot easily be dislodged, 
and is often by the current of events urged to look 
forward to more complete influence and even po- 
litical control. 

In Manchuria, Russia has leased Port Arthur 
and Talien-wan with the adjacent parts of the 
Liao Tung Peninsula. The northern limit of the 

^ § 3; see Note 2, appended to this Part. 
M l6l 



WORLD POLITICS 

concession has not been strictly defined as yet. 
Within this area the navai, military, and civil 
administration is controlled by Russia ; to the 
north, Chinese political control still nominally con- 
tinues, although Chinese troops may not be quar- 
tered there without the consent of Russia. This 
provision, taken in connection with the uncertainty 
of the boundary and the introduction of Russian 
garrisons, is a sufficient indication of the political 
purposes of the northern empire. Port Arthur 
has been turned into a strongly fortified naval 
base and is closed to foreign commerce and traffic. 
Talien-wan, on the other hand, or, as it has since 
been renamed, Dalny has been opened to the 
commercial fleets of all the nations,^ and exten- 
sive improvements are contemplated by the Russian 
government. The tax administration of northern 
Manchuria is controlled largely by Russian officials 
under the veil of friendly advice to the local man- 
darins. In addition to all this, Russia has obtained 
exclusive mining privileges within the province of 
Manchuria. In other words, mining concessions 
within that region are no longer granted by the 
imperial government at Peking, but by the Russian 
administration. 

That the Chinese government is still clinging to 

1 " In view of the commercial development of the future city, we 
confer upon it for the whole term during which that territory has 
been leased to Russia by China, under the agreement dated the 
I5th-27th of March, 1898, the rights of free trade which belong to 
free ports." — Imperial decree of July 30, 1899. 

162 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

the semblance of sovereignty in Manchuria is evi- 
dent from a Chinese imperial decree of December, 
1898, regarding railway construction. The decree 
mentions the Shan-hai-kwan line as most impor- 
tant, and then goes on to say: "Beyond, Moukden 
and Newchwang are strategical points, and rail- 
ways must be built." ^ As we have seen, the 
Newchwang concession was actually given to a 
British corporation, but Russia did not discontinue 
her opposition to this grant until she had made 
China deny to the concessionaries the ordinary 
mortgage and foreclosure rights, and had also 
secured from the Peking government the exclusion 
of all British control of the new lines. 

That the Siberian and Manchurian railway, the 
industrial value of which has already been dis- 
cussed, has also a great strategical and political 
importance must not be overlooked. According 
to a Russian imperial decree, the railway is to have 
" sufficient rolling stock to be able to form three 
sets of army trains per twenty-four hours." The 
railroad in Manchuria is already garrisoned by a 
force of 10,000 men.^ Considering that Enp^hr::' 
keeps India in order with a European force ol 
80,000 men, the protection of the construction of 
a railway seems to be most abundantly provKk-d 
for by the Russian government. Wherev r a 
railway station is erected, the flag of Russia is un- 
furled, usually above that of the Chinese Empire. 

1 See Consular Reports, May, 1899, p. 66. 
* Ibid.y March, 1900, p. 275. 
163 



WORLD POLITICS 

The railway company which was organized to 
build the Manchurian branch is, as has been said, 
merely a mask for the Russian government, and 
has a trusted coadjutor in financial matters in 
the Russo-Chinese Bank at Peking and Shanghai 
— a bank which is in close touch with the political 
purposes of the Russian Empire. 

The German Empire is fully aware of the im- 
portance of political influence and prestige in the 
affairs of the Orient. Thus, the emperor sent his 
own brother to represent the interests of Germany 
in China, and Prince Henry has missed no oppor- 
tunity to impress upon the Oriental mind the dig- 
nity of the German imperial house and government. 
He is the first foreigner who was ever presented 
to the Chinese emperor without the ceremony 
of kotozu, — i.e., abject prostration before the Son 
of Heaven, — and greeted by him on a footing of 
equahty. To impress central China with the 
greatness of Germany, Prince Henry undertook 
a trir n the Yangtse River. The Germans are 
evidciiLiy preparing to take advantage of any 
opportunities Vv'.ich the shifting conditions of 
China may afford. As Minister von Buelow said 
in a speech in the Reichstag : — 

* 
"Mention has been made of a partition of China. Such a 
partition will not be brought about by us at any rate. All 
that we have done is to provide that, come what may, we our- 
selves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot de- 
cide when the train is to start, but he can be sure not to miss 
it when it does start. The devil take the hindmost." 
164 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

In addition to the lease of the port of Kiao- 
chow, where she exercises the same control as 
does Russia at Port Arthur, Germany, as has 
already been noted above, has obtained exclu- 
sive mining and railway concessions in Shantung. 
Syndicates desiring to develop mines must there- 
fore obtain their concessions through the German 
government and not from Peking. The initial 
works for the construction of the railway were 
interfered with by Chinese mobs who did not 
like the high-handed manner of the German mili- 
tary and German officialdom. Troops for garri- 
sons were therefore landed and encounters took 
place between natives and soldiers. Should diffi- 
culties of this kind continue, they would inevitably 
lead to a military occupation of the entire province, 
against which protests would be of little avail. 

In the case of France, the political purposes of 
industrial undertakings are very evident. Organs 
of French colonial expansion have long discussed 
with evident favor the policy of establishing com- 
munication between the Russian and French 
spheres of interest in China, with the object of 
preventing Great Britain from exercising para- 
mount control along the whole of the Yangtse 
Valley and connecting her sphere of interest in 
China with her Indian possessions. It is not 
strange, therefore, that political importance should 
be attributed to the Hankow-Peking railway 
undertaking, in view of the fact that both Russia 
and France used their diplomatic influence in 
165 



WORLD POLITICS 

securing the concession. The rapidity with which 
the stock for this undertaking was subscribed at 
Paris, notwithstanding the unfavorable report of 
the Credit Lyoimais, may also to some extent be 
attributed to political enthusiasm. 

The Russians and French have long had their 
eyes on the city of Hankow, the natural centre of 
industrial China. As far back as 1896, an exclusive 
territorial concession was obtained here by Russia. 
Russian methods were illustrated by the ousting 
of many old inhabitants and by the contesting 
of titles that had been registered for more than 
thirty years in the British consulate. At present 
attempts are being made to gain an additional ter- 
ritorial concession in Hankow as a railroad termi- 
nal for the Hankow-Peking line. Politicians are 
inclined to look upon this as an attempt to form 
a Russo-French enclave in the Yangtse Valley. 

In 1898, the French government, with the assist- 
ance of Russia, attempted to obtain an exclusive 
territorial concession at Shanghai. Pressure was 
brought to bear on the viceroy of Nanking, which 
was only relieved by the appearance of some 
British men-of-war.^ The French demands were 
recently renewed with Russian support; but the 
requests of the ministers of other nations for an 
extension of the cosmopolitan settlement were 
granted, all the representatives except those of 
France and Russia signing the agreement. When 

1 " The Far East : Extension of Shanghai," London Times, Sep- 
tember 2, 1898. 

166 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

we remember the fact that the commercial interests 
of France in Shanghai are inconsiderable, and 
that at present they are actually decreasing, we 
can scarcely escape the conclusion that political 
motives were preponderant in all this agitation. 

France has obtained a concession for the occu- 
pation of Quangchow Bay in Quangtung on a 
ninety-nine year lease, with rights and conditions 
similar to those of Russia in Port Arthur. The 
French railway undertakings in southern China 
are financed and managed entirely by the French 
government. Their commercial importance is 
avowedly small, and their predominant purpose is 
therefore generally considered to be political and 
strategical. 

In this connection, it is interesting to note the 
expression of French colonial policy in Indo-China 
contained in a speech by the governor of that 
province, M. Dumer, before the Chamber of Com- 
merce at Rouen early in 1899: — 

"The quod libet which has presented itself to the adminis- 
trators of this colony was the proper action or means to be 
taken in order to create and increase a market there for the 
manufactured products of France. For it may be said that' 
this is a colony's raison d''etre; in other words, the purely 
administrative government of a colony is a relatively easy 
matter to deal with, when compared with the development of 
its commerce. Those appointed to guide the destinies of our 
foreign possessions should spare neither effort nor application 
in widening the outlet therein for the fruits of our home labor 
and industry. ... I have asked the French government for 
a loan of two hundred million francs in order to further im- 
167 



WORLD POLITICS 

prove the condition of its eastern colony. Some consider 
this too much, but it must not be imagined that the two hun- 
dred million francs will be taken away from France, nor that 
the loan will be lilce so much money withdrawn from circula- 
tion, for more than two-thirds will be expended in nourishing 
French industries. Your founderies will send us iron for 
bridges and buildings ; your rolling mills, rails ; your forests, 
sleepers ; your car shops, rolling stock ; your quarries, slate ; 
your hills, cement. All these will be carried to the Orient by 
French ships, giving employment to French people. Our 
colonies in Tongking in particular have cost us a great deal. 
We have already spent there one thousand million francs and 
lost many human lives. The time has now come to reap the 
harvest of our expenditure and the fruit of our labors." ^ 

The loan asked for by the governor was granted 
by the French government, the proceeds to be 
used exclusively in the construction of railways; 
and, as has been said before, the first issue of 
stock was bid for thirty-six times over in one day. 
According to the terms of Article 4 of the Law of 
December 25, 1898, creating the loan, any mate- 
rial necessary for the construction of the above 
mentioned railroads which is not obtainable in 
Indo-China must be purchased of French dealers 
and must be carried in vessels flying the French 
flag. According to the new Indo-Chinese tariff, 
export duties are collected on all merchandise 
leaving the colony, except that going to France. 

In 1897, the French government obtained from 
the Tsungli Yamen the promise not to alienate 
any portion of Hainan Island to any other foreign 

^ Translation given in the Consular Reports, 1899. 
168 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

power. In 1898, this promise was extended to 
the three boundary provinces of Quangtung, 
Quangsi, and Yunnan. No industrial concessions 
were connected with this agreement, but certain 
industrial preferences had already been given to 
the French government in the two preceding 
years. 

The official agreement for the Lungchow-Nan- 
ning railroad was signed at Peking on September 
15, 1899. The Chinese government is to provide 
3,000,000 taels of the capital required, but only 
French engineers and materials are to be employed 
in the construction of the line. The Russo-Chinese 
Bank furnishes the necessary funds. On his return 
to Indo-China, Governor Dumer went in person to 
Yunnanfou, where he tried to prevail upon the 
Chinese governor to grant some important terri- 
torial concessions in connection with the terminus 
of the French railway line. On this occasion the 
French flag was unfurled in the centre of the town. 
Anti-French feeling is reported to be so strong in 
Yunnan that the viceroy felt himself called upon 
to warn the people not to molest the engineers on 
their surveying expeditions. Persons interested in 
the development of Yunnan, both French and Brit- 
ish, maintain that the resources of that province are 
far beyond what has ordinarily been believed on 
the basis of former reports. 

While the inroads upon Chinese sovereignty 
which have been described in the above para- 
graphs were being made, the British government 
169 



WORLD POLITICS 

appeared to be so singularly supine and so indif- 
ferent or ignorant regarding the importance of 
Chinese affairs, that for a time it seemed as if Brit- 
ish influence at Peking would be entirely super- 
seded by that of Russia, France, and Germany. 
It cannot be denied that during this time British 
prestige received a decided set-back, from which 
British interests in China still suffer, and which, 
unless repaired within a very short time, must nec- 
essarily leave permanent marks on the history of 
the Celestial Empire. The British government 
was at that time concentrating all its efforts on 
the task of reconquering the Soudan and render- 
ing futile French and Russian intrigues in Abys- 
sinia and Bahr-el-Ghazal. In February, 1898, 
however, Great Britain shook off her previous in- 
difference and obtained the well-known agreement 
on the part of the Chinese government never to 
alienate any territories in the province adjoining 
the Yangtse to any other power, under lease, 
mortgage, or any other designation. No exclusive 
privileges were claimed in connection with this 
agreement, and the British government has so far 
adhered to its policy of making its influence the 
aegis of equal industrial and commercial opportu- 
nities for all nations. 

On July I, 1898, a convention was signed at 
Peking, by which the Chinese government leased 
to England Wei-hai-wei and the adjacent waters 
for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain 
in the possession of Russia. The grant comprises 

170 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

a belt of land ten miles wide along the entire coast 
line of the bay of Wei-hai-wei. Chinese admin- 
istration is still to go on except where it would be 
inconsistent with naval and military requirements. 

Iri the same year the British government also 
obtai!:ied the lease of an additional slice of Kow- 
lun, while at the same time the Shanghai foreign 
settlement was extended, chiefly through the influ- 
ence of Great Britain. The Chinese government 
has also been prevailed upon to give verbal assur- 
ances thvt the provinces of Yunnan and Quang- 
tung she ;ld not be alienated to any other power. 
With regard te» these two provinces, therefore, the 
same promite has now been given to both France 
and Great Lritain. But as the Chinese govern- 
ment lacks botA power and inclination to stand by 
its promises and keep them to the fullest extent, 
they are really to b"^ regarded rather as manifes- 
toes declaring the inter.tion of the power in whose 
favor they are made. 'bus, in the promise given 
to France, the latter leally declares its wish to 
exclude the interference of other governments in 
the boundary provin :es, and a similar purpose 
lies at the basis of the Anglo-Chinese convention. 

Many writers interpret these conventions as 
implying the definite seizure and occupation of 
certain portions of the Chinese Empire by foreign 
powers ; but such an interpretation is entirely un- 
justified and misleading. On the contrary, it must 
be emphasized that they do not necessarily involve 
any immediate or future political control, but, leav- 
171 



WORLD POLITICS 

ing the sovereignty of China otherwise undisurbed, 
simply demand from her that non-interference shall 
be insisted upon, and that no exclusive advantages 
shall be granted to other foreign powers, bhould 
the partition of China become an actuality, how- 
ever, the spheres thus delimited will be ir*.jisted 
upon by the powers respectively interestec'. as a 
basis for partition. But as Quangtung, Sze_huen, 
and Yunnan are regarded as special spheres of 
interest by both Great Britain and France, far- 
reaching international complications a'"e to be 
apprehended in case of the dissolution of China. 
Discussion of these possible complications is for 
the present deferred. 

The Yangtse region being commonly regarded 
as the sphere of interest of Grcitt Britain, it be- 
comes important to note the ofi"cial expressions of 
the British government with regard to this basin. 
The region was defined by Mr. Brodrick, Under- 
Secretary of State, as con listing of the provinces 
bordering on the Yangtse, together with Chekiang 
and Honan. In the Anglo-German agreement of 
September, 1898, it is define. I as consisting of those 
districts through which streams flow into the Yang- 
tse. The British sphere of interest is ordinarily 
interpreted as also including the eastern two-thirds 
of Quangtung, which contains the city of Canton, 
and in which English commercial interests are far 
in the ascendant. This interpretation confines 
French interests to the western part of that prov- 
ince, which is tributary to the harbor of Pakhoi. 

172 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

The policy of the British government with regard 
to the Yangtse region was outHned in the speech 
by the Right Honorable Mr. Brodrick, in Parlia- 
ment, on June 9, 1899, to which reference has 
already been made. He said in substance : — 

"We hold the Chinese government to their undertaking 
not to alienate any province in the Yangtse basin and to per- 
mit the extension of the Burma railroad into Yunnan to con- 
nect us with Chingkiang. We regard the improvement of 
the Yangtse gorges as a question for British engineers. We 
shall keep what force is necessaiy between Ichang and the 
mouth of the Yangtse. These measures are purely precau- 
tionary, and are taken with the object of giving security to 
our merchants and traders." 

Speaking of the open door and of spheres of 
interest, he continued : — 

"I deny that we have abandoned the one policy or adopted 
the other. We are endeavoring to secure that a full share of 
railway and mining concessions shall fall to British investors. 
We shall endeavor to provide that trade shall be free from 
undue taxation. We are looking forward to the opening of 
inland waters besides the Yangtse and ports that are not now 
treaty ports to trade." ^ 

Turning now to a consideration of Italy in her 
relations to China, we note that at the beginning 
of 1899 she was engaged in an effort to secure a 
footing in China, having selected as her field of 
exploitation the province of Chekiang. Although 
supported by British influence, she did not meet 
with a favorable response at Peking. For this 

1 Cited in "The Problem of China," Edinburgh Review, July, 



173 



WORLD POLITICS 

reason, and also on account of the popular oppo- 
sition which the ItaHans manifested toward the 
further acquisition of territory or to an expansion- 
ist policy, the Italian foreign minister declared, in 
June, 1899, that the wisest course for Italy to pur- 
sue was to avoid territorial expansion and to util- 
ize the commercial opportunities in China. The 
present policy of Italy in China, therefore, is purely 
industrial and commercial. Trained consuls are to 
be sent to various parts of the empire, and a com- 
mercial attache is to be added to the legation at 
Peking. The government expects to give steady 
support to private undertakings, and demands for 
mining concessions are vigorously pressed at the 
Chinese capital. 

The last country whose relations with China we 
have to consider is Japan, which obtained the 
island of Formosa as a part of the war indemnity 
in 1896, and exacted a promise of non-alienation 
with regard to the province of Fokien, opposite 
Formosa. There has been no further interference 
on the part of this power, although Japan is in 
close sympathy with the reform party and the 
nativistic tendencies in the Chinese Empire. In 
Corea, Russian ascendency has been temporarily 
supplanted by the Japanese, on account of the 
overbearing harshness and financial incompetence 
of the Russian representatives. The Japanese in 
Corea encourage every attempt at reform, while 
the Russians oppose it. Large numbers of Jap- 
anese citizens are emigrating and settling there, 
174 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

the free port of Mokpo alone having received a 
Japanese population of twelve hundred since 1897. 
Corea has been kept open for exploitation, and 
American and German gold mine concessions are 
worked with vigor, while the French are inactive, 
having drawn but little profit from their Russian 
alliance in this section of the Orient. The 
Japanese systematically and tenaciously counter- 
act every Russian attempt to gain territorial 
concessions or a political foothold of any kind in 
Corea. It would seem that ultimately an armed 
conflict between Russia and Japan over the con- 
trol of Corea will be unavoidable. 

It remains for us now to review briefly the 
international arrangements recently concluded 
with regard to China. We must first, in this 
connection, call attention to the importance of 
" the most favored nation " clauses in the various 
treaties formerly concluded between China and 
foreign powers. The upholding of this clause is a 
necessary condition of the policy of the open door ; 
but it has been shown repeatedly, during the last 
few years, that wherever a power is strong enough 
and persistent enough in its demands, exclusive 
mining and railway privileges, even when they in- 
fringe these clauses in letter and in spirit, will be 
granted. Never has it been more true that treaties 
are simply a statement of existing facts. Treaties 
concluded with China, and treaties framed with 
regard to China, are simply an index to the 
present position and power of the various govern- 

175 



WORLD POLITICS 

ments who are parties to the respective agree- 
ments. Wherever an opportunity or a plausible 
pretext to disregard the treaties offers itself, or 
wherever a power feels that the rival nations are 
so occupied with other matters as not to be able to 
insist upon the enforcement of their treaty rights, 
the promises and arrangements contained in 
treaties will have very little restraining influence 
on political action. 

During the past six months a diplomatic cor- 
respondence has been going on between the minis- 
ters of foreign affairs of the great powers who are 
interested in Chinese affairs and the American 
Department of State. The United States ambas- 
sadors had been instructed by Secretary Hay to 
endeavor to obtain from each of the various powers 
claiming "spheres of interest" in China a declara- 
tion substantially to the following effect : — 

(i) That it will in no wise interfere with any 
treaty port or any vested interest within any so- 
called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it 
may have in China. 

(2) That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time 
being shall apply to all merchandise landed or 
shipped to all such ports as are within such 
"spheres of interest" (unless they be "free 
ports "), no matter to what nationality it may 
belong, and that duties so leviable shall be col- 
lected by the Chinese government. 

(3) That it will levy no higher harbor dues on 
vessels of another nationahty frequenting any port 

176 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

in such " sphere " than shall be levied on vessels 
of its own nationality and no higher railroad 
charges over lines built, controlled, or operated 
within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to 
citizens or subjects of other nationalities trans- 
ported through such " sphere " than shall be levied 
on similar merchandise belonging to its own 
nationals transported over equal distances. ^ 

By March 20, 1900, favorable replies had been 
received from the leading European powers, — 
France, Germany, Great Britian, Italy, Russia, — 
and from Japan. At that date Secretary Hay in- 
structed the American ambassadors to these powers, 
and the minister at Tokyo, to notify the powers to 
which they were respectively accredited that all the 
governments concerned had accepted the proposal 
of the United States and that therefore the consent 
of each would be considered final and definite. 

The portion of the reply of Count Mouravieff 
which relates to the imposition of customs duties 
in the Russian "sphere," reads as follows: — 

" In so far as the territory leased by China to Russia is 
concerned, the imperial government has already demonstrated 
its firm intention to follow the policy of "the open door" by 
creating Dalny (Talien-wan) a free port ; and if at some future 
time that port, although remaining free itself, should be sepa- 
rated by a customs limit from other portions of the territory in 
question, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone 
subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchandise without dis- 
tinction as to nationality." 

1 Open-Door Policy in China. House of Representatives Docu- 
ment No. 547, Fifty-sixth Congress. 

177 



WORLD POLITICS 

It will be noted that this answer reserves to 
Russia the right to levy customs duties on foreign 
imports into her Chinese " leasehold," and simply 
promises not to make any distinction between 
foreign nations. Furthermore the Russian reply 
passes over clause 3 of Secretary Hay's proposal 
in silence ; i.e., it makes no promises with regard 
to railway charges and harbor dues. 

It may seem that this diplomatic reserve on the 
part of the power from which infractions of the 
"open-door" policy have been especially feared, 
renders the mutual assurances given of somewhat 
problematical value. The informal character of this 
correspondence would also prevent it from ranking 
as the foundation of mutual treaty rights among the 
powers interested. Nevertheless it is important 
in contemporary history, as recognizing the regime 
of spheres of interest as an established fact, and as 
containing the first clear declarations on the part of 
the great European powers in favor of upholding 
the policy of equal opportunity in China. To have 
obtained an expression of international opinion on 
this point was a valuable achievement on the part 
of the American Department of State. 

Among recent international agreements concern- 
ing China, three claim our special attention. In 
the first place should be mentioned the Anglo- 
French Siam Convention of 1896, respecting the 
exploitation of Szechuen and Yunnan, by which 
the two nations pledge each other to enjoy in 
common all the privileges and advantages of any 

178 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

nature conceded to either nation within these or 
other provinces. The agreement can be looked 
upon only as a temporary modus vivendi. In 
fact, the concessions which France is now insist- 
ing upon virtually constitute an abrogation of the 
agreement. Of course they may be toned down 
so as to come within the compass of the proper 
share of that nation in the development of these 
provinces on an equal footing with other powers, 
and against such concessions no objections could 
be made. 

A second agreement of special importance is 
that concluded between German and British 
financiers in September, 1898, by which the latter 
agree to recognize and respect the primary right 
of Germany to obtain railway concessions in 
Shantung, and in the valley of the Yellow River, 
while, reciprocally, the German capitalists recog- 
nize a similar preemption on the part of Great 
Britain in the Yangtse region. This agreement, 
entered into with the sanction of the two govern- 
ments, may have important international conse- 
quences, as it favors a more complete understand- 
ing between the two nations, and a strengthening 
of the common purpose to prevent further en- 
croachments by Russia upon the centre of the 
Chinese Empire. 

The third important agreement is that concluded 
between Russia and England in April, 1899. 
The substance of this informal treaty is that 
Great Britain will not seek on her own account, 

179 



WORLD POLITICS 

or in behalf of her own subjects, any railway con- 
cessions to the north of the Great Wall of China ; 
and that she will not obstruct any appHcation for 
such concessions in that region which are sup- 
ported by the Russian government. Russia, in 
return, enters into a similar engagement with 
regard to railway concessions in the basin of the 
Yangtse. The following paragraph is particularly 
significant : — 

"The two contracting parties, having in no wise in view 
to infringe in any way the sovereign rights of China or the 
existing treaties, will not fail to communicate to the Chinese 
government the present arrangement, which by averting all 
cause of complications between them, is of a nature to con- 
solidate peace in the far East and to serve the primordial 
interests of China herself." 

The agreement also includes the arrangement 
with regard to the Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang 
line, which has already been discussed. 

Although the last two agreements, — the Anglo- 
German and the Anglo-Russian, — refer entirely 
to railway exploitation, and are therefore only in- 
directly of political significance, they nevertheless 
serve to mark a spirit of mutual forbearance and 
an intention to carry on the work of opening and 
developing China along equitable lines, each nation 
being granted an adequate sphere in which she 
can centralize her interests and from which she 
can join in an effective cooperation in the inter- 
national purpose. 

The relations between Great Britain and Japan 
i8o 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

are on the whole friendly and favorable to active 
cooperation in the affairs of the far Orient. True, 
England is thought by many Japanese to have 
entered into the scramble for territorial conces- 
sions in China. Thus, the Djivinim, the chief 
liberal journal of Tokyo, says: — ■ 

" We must finish once for all with tlie idea of an Anglo- 
Japanese alliance whose mission it would be to save China. 
An alliance is possible only between nations that understand 
each other perfectly and that have a common enemy. Now, 
who is the probable enemy of Japan? We see several. . . . 
England having forgotten her former solemn promises, we 
cannot preserve the integrity of the Chinese Empire alone. 
The fate of the Celestial Empire is decided." ^ 

On the other hand, the most influential statesmen 
of Japan, Counts Ito and Okuma, and Viscount 
Aoki, still favor cooperation with Great Britain. 

Prince Chung, of China, has been agitating at 
Peking in favor of a Chino-Japanese aUiance. He 
has even, on his own responsibility, sent a legation 
to Japan to investigate the state of opinion at To- 
kyo regarding such an alliance. It is not believed, 
however, that any alliance can at present be 
concluded, because Japan does not wish to commit 
herself to support the Manchu government, while 
the latter fears the sympathy of Japan with the 
reform and native Chinese element.^ 

1 Cited in the Reviie Politique et Parlementairey Vol, XXI., 
p. 645. 

2 It is also reported that the Japanese were scandalized and 
offended by the personal and social insignificance of the special 
envoys sent by the Chinese government to negotiate a treaty. 

181 



CHAPTER IV 

Summary of the Actual Condition of Affairs 
IN China 

Having now reviewed the details of the opening 
up of China as it is going on at the present time, 
we are in a position to draw some general con- 
clusions based on the previous discussion. The 
general situation is characteristically outlined in 
some remarks by the Japanese Count Okuma. 
He says in substance : — 

" If the powers take so much pains in making a new map 
of China, it is a result of their ignorance of the true state of 
that unhappy land and its people. We may best compare the 
Chinese nation to a gigantic tree with mighty roots and strong 
branches. The tree itself has great vigor, but its fruit falls 
from time to time at the merest breath of wind. Such is the 
Manchu dynasty. That it has no longer any authority or 
power does not justify the conclusion that the Chinese nation 
is also menaced in its existence. The great powers may yet 
repent of their error. If the four hundred milhon Chinese, 
appealed to by a superior spirit in their common sentiments 
and beliefs, should rise, what would become of the few 
thousand foreigners ? " ^ 

1 Cited in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Vol. XXL, 
p. 646. 

182 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

It is certainly a great political mistake to judge 
of the weakness or strength of the Chinese Em- 
pire from the condition of its central government. 
Chinese civilization is still a clan civilization, never 
having passed through feudalism into a well- 
moulded state. Even the weakness which Okuma 
attributes to the Manchu dynasty might be denied 
by many. Chang Chi Tung, the great viceroy, 
speaks of the present dynasty in terms of the 
highest praise, and contrasts the peace and 
prosperity of the empire during the centuries of 
Manchu reign with the rebellions, revolutions, and 
assassinations that have filled the annals of 
Western history during the same period. 

The actual status of affairs may be briefly 
summed up in a few sentences. The Europeans, 
protected by their fleets, are in political control of 
a few coast settlements. Russia has obtained 
important political powers in Manchuria, although 
even there she meets with frequent and strenu- 
ous resistance on the part of the masses and has 
to employ an army to protect her railway. Ger- 
many refuses to interfere in the internal affairs of 
China, and, in line with this policy, has recently 
declined to protect Chinese converts to Christian- 
ity, who are always a special mark for persecution 
on the part of their fellow-citizens. German politi- 
cal protection is restricted to her own citizens and 
industries. British gunboats now patrol the Yang- 
tse and West rivers, but it is only to prevent piracy 
and to protect European trade, a duty laid upon 
1S3 



WORLD POLITICS 

them by the fact that the torpedo boats which the 
Chinese government detailed for duty along these 
rivers promptly engaged in turning an honest 
penny by towing, while the pirates plied their 
trade with undisturbed effrontery ! The question, 
outside of those territories which have actually 
been leased, is up to the present moment one of 
security, — of protecting the incipient industrial 
and commercial interests and communications. 
No power, except perhaps Russia, seems to be 
contemplating any actual assumption, at least in 
the immediate future, of sovereignty over large 
tracts of land. 

The policy of "spheres of influence" is not 
necessarily opposed to the policy of the " open 
door." At present, if we may interpret the dec- 
larations of the great powers by their course of 
action, the term " sphere of influence " in its most 
extended meaning refers to a region where a power 
holds itself specially responsible for security of 
life and investment, and uses its political influence 
for the furthering of economic development. As 
long as freedom of opportunity is preserved within 
these spheres, as long as treaty ports are kept 
open and their number is gradually increased, the 
policy designated by the term "open door" is prac- 
tically in force, even although the policing of the 
empire may have been divided up among the 
powers. The fact that a nation is interested in 
certain portions of China to the extent of desir- 
ing to exclude other powers from far-reaching con- 

1S4 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

cessions within such territories does not of itself 
argue that it contemplates the assumption of politi- 
cal sovereignty therein. 

To arrive at a conception of the difficulties which 
would meet any proposal looking toward the 
immediate assumption of complete political sover- 
eignty over extended districts in China, we need 
only consider the actual internal conditions of the 
empire. The success of the industrial develop- 
ments thus far undertaken is a question yet to be 
answered. It is not even known how the popula- 
tions of the interior will bear continued exploita- 
tion by European capitalists. We do know that 
Russia and Germany have had serious trouble in 
the construction of their railways, and while the 
surveyors of the Canton railway did not meet with 
the anticipated resistance, riots in other parts of 
the empire — as in Szechuen, arising from opposi- 
tion to the introduction of mining machinery and 
other improvements — have been frequent and 
violent. 

In the great industrial revolution that is im- 
pending in China, the inevitable sufferings will 
readily be attributed to foreign influence and for- 
eign interference. If we compare the probable 
situation in China during the coming days with 
that of England at the beginning of the present 
century, we can imagine what serious disturbances 
may arise. It may be said by some that the 
development of China will take the form of the 
introduction of new industries, which will give 
185 



WORLD POLITICS 

employment to great numbers of Chinese. But, 
at the same time, the old industries now existing 
in the empire, — house industries, carried on by 
families in their homes, — will be replaced, as they 
have been in India, by the modern factory system, 
so that the revolution may be even more intense 
than it was in the cotton manufacturing districts 
of England, and will certainly be more formidable 
on account of the vastly greater multitudes affected. 
^At present, for instance, the construction of rail- 
ways is giving employment to large numbers ; but, 
once completed, they will drive out of service the 
private carriers who are now a very numerous 
class of the laboring population. Many of these 
carriers do not even have any beasts of burden, but 
furnish, none the less, a very rapid delivery ser- 
vice at remarkably low compensation. As the rail- 
way net spreads and covers the land, their services 
will of course become unnecessary, and they will 
have to seek employment in other branches of in- 
dustry. So, too, in all branches of native manufac- 
ture, the introduction of European machinery will 
at first produce intense suffering to individuals, by 
concentrating the industries and undoing hosts of 
trained workmen. X' 

All this must be taken into account in framing 
any policy of opening the resources of China to 
European exploitation. Inevitably the disastrous 
consequences which reform always brings in its 
train to those individuals whose accustomed econ- 
omic function is destroyed, will be attributed to the 

i86 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

"foreign devils," and the prejudiced multitude, 
wrought upon by the evident discomfort of large 
classes of laborers, may go to the length of inflict- 
ing the greatest damage on foreign industrial prop- 
erty, and may perhaps even make industrial 
operations impossible. Though this view presents 
only a possibility, it is a possibility that must be 
taken into account as an unavoidable risk to be 
assumed by foreign investors, and as an element in 
the political situation that may lead to serious com- 
plications if European powers are ever called upon 
to protect the property of their subjects in China. ^ 
\\ There are still large sections of Chinese territory 
in which the government has so far been unable to 
suppress brigandage and piracy. The brigands of 
Quangtung are especially efficient and energetic.^ 
They often defeat detachments of the regular army 
and take whole towns, above which they float their 
feudal banners. The methods of the pirates are 
characteristically practical and efficacious. A band 
of pirates will buy regular passage on a river 
steamer, and, when they come to a convenient 
place, overawe the officials of the ship and the 
passengers, pocket whatever valuables are to be 
found, and have themselves landed, to be received 
on shore by their associates and hurried away into 

1 The great secret societies of China, e.g. the Boxers, are already 
showing signs of a readiness to antagonize foreigners on account of 
their interference with Chinese custorns and industries. 

2 Of late they have even been bold enough to extort money from 
the merchants of Canton by threats of dynamiting their hongs. 

187 



WORLD POLITICS 

the mountain regions. As pirates are convention- 
ally supposed to sail in a ship of their own, it is 
perhaps doubtful whether these river robbers should 
be dignified with that more romantic designation. 
But, whether they are pirates or robbers, the Chi- 
nese government is apparently powerless to sup- 
press them, and there is in this another dangerous 
obstruction to the peaceful development of indus- 
try and the avoidance of foreign interference.^) • 

The condition of the private law and its admin- 
istration is also of such a nature that reform is 
imperatively demanded before foreign capital can 
be safely invested and business arrangements reg- 
ularly concluded. There is practically no poUce. 
The Yamen runners, unpaid hangers-on of the 
mandarin judges, supply the place of a regular 
police in the most unsatisfactory manner. As they 
are not regular officials, they have absolutely no 
sense of duty toward the state, and will use every 
opportunity to extort unlawful payments from the 
unfortunate individuals who fall into their hands. 
So inefficient is the administration of the law that 
it has become a practical tenet of Chinese wisdom 
that courts must at all risk be avoided, and from 
the classics down, the writers unite in bewailing 
the fate of the man who becomes involved in a 
lawsuit. There is practically no civil law and 
no commercial code. Courts act on the principle 
of arbitration, and whatever security commercial 
dealings now have, rests on the unimpeachable 
honesty manifested by the Chinese merchants. 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

The reform of the law and the adoption of a 
commercial code to be used by Chinese and 
foreigners alike, have long been a desideratum of 
Chinese commerce and industry. As far back 
as 1876, the English government, through Sir 
Rutherford Alcock, made a demand upon the 
Tsungli Yamen to have such a code prepared and 
enforced. But it seems hardly probable that a 
sweeping reform of local administration can be ex- 
pected of the central government at the present 
time. Reform will have to be begun in some of the 
more populous industrial provinces, where a strong 
public opinion in favor of an impartial and regular 
administration of justice already exists. A remark- 
able illustration of the desire of the Chinese mer- 
chants for settled legal conditions is found in the 
manner in which they crowd into those territo- 
ries which are held by foreign nations, such as 
Hongkong and the international settlement at 
Shanghai. Here they may enjoy the advantages 
of impartial courts and consistent rules of law 
which they so highly appreciate. The Chinese 
government apparently foresees trouble in this 
matter. It has, therefore, indicated its refusal to 
implicate itself in private controversies between 
foreigners and Chinese.^ It is very doubtful, how- 
ever, whether foreign governments will take the 
same view of the case. They will certainly insist 
upon fair play and an equitable administration of 

1 See " Regulations for Mines and Railways in China," Note 2, 
at the end of this chapter. 

180 



WORLD POLITICS 

justice in all those cases in which their own citi- 
*zens are concerned. 

From all this it may be judged how easily Chi- 
nese affairs may become complicated by foreign 
intervention. It is to be hoped that the develop- 
ment of China will be managed with such tact and 
careful consideration of the feelings of the Chi- 
nese population as to avoid a serious collision 
between foreigners and natives, or the growth of 
animosities and prejudices which may arrest for 
decades the work of reform and progress. With 
this careful guarding of the friendly relations 
between Europeans and Chinese, there must, how- 
ever, go a firm and constant pressure for adminis- 
trative and legal reform ; for, unless the insecurities 
which are bound to result from the defects above 
outlined are obviated, the relations between the 
Chinese and the foreign investors and industrial 
leaders will always be in danger of far-reaching 
disturbance. 

Up to the present time, Great Britain, counting 
on the wilHngness of the Peking mandarins to 
reform the empire if given the active assistance 
of a strong foreign power, has attempted to effect 
these reforms by strengthening the central power. 
Now, however, the difficulties of this policy, — 
which, moreover, has borne little fruit in the past, 
— have become almost insurmountable. On ac- 
count of the international jealousies centring at 
Peking, the exercise of influence by any power, 
no matter how humanitarian and unselfish its 
190 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

motive may be, would to-day arouse the ever ready 
jealousies of other nations, if it desired to inter- 
fere in Chinese affairs through the central gov- 
ernment. Moreover, the decentralization of the 
Chinese administration is such that it could be 
moulded into a unified organism only by a great 
revolution or by the work of an overpowering 
genius. ? The Tsungli Yamen is very generous 
in promises ; but, unless there is at hand a power 
ready to enforce these promises against other for- 
eign nations, they have absolutely no value, since 
it is a settled principle of Chinese action to put a 
man off with promises in order to make him feel 
satisfied. Both the power and the inclination for 
any really far-reaching reform, therefore, are lack- 
ing in the imperial council. J>/ 

It is different with many of the local govern- 
ments. Here the officials come more directly in 
contact with the people and with the practical 
business of administering the law. While, as a 
class, they receive very inadequate salaries, and 
are consequently given to the universal Chinese 
official practice of extorting from ten to twenty 
times their legal emolument, they have among 
their number many men of strong character and 
practical experience. It is through these men 
and through the administrations of which they are 
the heads that enduring reforms must be attempted. 

The methods of controlling the Chinese admin- 
istration from the capital are very lax, and there- 
fore any power that can gain the support of the 
191 



WORLD POLITICS 

local authorities will be able to effect important 
reforms. Of late, it is true, the imperial govern- 
ment has dismissed several local administrators 
from office on account of their connection with 
foreigners. Thus, the governor of Shanse was 
discharged because he had been instrumental in 
granting the concessions of the Peking syndicate 
and of the Russian Chengting-Taiyuan railway in 
his province. It may be, however, that by such 
action the central government simply desired to 
indicate that the exceptional privileges there 
granted were not to be set up as precedents for 
future action. Again, the Tsungli Yamen, on the 
ground that the mining regulations of the govern- 
ment had not been complied with, recently refused 
to ratify certain mining concessions which had 
been granted to the French by the viceroy of 
Szechuen. While in matters of important conces- 
sions of this kind the central government may 
interfere, the conduct of ordinary administration, 
military and civil, is in the hands of the local offi- 
cials, and it is through them that the beginnings 
of actual reform must be made. These officials 
could be interested in reform by raising their 
salaries so that they may be above the need of 
extortion, and by bringing to bear upon them the 
strong public sentiment of the Chinese merchants 
in favor of reform in the administration of commer- 
cial law. There need be absolutely no interference 
with the prejudices and feelings of the masses. 
Through the viceroys and governors the admin- 

192 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

istration of finance and law and the regulation 
of the armies may be so reformed as to vitalize 
state life in large regions of the Chinese Empire. 
The important change which such a system would 
effect in the collection of taxes would tend to 
satisfy the central government, whose function 
it would be to represent the ideal unity of the 
Chinese Empire and to act as the formal bearer 
of the sovereignty which no European power is 
ready to assume or should venture to claim. 

The question of holding China by force and add- 
ing large portions of Chinese territory to the national 
domains of European powers must appear fan- 
tastic, when we consider Chinese conditions. The 
secret societies alone, which are the most active 
and effective social organizations in the empire, 
could easily prevent the actual seizure of sover- 
eignty by European powers. A very different 
condition from that in India would here confront 
the invader. ^The Chinese are an active, energetic 
race. For ages there has been with them a sur- 
vival of the hardiest. Trained from youth to 
subsist on the most meagre diet, to get along 
with little sleep, and to work patiently for twelve 
or fourteen hours a day, these men scoff at diffi- 
culties and exertions which would within a year 
weary a European to death. There is no over- 
strained sensibility. Human life is held so cheap 
that people often commit suicide simply to cause 
inconvenience to othersTVWith an intense vener- 
ation for the past and an unusual reverence for 

o 193 



WORLD POLITICS 

their ancestors, these people naturally combine a 
tenacious conservatism in matters of every-day 
life and intercourse. 

Should the idea spread that foreigners are about 
to effect a radical change in the social and indus- 
trial constitution of their empire, a violent and 
frantic resistance would be offered. When we 
consider that most of the four hundred million 
inhabitants would readily be drawn into the exist- 
ing secret societies for the purpose of defending 
their hearths and their civilization, the futility of 
any effort of Europeans to govern against their 
will an intelligent and stubborn race like this at 
once becomes apparent. 

The only way in which the Europeans can 
make their influence count permanently in China 
is by a tactful lightening of burdens from above 
and by the introduction of more settled methods of 
administration and law, without at all interfering 
with the local habits and prejudices of the masses. 
As long as European troops shall be employed 
only for the upholding of law and order, for the 
persecution of brigands and rebels, the Chinese 
masses will not oppose them. The multitudes in 
China are peace-loving and orderly, and European 
powers may therefore, without danger to them- 
selves, assist in rendering secure the highways of 
Chinese trade. For this purpose it is of the 
greatest importance to have troops on the ground, 
since a nation that claims any influence in Chinese 
affairs must primarily be able to protect European 
194 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

investments within its sphere of influence. Should 
England, for instance, not be able to protect the 
property of Europeans at Hankow, a plausible 
pretext would at once be furnished for Russian or 
Japanese interference. While, therefore, all un- 
necessary coUision with the details of Chinese life 
must be avoided, a beneficent influence may be 
exercised from above, and order may be main- 
tained at least along the principal highways by 
which European commerce enters the empire. 
Chinese unity can be preserved only through the 
active cooperation of the great commercial powers 
in keeping open her markets and in maintaining 
security for European investments throughout the 
empire, without, however, permitting any power 
to acquire other political rights than are necessary 
for this purpose. 

II 

Note i. Bibliography on Chinese Affairs 

I. Official Publications: — 

Commercial Relations of the United States with For- 
eign Countries. Issued from the Bureau of For- 
eign Commerce, Department of State, Washington. 
An annual publication based on the monthly Coi> 
sular Reports. 

Customs Gazette, Shanghai, published quarterly. 

Report of the Trade of Central and Soidhern China. 
Foreign Office Reports, Miscellaneous Series, No. 
458. London, 1898. 

Rettirns of Trade at the Treaty Ports in China. Part I. 
Abstracts of Trade and Customs Revenue Statistics. 
Shanghai, published yearly. 

195 



WORLD POLITICS 

Report by Mr. Bourne of a Journey in Southwestern 

China. London, 1888. 
Treaties between Great Britaiii and China, by Sir E. 

Hertslet. 2 vols. London, 1896. 

n. Treatises: — 

Ball (J. D.), Things Chinese. 2d ed. London, 1894. 

Barrows (John Henry), Ed., The Worlcfs Parliament of 
Religions. 

Beresford (Lord Charles), The Break-2ip of China. Lon- 
don, 1898. 

Boulger (D. C), History of China. 2d ed., 2 vols. Lon- 
don, 1898. 

Brandt (M. von), Ostasiatische Fragen. Leipzig, 1897. 

Die Zuknnft Ostasiens. Leipzig, 1895. 

Drei Jahre ostasiatischer Politik. 1894-97. 

Die chinesische Philosophie und der Staatsconfucian- 

ismns. Leipzig, 1898. 

Chirol (V.), The Far Eastern Question. London, 1896. 

Colquhoun (A. R.), Across Chryse: frofn Canton to Man- 
dalay. 2 vols. London, 1883. 

China in Transfortnation. London and New York, 

1898. 

Curzon (G. N.), Problems of the Far East. London, 1896. 

Douglas (R. K.), China. London, 1887. 

Confucianism and Taoism. London, 1893. 

Society in China. London, 1894. 

Li Hung Chang. London, 1895. 

Dudgeon (Dr. J.), Historical Sketch of the Ecclesiastical, 
Political, and Commercial Relations of Russia with 
China. Peking, 1872. 

Ehlers (O. E.), Im Osten Asiens. 3d ed. Berlin, 1896. 

Gundry (R. S.), China a? id her Neighbors. London, 1895. 

China Past and Present. London, 1895. 

196 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

Hosie (A.), Three Years in Western China. London, 

1897. 
Hue (L'Abb^ E. R.), I^Einpire Chinois. 2 vols., 4th ed. 

Paris, 1862. 
Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China, 18S 4-1886 

(translated from the French). 2 vols. London, 1898. 
Krausse (A.), China in Decay. London, 1898. 
Laguerie (V. de), La Coree Independante, Russe oti Japo- 

naise. Paris, 1898. 
Little (A.), Through the Yangtse Gorges, or Travel and 

Trade in Western China. 3d. ed. London, 1898. 
Legge (J.), Chinese Classics with Translations, Prolegom- 
ena, etc. 7 vols. Oxford, 1893. In progress. 
MacGowan (J.), Pictures of Southern China. London, 

1897. 

History of China. London, 1897. 

Madrolle (C), Les Peuplcs et les Langues de la Chine 

Meridionale. Paris, 1898. 
Martin (Dr.), A Cycle of Cathay. Edinburgh, 1896. 
Mayers (W. F.), The Chinese Government. New ed. by 

G. M. H. Playfair. Shanghai, 1886. 
Norman (H.), Peoples and Politics of the Far East. Lon- 
don, 1895. 
Reclus (Elisde), Nouvelle Geographic Universelle. Tome 

Vn. Paris, 1882. 
Richthofen (Ferd. von), China: Ergebnisse eigetier Reisen 

und darauf gegrilndeter Studieti. 4 vols. Berlin, 

1877-1885. 
Letters on the Provinces of Chekiang, Nganhwei; 

and on Nafiking and Chiang. Shanghai, 1871. 

Smith (A. H.), Chinese Characteristics. London, 1895. 

Younghusband (F. E.), The Heart of a Continent; Travels 
in Manchuria. London, 1896. 
— Among the Celestials. London, 1898. 
197 



WORLD POLITICS 

III. Articles : 

Brandt (M. von), " Ostasiatische Zustande," in Die deutsche 
Rundschau, December, 1898. 

Courant (Maurice), "■ Les Commer^ans Cliinois et les 
Corporations," in Revjie dcs Dejix Alotides, June, 
1899. 

Fauvel (A. A.), "Le Transsinien et les Chemins des Fer 
Chinois," in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Sep- 
tember, 1899. 

Gundry (R. S.), "China: Spheres of Interest and the 
Open Door," in Forinig/itly, July, 1899. 

"The Yangtse Region," in Fortnightly, September, 

1899. 
/,-Kang Yeu Wei, " The Reform of China," in Contemporary 
Review, August, 1899. 

Leroy-Beaulieu (Pierre), Le Problhne Chinois : I. "La 
Classe des Lettres," Revue des Deux Mondes, No- 
vember, 1898. II. " Le Peuple Chinois et ses Rela- 
tions Actuelles avec les Europeens," ibid., January, 
1899. III. " La Chine et les Puissances," z&'i/., March, 
1899. 

Louis (Paul), " L'Extreme Orient," in La Revue Socialiste, 
October, 1899. 

Moreing (C. A.), "An All-British Railway to China," 
in Nineteenth Centufy, September, 1899. 
v-Owen (George S.), "Reform Policy of the Chinese Em- 
peror," in National Revietv, 1899. 

Pinon (Ren^), " La France et la Question d'Extreme 
Orient," in Revite des Deux Mondes, November, 1899. 

Salaun (Louis), "Apropos des Affaires de Chine, 1895- 
1899," in Annates des Sciences Politiques, May, 1899. 

Schumacher (Dr. Hermann), " Eisenbahnbau und Eisen- 
bahnplane in China," in Archiv fur Eisenbahnwesen, 
September, 1899, ^i^<^ January, 1900. 
108 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

Valbert, "Confucius et la Morale Chinoise," in Revue des 
Deux Mondes^ December, 1898. 

Yedburgh (R. A.), "Our Duty to China," in National 
Review, August, 1899. 

\^0T^ 2. Regulations for Mines and Railways in 

China 

Prepared by the Bureau of Control for Mines and Railways^ 
and approved by the Emperor. 

y^i) There are three ways in which railways and mines can 
be managed, — by officials, by merchants, and by the two in 
combination. The second is the best and will be encouraged 
and promoted by the Government as much as possible in the 
future. The officials should do all in their power to encourage 
such enterprises, but will not be allowed to conduct them 
themselves. 

(2) All such enterprises for which contracts have not been 
completed before the establishment of the Government board 
must be sent up to the Throne for sanction, but from the date 
of the establishment of the said board they will be subject to 
the regulations of the board. Enterprises which have been 
previously arranged will not be allowed to form precedents. 

(3) The mines and railways of Manchuria, Shantung, and 
Lungchow are affected by international relations and therefore 
will not be allowed to form precedents either for Chinese or 
foreigners. 

(4) Railways and mines are entirely separate affairs, and 
therefore must not be worked in combination. Railway agree- 
ments giving mining rights along the route will not be allowed 
to form precedents in future. In cases where permission is 
given to mining companies to construct branch railways to 
connect with waterways and for the purpose of carrying the 
produce of the mines, such lines must only be carried as far 
as the nearest water communication. Such railways must 
not carry passengers or cargo so as to interfere with the 

199 



WORLD POLITICS 

profits of other lines. Plans of such proposed railways must 
be submitted to the Government for approval. 

(5) All mining and railway companies must provide a 
school of instruction, as already ordered by the Throne. 

(6) When applications are made by Chinese gentry or 
merchants to the local officials for permission to engage in 
mining or railway enterprises, the said officials must inquire 
into the character and standing of the applicants, and if the 
latter are found to be reliable people and their applications are 
not in opposition to the regulations, they may be submitted 
to the Government board. The local officials have no power 
to grant such applications. If such applications are made to 
the board direct, inquiries must be made through the officials 
of the applicants' district, and only such applications will be 
granted in which the report of the local authorities is of a 
favorable nature. 

(7) When it is necessary to acquire land for mining and 
railway purposes, the peoj^le must be notified by the local 
authorities, and the former must not show wanton opposition. 
When land is so acquired, houses and graves must be re- 
spected so as not to offend the feelings of the people. 

(8) All enterprises sanctioned by the board must be com- 
menced within six months of the date of sanction ; otherwise, 
the sanction will be withdrawn, unless it can be shown that 
the delay was unavoidable. 

(9) In all cases, every endeavor must be made to have the 
Chinese proportion of the capital of such enterprise the 
greater. There must be a proportion of at least three-tenths 
of the shares owned by Chinese. When this proportion has 
been raised, foreigners may be invited to buy shares or foreign 
money may be borrowed. Sanction will not be given in cases 
where all the money employed is foreign. 

(10) When it is proposed to borrow foreign money, the 
sanction of the board must first be asked. If such sanction 
is given, the loan must be regarded as being made by mer- 
chants and to be repaid by merchants — that is to say, the 
Chinese Government will accept no responsibility. If loans 

200 



THE OPENING OF CHINA 

are concluded without the sanction of the board, they will not 
be recognized, even though an agreement has been signed. 

(ii) In case of foreign loans, the preliminary agreements 
must be submitted to the board for their approval. If such 
agreements are contrary to these regulations, they will be sent 
back for amendment. In case they are not amended properly, 
negotiations may be entered into with other parties. Should 
foreign merchants enter into private contracts for loans and 
thereby suffer loss, the Tsungli Yamen and the board will not 
help them to recover their money. 

(12) When Chinese companies are authorized to borrow 
foreign money, the board will advise the Tsungli Yamen, which 
will communicate with the minister of the power concerned, 
who will reply, and their permission will then be considered to 
be given. When foreign merchants are desirous of lending 
money to Chinese companies, they must request their minister 
to communicate with the Tsungli Yamen, who will ask the 
board if the company is authorized to borrow, and will reply 
accordingly to the minister. Money lent in any other way will 
be treated as a private loan. 

(13) In order to protect the sovereign rights of China, the 
control of all railways and mining companies, irrespective of 
the I'oreign capital concerned, must remain in the hands of the 
Chinese merchants ; but the accounts of such companies must 
be open to the inspection of foreign shareholders. 

(14) Promoters professing to have a certain amount of 
capital must show satisfactory proof of their assertion. 

^15) The local authorities must in all cases encourage and 
protect mining and railway companies, in carrying out their' 
duly authorized enterprises. 

. ,^i6) In case of disputes between companies or any inter- 
ference with the rights of any company, the local authorities 
must decide the question fairly. Appeal may be made against 
their decision to the Government board. Should disputes 
arise between Chinese and foreign merchants, in connection 
with railway or mining enterprises, they must be settled by 
arbitration ; the governments concerned will not interfere. 
201 



WORLD POLITICS 

(17) Foreign engineers and surveyors sent to inspect 
mines and railways must be protected by the local authorities. 
.^18) Rewards will be given to Chinese merchants investing 
500,000 taels and upwards in mining or railway enterprises, or 
doing extra good work in connection therewith. 
^ {19) All such enterprises will be granted a monopoly for 
a fixed period, the duration of which will be determined by 
the circumstances of the case. 

(20) Customs stations will be established on all railways 
for the levying of duties. The duties on mining produce and 
on the export of the same will be decided by the Government 
board in conjunction with the board of revenue, which will 
draw up regulations for submission to the Throne. The pro- 
portion of profits to be paid to the Government for railways 
will be four-tenths, and for mines 25 per cent, to be handed 
to the board of revenue. 

. X'2i) The affairs and accounts of each company will be ex- 
amined from time to time by the Government board, either by 
having the books sent to the offices of the board or by deput- 
ing an officer to examine on the spot. 

(22) A detailed account of the affairs of the railway and 
mining companies at present in existence must be sent to the 
board for consideration. The board will also prepare forms 
for setting forth such details. These will be sent to all the 
provinces, and must be filled up at the end of each year by 
such companies, and sent to the board for inspection. 

— Translation given in the Consular Reports, April, 1899. 



202 



PART III 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
OPENING OF CHINA IN WORLD 
POLITICS 



203 



CHAPTER I 

Russian Imperial Politics 

Even to the modern mind, accustomed to gigan- 
tic and swift changes, the possibilities revealed 
by the opening of China since the Treaty of Shim- 
onoseki have been startling. The world seems to 
be shrivelling up. Regions that were akin to 
fable-land become a scene of prosaic exploitation. 
Railways take the place of picturesque caravans, 
and forests of chimneys rise in places that were 
once enchanting Meccas for the venturesome 
traveller. The Oriental and the Occidental civil- 
izations have met face to face, and the future con- 
stitution and ideals of society are in the balance. 
The general effects of the meeting are more ob- 
vious than definable. We can, however, mark 
certain definite influences in the present political 
situation that are distinctly traceable to the devel- 
opments in China. 

Let us first consider the effect of this develop- 
ment on the individual countries of Europe, begin- 
ning with the Empire of the North. There have 
205 



WORLD POLITICS 

been three stages of Russian expansion, which 
may be focussed respectively on Constantinople, 
Afghanistan, and China. The first natural impulse 
of a strong nation confined within the interior is to 
reach an unobstructed port. In the case of Rus- 
sia, this desire led to a southward expansion and 
an attempt to embrace the Balkan states within its 
boundaries and thus get unimpeded across to the 
Mediterranean. This movement also has a reli- 
gious and idealistic aspect, since Russia, as the 
chief pohtical representative of the Greek Church, 
feels that there exists a historic connection be- 
tween the Byzantine Empire and the Czardom; 
as a consequence, the restoration of Constanti- 
nople as the metropolis of the Orthodox Church 
and as the capital of a great empire has always 
appealed to the Russian imagination. 

It was in this movement to the southward that 
Russian and English interests first clashed. When 
national animosities had thus arisen, and Russia 
still continued her forward movement across the 
Ural into Central Asia, her plans were interpreted 
as being directed against English sovereignty in 
India. Turkestan, a country of Hmited resources, 
affords comparatively little attraction to a con- 
queror, and its occupation was therefore supposed 
by the British to have an ulterior aim, — that of 
gaining an approach to India across the mountains. 
Russian advance in Central Asia thus became the 
second great cause of hostility between England 
and Russia. 

206 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

Aside from the ambitious plans of Peter the 
Great and the Empress Catherine, it cannot be said 
that the Russian government, up to the stage in 
the development marked by the Afghan question, 
consciously plotted for the establishment of a vast 
Asiatic-European empire. But, as has already 
been stated, the expansive energies of the Russian 
nation, combined with their methods of agricul- 
ture, which are rather extensive than intensive, 
naturally led to the absorption of more and more 
territory for the purposes of Russian agricultu- 
ral colonization. Her expansion was more like 
a formless and unresting torrent of lava than 
like the scientific and carefully designed work of 
an engineer. When once their government had 
gained a foothold in Central Asia, Russian offi- 
cials often expressed the hope of finally reaching 
the sea by way of Persia or even of conquer- 
ing India. Afghanistan thus became the second 
centre of interest and intrigue, and large sums 
were expended by the great hostile powers, Eng- 
land and Russia, in strengthening their position 
at this critical point. 

All former developments, however, have been 
overshadowed and put in the background by the 
vast importance of the more recent Russian occu- 
pation of Manchuria. It was Russia who first drew 
practical consequences from the demonstration of 
Chinese weakness. By a series of exceedingly 
shrewd moves, she undermined the English influ- 
ence at Peking, and, gaining access into Manchuria, 
207 



WORLD POLITICS 

extended her railway into that province, assumed 
virtual control over a large part of its territory, and 
thus at last realized her ambition of having ports 
permanently free from ice. Moreover, the com- 
mercial success of the Siberian railway, which up 
to that time had been exceedingly problematical, 
was brought much nearer to certainty, and a vast 
and inviting field for Russian colonization and the 
expansion of Russian industry was opened. The 
mineral and lumber wealth of Manchuria is practi- 
cally untouched, and, considering the constantly 
increasing demands of the awakening industries in 
China, Russia's foothold and position as a neigh- 
boring nation, with the wealth and the methods of 
western Europe at her control, are bound to prove 
invaluable to her. Russian statesmen, recogniz- 
ing the importance of the source of wealth and 
power thus opened to their government and na- 
tion, withdrew their attention from Constanti- 
nople and the Balkan to concentrate all their 
efforts on strengthening their position and 
utilizing their advantages in the newly acquired 
province. 

Even to Russia, however, the absorption of a 
vast province like Manchuria is no small matter, 
but demands, on the contrary, an intense concen- 
tration of energy ; and it therefore became a neces- 
sary part of Russian politics to obtain time for 
peaceful development. At present the position 
of Russia in Manchuria is still weak against the 
possible attack of foreign powers, as there can be 

20S 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

no effective connection between that province and 
European Rustia until the completion of the Sibe- 
rian railway. Russia therefore has, at present, 
nothing to gain and everything to lose by war in the 
Orient. Moreover, on account of her masterful 
management of Oriental diplomacy, she could 
obtain all that she desired if only peace could be 
maintained. To favor a policy of disarmament, 
as she has recently done, was therefore thoroughly 
consistent with the conditions in which Russia 
found herself. Her finances, too, had been strained 
to the utmost by the vast expenditures for strate- 
gical and industrial purposes in Siberia,^ so that in 
the event of a war the great fabric so successfully 
constructed by her diplomacy might not have stood 
the test of fire. 

Having become a naval power by her occupa- 
tion of Port Arthur, Russia needed great accessions 
to her fleet in order to maintain her prestige effec- 
tively in this direction. During the seven years 
from 1893 to 1899, 461 million rubles were spent 
on the Russian navy; between 1896 and 1897 the 

1 In the ten years between 1887 and 1897, the total public debt 
of Russia had increased 27.5 per cent. On January i, 1897, ^^ 
amounted to 6,735,376,443 rubles. The debts owed to the state 
at that time amounted to 3,000,997,928 rubles. — Annual Cyclo- 
pcEdia, 1898, p. 685. The ruble is the unit of the Russian monetary 
system. The gold ruble, — a money of account, not a coin, — is 
equal to 51.5 cents. Up to 1897, the silver ruble varied in value 
with the price of silver; in January,, 1897, it was quoted at 37.9 
cents. At present subsidiary silver is maintained at a parity with 
gold, as in the United States. 

P 209 



WORLD POLITICS 

expenditure was increased by 26 million rubles, 
and an extra expenditure of 90 million rubles, 
beyond the regular allowance, was provided for in 
the imperial budget of 1898, to be used for the 
construction of new ships. ^ 

It has already been pointed out that the charac- 
ter of the Russian policy of expansion has changed. 
Whereas it formerly occurred only in response to 
the overpowering needs of the nation, this expan- 
sion has now become more conscious, and is at the 
present time being planned on a truly imperial 
scale. The development is largely due to the 
feeling that the available portions of the earth's 
surface are becoming few, and that, when a vast 
prize like China is at stake, nations cannot wait 
for the natural forces of trade and colonization 
to expand their political influence, but must an- 
ticipate the operation of these forces by reserving 
territories in which they may later assert them- 
selves. 

A further cause of the change noted is found in 
the fact that of late the military aristocracy of 
Russia has become especially ambitious and 
desirous of imperial expansion. This class, which 
wields the real political power in Russia, is 
bound together by common interests and senti- 
ments so as to form a compact society with 
definite aims. Even the Czar is in most matters 
dependent on the opinion and will of this class, 
who control all the important branches of the ad- 

1 See Statesman'' s Year Book, 1899, p. 926. 
210 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

ministration. Their ambitious and unscrupulous, 
but exceedingly able, statesmanship has made 
Russia a formidable factor in international diplo- 
macy and has given a decided impetus to the 
policy of Asiatic expansion. 

It is unfortunate that all these developments 
tend to emphasize the Asiatic character of the 
Russian Empire and to estrange it more and more 
from Western, and especially English, civilization. 
National animosity between England and Russia 
has become so intense that a mutual understand- 
ing of motives seems almost out of the question. 
Whatever England may do, even with the purpose 
of merely preventing exclusive exploitations, will be 
interpreted as an extension of imperial influence, 
while the efforts of the vast Russian Empire to 
gain new fields for its teeming population are 
equally sure to be regarded as hostile to all 
civilization. 

It does not admit of doubt that autocracy in 
Russia has been strengthened by the recent de- 
velopments. The Russian government has been 
so successful in acquiring new territories, in giving 
new outlets to popular energy, that the voices of 
nihilism and of liberalism have become smothered 
in the universal acclamations that rise from a vast 
people to the throne of the Czar. Never have the 
efforts of the Russian government to suppress 
manifestations of individual nationality, like those 
of Poland and Finland, been more successful : 
never has the power of this great empire been 



WORLD POLITICS 

welded into more compact form. Any thought 
of giving the state a constitution based on Western 
models has been definitely abandoned. 

The attitude of Russian nationalism toward West- 
ern civilization may be seen, in a form perhaps some- 
what extreme, in Pobedonostseff's recent book on 
religion and politics.^ The writer, who is the chief 
spiritual adviser of the emperor and the administra- 
tive head of the Greek Orthodox Church, believes 
that Western civilization is suffering from fatal de- 
bilities and diseases. Basing his case on the growth 
of anarchism and infidelity and the increasing 
strength of the dissolvent forces which are attack- 
ing individualistic societies, he holds that social 
existence cannot successfully withstand the corrod- 
ing influence of these tendencies, and affirms his 
beHef that the torch of civilization has passed to 
Russia. The elements which in his eyes make Rus- 
sia great and are bound to make her the saviour 
of the world are autocracy, religion, and the village 
community, the last named being, to his mind, the 
best antidote to socialistic agitation, since it con- 
tains within itself all that is reasonable and healthy 
in the socialistic propaganda. The religious rev- 
erence of the Russian masses is the great force 
that holds society together, while the autocratic 
power of the Czar provides the state with a means 
of quick and effective action. Unity, harmony, 
subordination, reverence, and simplicity are to him 

^ Reflections of a Russian Statesman (translated from the Rus- 
sian), London, 1898. 

212 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

the watchwords of Russian civilization. There 
comes from him no word about the dignity of 
human nature, the independence of the individual, 
the right of the individual to develop his aptitudes 
and powers, the hope that vast masses of human- 
ity may be raised to a higher plane by general 
education and participation in government, for to 
him all these ideals of Western life appear to be 
merely poison administered in a seductive form. 
Though Pobedonostseff' s work is extreme, the in- 
fluence and position of its author make it a note- 
worthy expression of Russian nationalism. 

, Indeed, to any one who casually peruses political 
extracts from Russian papers, it must have become 
evident that Russian opinion has grown more nar- 
rowly nationalistic than it has ever been before. 
Up to a few decades ago, the Russian aristocracy 
was considered the most cosmopolitan in the world, 
and St. Petersburg was a second Paris. But with 
the growth of a native Russian literature there also 
began to develop among the upper classes a dis- 
tinct feeling of separate nationality. The poHtical 
and social party which advocated this tendency 
was in the sixties given the name Slavophiles.^ 
On account of some extravagant tenets, and of its 
democratic sympathies, the sect was discredited. 
As a result of the recent developments, however, 
with the more conscious expansion of Russian 
influence, and with the discovery that Russian ad- 
vance is irresistible, the whole society of that great 

1 See Wallace, Russia, p. 415. 
213 



WORLD POLITICS 

empire has become practically Slavophile. In line 
with this change is a recent edict of the impe- 
rial government which has entirely remodelled the 
system of education and makes the spread of 
Russian ideas one of its main objects. 

By this same edict, the education of the official 
classes is sharply separated from that of the com- 
mon people, in this way emphasizing the caste sys- 
tem, which is rapidly taking a firm hold on Russian 
society. This is simply another of the ways in 
which the semi-Asiatic character of Russia is be- 
coming still more Oriental. Conscious opposition 
to Western ideals, firm allegiance to the idea of 
autocracy, emphasis laid upon the distinctions 
of a caste system, employment, for political ends, of 
the methods and teachings of a theocracy — all 
these indicate that Oriental influences in Russia 
are becoming more and more predominant. 

In other countries the chief strength of religion, 
— or of cult as a social system, — lies with the 
upper classes ; in Russia, religion has always been 
essentially national, finding its chief stronghold 
among the masses of the agricultural population.^ 
The Russian state has not yet emerged from the 
religious stage of development.^ The Czar himself, 
though not technically an ecclesiastical officer, has, 
in the eyes of the people, a decidedly religious 
character. The ceremonial of coronation is of far 
greater importance than one accustomed to West- 

^ Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Czars, Vol. III., p. 41. 
"^ In the sense in which this term is used by Comte and Seeley. 
214 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

ern methods of state action would imagine. In 
reading Castelar's Ano '83, one may at first be sur- 
prised at the importance which he attributes to the 
coronation ceremonies at the KremHn. But Castelar 
was right. It is on the occasion of his corona- 
tion that the Czar appears in that almost super- 
human character of the anointed representative of 
God, borne aloft in imperial splendor, and striking 
reverence into the hearts of the countless multitudes 
who gather from all parts of the empire to admire 
the greatness of their exalted master. Especially 
in Oriental politics will Russia profit much from 
the impressiveness of her imperial dignity. Tre- 
mendous, apparently irresistible, power, wielded by 
a single hand, especially when emphasized by more 
than regal splendor, impresses the Oriental mind ; 
and the Kirghis and Tartar chieftains who gather 
about the Czar on the day of his elevation go home 
to their native tribes with astounding reports of his 
splendor and power. 

The rehgious feeling of the masses in Russia has 
always been used as a motive power for political 
ends. When Russia makes war, it is nominally in 
defence of the Orthodox faith, and she thus enlists, 
not merely the narrower selfish interests of her vast 
population, but also their most fervid aspirations 
and the dearest ideals of their souls. A war against 
Turkey is a religious crusade to win back the 
ancient metropolis of the Orthodox Church. From 
the Russian point of view, a war against Great 
Britain would be a contest against heretics and 
215 



WORLD POLITICS 

infidels. It is this influence that moulds the Rus- 
sian nation into such a compact mass, wielded by 
a single will. The Russian state polity is simply 
absolutism, upborne and modified by superstition. 
That Russia has not left the religious stage of 
political development is also shown by the fact 
that she identifies complete unity of faith with 
her national existence, and subjects the Protestants 
of the Baltic provinces and Finland, and the Roman 
Catholics of Poland, to a constant political persecu- 
tion, which is largely directed against their religious 
faith. 

The conscious and systematic character of the 
Russian imperialistic policy of to-day is especially 
apparent in the vast plans, recently executed, for 
defending the southern border of the empire and 
securing its naval communications.^ A revolution 
is being effected in southern Russia. The Don 
is to be united with the Volga, and it will thus be 
possible for ships to pass from the Baltic to the 
Black and Caspian seas. The sea of Azoff is 
united with the gulf of Perekop by a canal cut 
through the Crimean isthmus. On September i, 
1899, the port of Sebastopol was closed to naviga- 
tion under the pretext of making it a marine station. 
Recently, however, the naval headquarters of south- 
ern Russia have been transferred to Nicolaiev on 
the river Bug, seventeen miles inland and beyond 
the city of Odessa. It is evident therefore, and gen- 

^ See an article on " Russia's Great Naval Enterprise," Fort- 
nightly Review, August, 1899. 

2r6 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

erally known at the present time, that Sebastopol is 
to be turned into a fortress for the defence of the 
territory of the Crimea. The arbitrary methods of 
the Russian government are here very well illus-' 
trated. Sebastopol was a port with flourishing and 
constantly expanding commerce and prosperous 
manufactures. By an order of government a stop 
is put to all these developments. The merchants 
have to migrate, the manufacturers have to desert 
their plants, fortunes are ruined, and the entire 
industrial development of that section of the 
country is arbitrarily changed. However, the 
gain to the defence of Russia can scarcely be 
exaggerated. Russian fleets can now, without 
coming out into the open on the Black Sea, pass 
from the northwestern part of that sea to the 
Caspian, — from Odessa and Kherson to Mikhae- 
lovsk, the Caspian terminal of the central Asiatic 
railway, — while invasion by land is rendered 
difficult by the almost impregnable fortress of 
Sebastopol. 

A similarly arbitrary manipulation of vast indus- 
trial interests will be effected by a law, — adopted 
though not yet pubhshed, — by which the chief 
ports in the Black Sea and the Baltic and in the 
far East are to be closed to foreign vessels in the 
year 1901. These ports, among which are Nico- 
laiev, Diinamunde, Cronstadt, and Vladivostok, 
are then to be used exclusively as naval stations 
and bases of Russian commerce, while foreign 
commerce, thus excluded from its former stations, 

217 



WORLD POLITICS 

will assist in building up new and prosperous ports 
in Russian dominions. 

In connection with this, an extensive policy of 
fostering the merchant marine has been entered 
upon. The right to trade between parts of the 
empire has been restricted to Russian vessels,^ and 
coastwise navigation will therefore be entirely 
carried on by ships sailing under the Russian flag. 
The government has given a guarantee to refund 
all duties paid at the Suez Canal by Russian ships 
going to the far East or coming thence. The 
exclusive tariff policy by which Russia also fosters 
native shipping is well known. In an article on 
the industrial development of Russia,^ Professor 
Oseroff states that on account of excessive pro- 
tection of Russian manufactures, there is really a 
superabundance of profits, and that there is no 
need of enterprise, and no stimulation, by com- 
petition, of new inventions and methods. Divi- 
dends of the established manufactories are exceed- 
ingly high, running up even to one hundred per 
cent. Since the prohibition on the investment of 
foreign capital in Russia has been removed, there 
has been a considerable immigration of capital 
from abroad, especially from England and Ger- 
many, but this introduction of new forces is 

1 By a law which took effect January i, 1900, foreign vessels 
sailing from one Russian port are prohibited from touching at 
another, even where the two are situated in different seas. — 
Consular Reports, March, 1900. 

- Oseroff, " Industrial Development of Russia," Forum, April, 
1899. 

218 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

opposed by the Russian press, and the adoption 
of a less liberal policy is constantly being urged. 

The manufacturing methods of Russia are in 
many cases archaic. For instance, cold-blast fur- 
naces are still extensively used in the manufacture 
of pig-iron. In general it may be said that Rus- 
sian technical knowledge is rather encyclopaedic 
than expert. An example of this is afforded by 
the gratification which Russian railway engineers 
displayed at having planned and executed a very 
deep cut through the solid rock, where engineers of 
any other nation would have employed the method 
of tunnelling. On account of the high tariff on 
iron, the construction of new works is exceedingly 
expensive. The agricultural population, too, is 
unprovided with the most necessary iron imple- 
ments. Wooden plows are still used throughout 
the empire. 

There has been, however, in the last ten years, 
an enormous increase of Russian manufactures, 
which now employ 1,750,000 workmen. Thus, the 
output of blast furnaces has increased fourfold 
since 1887, and the product of cotton spinning has 
been more than doubled since 1885.^ Mining, on 
the other band, has shown but little increase. 
Efforts of the Russian government to aid the de- 
velopment of industries by direct bounties and by 
direct privileges and tariff reductions on the rail- 
ways are said not to have appreciably stimulated 
industry, because these were looked upon by 

1 See Statesman's Year Book, 1899, p. 951. 
219 



WORLD POLITICS 

the manufacturers as simply an additional bonus 
obtained from the government. 

There has therefore been practically no effort 
on the part of Russian manufacturers to gain 
markets beyond the borders of the empire. In 
this connection, it may be well to repeat the fact 
that Russian expansion is not so much a struggle 
for markets, since the manufacturers have already, 
within the dominions of Russia herself, more of a 
market than they can supply ; but rather a struggle 
for soil to afford room for the constant agricultural 
expansion of the empire. This essential distinction 
between the purposes animating Russian politics 
and those of other nations must always be borne 
in mind. It cannot be said that the Russian gov- 
ernment has thus far succeeded in effectively using 
political means for stimulating the progress of in- 
dustrial methods within the empire. By shutting 
off foreign competition, she has simply made pos- 
sible the perpetuation of antiquated methods, and 
has enabled manufacturers to receive an undue 
profit for inferior goods, while the population of 
the empire suffers from a lack of supply of the 
most necessary industrial products. It can hardly 
be said, therefore, that Russian industry is ready 
for the work of developing a province like Man- 
churia. Only by inviting and protecting the in- 
vestment of the capital of other nations in her 
newly acquired sphere of influence can Russia 
hope to draw therefrom within a reasonable period 
the advantages which nature offers. But among 

220 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

the aristocratic classes of Russia there is even a 
strong feeling of contempt for an industrial and 
commercial civilization. They consider themselves 
called to propagate the ideas of Russian civiliza- 
tion, rather than to aid the industrial development. 
A Russian diplomat thus expresses this feeling : 
" The Russians are not a commercial nation. The 
people have aspirations toward higher ideals than 
those of commercial gain. The vtoujik exists for 
raising the sustenance of war." 

Some writers fear that in the mysterious work- 
shop of Asia, Russia may elaborate and force upon 
the world the industrial and financial preponder- 
ance of Slavism. It should, however, be borne in 
mind that Russia is in an entirely different position 
in Asia from that which other nations hold. She 
came there originally, not from a desire for com- 
mercial exploitation, but by following her destiny, 
the inward compelling power of national expan- 
sion. At present, by abandoning the traditions of 
this expansion, by actually planting outpost col- 
onies of Russians and by entering upon a policy 
of more conscious imperialism, she is in danger 
of materially weakening herself on account of too 
rapid an advance. Her statesmen have recognized 
all this, and hence naturally desire time and peace 
in which industrial developments may be brought 
up to a plane with the political achievements of 
the last few years. 

The unconscious instinct of the masses has been 
a foremost guide in Russian politics — a con- 

221 



WORLD POLITICS 

sideration which is of prime importance in judg- 
ing of the respective positions of England and 
Russia in China. Russia assimilates, while Eng- 
land merely superimposes her authority. Russians 
are fond of likening their empire to Rome ; the 
acid by which national and local organisms are 
dissolved into their elements, to be precipitated 
again in the form of a higher unity,^ is the Rus- 
sian national spirit. If Russian advance should 
be allowed to go on naturally and gradually as 
it has in the past, the power of that nation in 
Asia would become almost irresistible ; England 
in opposing her would have the unfortunate posi- 
tion of Carthage. She would have to rely for her 
defence on unassimilated subject nations, while 
Russia could summon against her the vast masses 
that will gradually become penetrated with the 
spirit of Russian polity and civilization. In gen- 
eral, economic considerations are of primary im- 
portance in British expansion ; in the expansion of 
of Russia, they are only secondary. 

1 Ihering, Geist des romuchen Rechts, § I. 



222 



CHAPTER II 

The Influence of the Oriental Situation on 
THE Western European Powers 

Turning now to Great Britain, we may note the 
same important effects of the opening of China 
on her politics. Originally, England considered 
herself the chief agent in the opening of China to 
Western influences, and having by far the greatest 
commercial interests there, she had little actual 
serious competition in this undertaking. Now, 
however, other nations have appeared upon the 
scene and have partly succeeded in gaining exclu- 
sive influence over certain portions of Chinese 
territory. This has tended to weaken that policy 
of equal opportunity throughout the civilized world 
for which England has so long stood. For, should 
other nations acquire vast portions of the earth's 
surface and close them against British importa- 
tions, it would seem a necessary act of self-defence 
to erect around the British possessions a similar 
protective barrier. It would seem, in other words, 
that Great Britain must soon make her choice 
between Cobdenism and a policy of imperial pro- 
tective federation. The English public recognizes 

223 



WORLD POLITICS 

the importance of the problem, and, as a result, 
other questions that before loomed grandly on the 
political horizon have sunk away into insignificance. 
Who can now become enthusiastic over Welsh 
disestablishment, or even over the reform of the 
House of Lords, when the influence of Great 
Britain on the progress of civilization is at stake, 
and when her commercial and industrial suprem- 
acy is threatened ? The optimistic spirit in which 
she formerly favored and championed free trade 
and equal industrial opportunities throughout the 
world has become " sicklied o'er with the pale cast 
of thought." 

Continental nations have usually attributed to 
selfish motives this desire of Great Britain to keep 
the whole world open to international commerce. 
It was, they say, because the English nation felt 
itself the strongest power in the field, and there- 
fore sure to profit from the freest competition. 
As supporting this view, it must be admitted that 
the advance of German manufactures has strength- 
ened the protective sentiment in Great Britain. 
But it is still doubtful whether the traditional 
policy of the British Empire would be definitely 
abandoned unless large portions of the available 
surface of the earth should come under the per- 
manent control of exclusive powers like Russia 
and France. At present, the large majority of 
the English nation still believe that all the par- 
ticipants in the world's commerce are benefited by 
the policy of free trade. 

224 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

The developments in China have been one cause 
of the recent rapprochemfnt between Great Britain 
and the United States. Both have the same in- 
terests in the Chinese Empire. Both have, so far 
as Chinese poHtics aie concerned, the same oppo- 
nents. Therefore, -Lhough in other matters these 
two nations are most eager rivals, they may well 
act in common when the question of the destiny 
of China is at stake. Had Great Britain not been 
reinforce'^ by the American republic in insisting 
upon the " open door " in China, it is doubtful 
whether that policy would have prevailed. 

The relations of Great Britain with other nations 
have also been strongly influenced by developments 
in the Orient. The traditional hostility between 
the Bear and the Lion has been intensified by 
anticipations of a coming contest,^ — of a struggle 
for influence in a part of the world which is 
destined to be industrially most important. Never 
have these two powers scrutinized each other with 
greater suspicion. Never has there been a keener 
diplomatic contest between them than the present 
one regarding the Chinese Empire. 

Again, the relations of England and Germany, 
which, in consequence of the emperor's telegram 
to Kriiger and the constant invasions of the Eng- 
lish commercial domain by German trade, had 
become dangerously strained, have now become 
decidedly more friendly on account of the parallel 
interests of the two powers in China. On the 
other hand, a bitter and apparently enduring hos- 
Q 225 



WORLD POLITICS 

tility has been engendered in Great Britain against 
France on account of her subserviency to Russian 
policy in China, as well as on account of the com- 
bined intriguings of those tv^o powers in the Sou- 
dan. In Chinese affairs, the grouping of the 
powers, so far as diplomatic influence and policy 
of exploitation are concerned, has been Russia and 
France against Great Britain, the United States, 
Germany, and Italy. The existing friendship be- 
tween Italy and England has been cemented and 
strengthened. Italy has always looked upon Eng- 
land as the protector of the freedom of the Medi- 
terranean from Franco-Russian control. She now 
relies on England for the protection of the rich 
markets of China against the insidious influence 
of the two exclusive powers. 

It remains to be noted how radically English 
anti-Russian politics have changed in bearing 
and scope by having their focus transferred from 
Constantinople and Afghanistan to China. At 
Constantinople, England was simply protecting 
her own national interests. In China, on the 
other hand, she has become the champion of the 
general rights and interests of the industrial 
nations. The interests which she there represents 
and defends are so much broader than those 
involved in the former contests that the earlier 
stages of Russo-English animosity have for the 
present lost much of their importance. 

Germany, more than any other European nation, 
has entered upon a conscious policy of imperial 
226 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

expansion since the recent developments in the 
Orient. She was the first power to take advan- 
tage of the Russian preoccupation with Manchuria. 
Judging correctly that Russian attention was now 
centred in the far East and withdrawn to a 
certain extent from Constantinople, she concen- 
trated her influence and succeeded in gaining a 
firm foothold in Asia Minor, receiving valuable 
concessions and replacing England in the friend- 
ship of the Sultan. In China, too, she acted with 
rapidity, tact, and clear-sightedness, and placed 
herself at one stroke in the first rank among the 
interested powers. Together with France, she 
assisted Russia in taking the fruits of victory from 
Japan ; she thus gained the good will of her 
powerful northern neighbor, and at the same time 
secured influence in China and a free hand in Con- 
stantinople. The Sultan is now the dear and 
exalted friend of the emperor, and the German 
government has obtained advantages in Asia 
Minor which could formerly be hoped for only 
as the result of successful warfare. 

As Russian interest has to some extent been 
withdrawn from the Balkan states, Austrian fears 
in this direction have become assuaged. Russia 
is beginning to recognize that she has more to 
hope from expansion in the Orient than from the 
forcible annexation of her Balkan neighbors, the 
assimilation of whom might give her no less 
trouble than she has experienced in Poland, the 
Baltic provinces, and Finland. Moreover, Austria 

227 



WORLD POLITICS 

has the less to fear from Russia because that power- 
ful empire sees its vital interests opposed by Great 
Britain rather than by any other power. In gen- 
eral, it may be said that the relations between 
Russia and the Teutonic empires have become 
decidedly more friendly as a result of the devel- 
opments of the past few years. 

A twofold influence of the opening of China 
may be traced in the case of France. The re- 
public was suddenly startled by the peace proposal 
of the Czar, which Paris interpreted at first as a 
desertion of France by her powerful ally, in her 
most cherished plans. The French had expended 
a vast amount of sentiment and money in courting 
the friendship of the Russians. Russian sailors on 
their visit to France had been idolized, and what 
Count Tolstoi' considers an epidemic of insanity had 
seized the people when the Czar himself appeared 
on French soil. But now, with the proposal for a 
peace conference, the Russian government seemed 
to have concentrated its entire interest upon secur- 
ing and maintaining its power in the far Orient, 
and to have forgotten poor France, with her long- 
standing woes and unsatisfied ambitions, though 
she had furnished the Russian financiers with much- 
needed loans and had lavishly poured the affection 
of her ardent soul upon the bushy beards of the 
Muscovites. 

It soon appeared, however, that, while Russia 
might not he ready to champion the French poHcy 
of revenge in Europe, her interests in China were 

228 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

identical with those of France, and a new basis 
for friendship was thus found. Both France and .- 
Russia are opposed to the policy of equal oppor-, 
tunity in their possessions. Both desire to make, 
their territorial acquisitions a direct aid to national) 
commerce and manufactures. Both desire, too^ 
to exercise a decisive influence in Oriental affairs! 
the one, from Siberia in the north ; the other, from 
Indo-China in the south. Their policy coinciding, 
the conditions of continued alliance and coopera- 
tion were present, and the cordial relations between 
Russia and France are therefore undisturbed, not- 
withstanding the peace programme. France and 
Germany, to be sure, acted in concert at The 
Hague, in defeating the Czar's project of disarma- 
ment, but the essential unity of French and Rus- 
sian political aims was not thereby disturbed. 

France, as we have seen, is endeavoring to join 
hands with Russia across the English sphere of 
influence in China, and all the expressions of 
French statesmen, as well as their actions in the 
far Orient, bear out the conclusion that the two 
nations are to stand together in the struggle for 
influence in China. Former causes of friction 
between France and Great Britain, such as the 
Newfoundland fisheries and the possession of the ' 
Nile Valley, sink into relative insignificance when 
compared v,^ith the tremendous interests at issue 
between the powers in the Celestial Empire. 

A word as to the influence of the opening of 
China upon the lesser nations of continental 
229 



WORLD POLITICS 

Europe. The recent developments of imperialism 
have made it plain that it is not for them to play a 
part in the control of world politics, but that they 
must confine themselves rather to a development 
of their national resources in Europe and to a 
defence of their own independence. Spain has 
already lost her colonies. The African posses- 
sions of Portugal have already been prospectively 
divided between England and Germany, who will 
secure them at the first favorable opportunity. 
Germany is evidently seeking means whereby 
she may open a way to the acquisition of the 
Dutch colonies in Asia. But while these minor 
nations must tremble for their transoceanic posses- 
sions, their national existence is not immediately 
threatened by present developments. The great 
European powers have too much at stake in the 
struggle for world influence to weaken themselves 
by the attempted assimilation of recalcitrant 
and still powerful nationalities in Europe. This 
accounts for the evident diminution of Russia's 
interest in the Balkan states. For the same 
reason, it seems certain that the political theo- 
rizing which would attribute to Germany a desire 
presently to swallow up Holland, and to France 
the policy of intriguing for sovereignty in Bel- 
gium, has but little foundation. 

In general, the political perspective is widened 

and extended by the developments in China. The 

narrow arena, within which European contests 

seemed destined to be fought out, has been broad- 

230 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

ened to include the whole world. The pettier 
affairs that formerly divided nations have given 
place to vast interests, for when the question of 
civilization is itself at stake, disputes over territo- 
rial boundaries must necessarily give way. It is 
a grave reflection on the statesmanship of the 
present government of England that it should 
not have succeeded in quieting the uproarious 
spirits of South Africa, and thus have prevented a 
struggle which may fatally weaken the empire at 
this critical moment of the world's history. The 
energies of all nations should be concentrated in the 
far East, in order that irretrievable disaster may 
be prevented, — such a disaster as would be the 
abandonment of China to any one ambitious power, 
or a mismanagement of Chinese affairs that would 
make forever impossible the peaceful fusion of 
Oriental and Western social ideals and industrial 
capacities. 

Such questions as that of Alsace-Lorraine, of 
Newfoundland, the Balkans, and Trieste, or of the 
impending dissolution of the Austrian Empire, 
wane before the vast importance of these recent 
developments. There, the fate of a nation or of 
nations is at stake ; here, that of the world : there, 
some millions of people may be interested ; here, 
not only the four hundred millions of Chinese, 
but also the members of every civilized state feel 
that their dearest interests are involved. The 
total revolution of European political ideas, a com- 
plete change in perspective and in the valuation of 
231 



WORLD POLITICS 

the various aims and controversies, is therefore the 
result of the opening of China. Never have the 
conditions of statesmanship changed more within a 
quarter of a century, — perhaps even within cen- 
turies, — than they have within the last three years. 
Events have moved with such rapidity that it has 
seemed almost impossible that human ingenuity 
and statesmanship could be able to control them, 
or in any measure to influence their results. Hu- 
manity seemed to have been drawn into a tor- 
rent which was rapidly hurrying it on to the most 
destructive contests that the world has ever seen. 
The outcome has not been as fierce and terrible as 
might have been expected even a year ago. It is 
now time for those to whose hands the destinies of 
the nations are intrusted, to take stock of the devel- 
opments, and to fix on a rational, conservative 
policy to be pursued with regard to the questions 
which we have been discussing. 

Passing now to the relations of the European 
powers to southern Asia, we find that no less im- 
portant changes in political conditions have been 
brought about there by the opening of China. 
As Russian attention was partly withdrawn from 
Constantinople and Afghanistan, it became possi- 
ble for the balance of political influence in these 
regions to be shifted. It has been one of the cen- 
tral ideas of German imperial politics to obtain in- 
fluence in Turkish dominions. The culmination of 
this policy in the visit of the emperor to the Orient 
and the obtaining of the valuable concessions to 

232 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

which reference has already been made, will be 
more fully discussed in a subsequent chapter. In 
brief, it may be said that English influence at the 
Porte has been entirely superseded by that of Ger- 
many. The influence of France in the Levant is 
also admittedly on the decline. While French 
capital is still interested in enterprises in Asia 
Minor, the Germans are engaged in active coloni- 
zation, and are fully alive to their present opportu- 
nities in that region. 

Afghanistan has for a time ceased to be the 
storm centre of Asia. The attention that was 
formerly concentrated on the Afghan mountains 
and passes has now been directed to much broader 
fields, and the relative importance of the Afghan 
question has consequently decreased. As it is 
true, however, that, should a contest between Great 
Britain and Russia actually come about, land opera- 
tions would be of exceedingly great importance, and 
as the approaches by way of Afghanistan to India 
are still the easiest for Russia, Great Britain has 
continued in her policy of fortifying her northwest 
Indian boundary, and especially the Khaibar Pass. 

Although Russia has realized her ambition of 
obtaining an ice-free port, and her desire to reach 
the Persian Gulf has consequently abated in inten- 
sity, she remains fully aware of the value of diplo- 
matic ascendency in Persia coveted so long by her.^ 

1 Ever since the treaty of Turkmantchai in 1828, when Persian 
Armenia was ceded to Russia, this power has exercised great influ- 
ence in Persia. 

233 



WORLD POLITICS 

Making excellent use of the preoccupation of 
her great rival in the African war, Russia has 
now succeeded in firmly and definitely establishing 
her preponderating influence in Persian affairs. 
Through the Loan Bank of Persia, she has just 
advanced the Shah the sum of 22,500,000 rubles, 
upon condition that the customs revenues of north- 
ern Persia be mortgaged as security, and that no 
other foreign loan be contracted by Persia without 
the consent of the Russian government. At the 
same time, Russia obtained extensive railway con- 
cessions within Persia, including the right to ex- 
tend the trans-Caspian railway to Bandar Abbas, 
on the Persian Gulf. Thus Russia has entered a 
region which Great Britain was especially anxious 
to reserve to herself as a sphere of interest. If 
Russia now succeeds in gaining from the Porte the 
coveted concessions of railway lines in northern 
Asia Minor, especially along the shore of the Black 
Sea, the triumph of her diplomatic policy of peace 
and opportunism will be complete. 

The position of Great Britain in India has cer- 
tainly been rendered more precarious by recent 
developments. The Russian line of approach to 
the Indian Empire has been extended, especially 
by the advance of the trans-Caspian railway into 
Persia, and by the acquisition of a paramount in- 
fluence in northern China. Although protected 
against direct attack from China by the mountains, 
India could be menaced by an invasion through 
Siam, in which country French and Russian diplo- 
234 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

macy work in concert. The position of Russia 
receives special reinforcement from the fact that 
she will have two bases for naval eA;'>editions, — 
Port Arthur, and her railway terminal on the 
Persian Gulf. 

It therefore Irccomes doubly important for Great 
Britain to fortify her rule in India by enlisting the 
population of that empire in her support. It can- 
not be said that England has succeeded in gaining 
the affections of her Indian subjects ; in fact, the 
separation between the natives and their Western 
rulers is rather on the increase. The facilities of 
modern travel tend to make the British adminis- 
trators mere sojourners in India, very unlike the 
older generation of British Indians, who became 
thoroughly intimate with Oriental life and character. 
At present it happens too frequently that officials, 
while honestly endeavoring to enforce justice and 
govern for the best interests of the subject race, 
entirely disregard the susceptibilities of a sensitive 
people, and by a haughty, domineering manner, 
antagonize men who pride themselves on their 
rank among the natives. Moreover, English ideas 
of official morality and conduct, as well as the 
higher elements in Western intellectual civiliza- 
tion generally, are on a plane rather too elevated 
for the masses of the East. The Russians, on the 
other hand, do not demand so much of their sub- 
jects, but allow them to continue in their Oriental 
ways, simply superadding a thin varnish of Rus- 
sian religion and civilization. 
235 



CHAPTER III 

The Meeting of Orient and Occident 

The results of the opening of China on the 
Chinese Empire itself have already been partly 
discussed. We have not yet, however, considered 
the meaning of this development to civilization 
in general. The meeting of the Orient and the 
Occident, long foreshadowed, has finally taken 
place, and the settlement of accounts between 
the two civilizations cannot be longer postponed. 
Whenever the Orient and the Occident have met 
before, it has always been in a life-and-death strug- 
gle for leadership in civilization. It was at Mara- 
thon that the West first saved itself from Oriental 
dominion : later, Alexander carried Western in- 
fluences far into the Orient ; but the wave swept 
back, and the European nations were again in 
turn forced to fight for their existence against 
Moors, Tartars, and Turks. But the end of the 
struggle is not yet. Far from the battlefields of 
Tours and Wahlstatt it is going on with different 
means and under new and more portentous circum- 
stances. Western civilization, now fully developed, 
236 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

and rich in the accumulated wealth and wisdom 
of centuries, stands panoplied in all the glories 
of history. The Orient, which believes that it 
has learned ages ago the sum of knowledge and 
the essence of truth, is still animated with the same 
spirit, and still has in great measure the same 
social and political institutions that existed at the 
beginning of the Christian era. Though these 
two civilizations have in some degree reacted upon 
each other, they still maintain a distinct character, 
with little real mutual understanding. 

The great question that now agitates thinking 
minds is as to the future predominance of either 
tendency in the life of the world. Is the Western 
spirit to conquer or to be conquered, or is there to be 
a peaceful union of the two ancient civilizations, 
combined into a higher harmony ? Considerations 
like the above may seem too general and indefinite 
for purposes of political discussion. Yet it must 
be remembered that in politics we should be aware 
of the widest consequences that may follow from 
any policy or situation ; and perhaps at no other 
time in the world's history has the general devel- 
opment of civilization so hinged upon immediate 
political action as at the present day. True, the 
considerations here presented are mere possibilities, 
but they are possibilities of such far-reaching and 
tremendous import that they should not be over- 
looked ; and to one who wishes to understand the 
forces at work about him, and to witness with 
appreciation the development of the greatest 
237 



WORLD POLITICS 

drama of the world's history, the knowledge that 
the fate of civilization is involved will not make 
events of less interest. 

While, as we have said, the two civilizations have 
mutually influenced each other, and while, in places, 
they shade off into one another, their general 
characteristics may nevertheless be clearly stated 
and distinguished. The Orient has the pessimism 
of completed knowledge and disillusionment : it is 
quiet and serene, because it sees nothing worth 
striving for: individual existence is unimportant. 
The West, on the other hand, is intensely individ- 
ualistic, and filled with an optimistic energy which 
leads it to believe in an evolution of higher forms 
and in progress to a higher civilization : not always 
clear as to the final aim, it yet believes above all 
in upward struggle, and takes for granted that 
humanity can progress. 

The meeting between the two civilizations has 
long been foreshadowed in philosophy and in 
general thought. The opening of India to the na- 
tions of Europe introduced the Western mind to the 
treasures of Eastern philosophy. With the growth 
of philological studies the influence of Oriental 
thought has become preeminent in many fields. 
Schopenhauer, the philosopher who perhaps best 
represents the attitude of continental European 
thought in the middle of the present century, is 
a Buddhist, and derives from Oriental ideas the 
life and spirit of his pessimistic philosophy. Even 
Nietzsche, standing though he does for a revival 
238 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

of Western individualistic energy, has not escaped 
the same influence. His individualism is after all 
an individualism of genius, of the select few, with a 
truly Oriental disregard for the masses of humanity. 
Russia, the chief Western exponent of Oriental- 
ism, has loomed larger and larger in men's minds, 
and the strange fascination which her power exer- 
cises in modern political life is due in no small 
measure to the anti-individualistic tendencies of 
her civilization. 

But, some one may ask, was not this threatened 
meeting of Orientalism and Occidentalism already 
accomplished long before the invasion of China, — 
when Europeans took in hand the guidance of 
Indian nations .'' It must be remembered, how- 
ever, that in India very few Europeans settle per- 
manently, and that no real communication has 
been established between the natives and the 
foreigners. The educated Indian regards the 
English as masterful barbarians who understand 
the art of government, to be sure, but who, in 
matters of culture, are still mere children. What 
the West is striving for and struggling over, their 
Oriental mind has solved long ages ago. 

In China, the relations of the races will be dif- 
ferent. First of all it must be remembered that 
China is in a more temperate zone, and will 
therefore permit and even invite settlement by 
Europeans. Consequently, more direct and more 
far-reaching relations will be established between 
China and the Western nations than was the case 
239 



WORLD POLITICS 

in India. Moreover, the Russian spirit will be 
present there to act as an interpreter and mediator 
between the two civilizations, and should Russia 
succeed in assimilating large areas of the Chi- 
nese Empire, Orientalism will be furnished with a 
strong political organization to aid it in impressing 
its character upon the world. It is therefore 
evident that the real meeting between the forces is 
still in the future, and that it will be a meeting 
fraught with unprecedented consequences. The 
Chinese themselves are tenacious of their social 
and religious ideas. While often ready to accept 
Western methods in commerce, they have received 
little impress from the Western spirit in any other 
way, as is witnessed by the slender success of 
Christian missions in the Chinese Empire. 

Buddhism, introduced into China from India, is 
the true religion of the Orient. Its pessimistic 
view of life, its weariness of existence, and its 
search after Nirvana, the quiet of the soul, are the 
fruit of long ages of suffering. It is averse to all 
fretting energy. Its ideal is a quiet life of con- 
templation and the extirpation of all violent pas- 
sions and desires. Buddhist temples are a true 
symbol of the deepest ideas of the religion. The 
shrines, containing the seated image of Buddha, 
rise from the edge of a translucent pond of water, 
surrounded by tall trees, — these shallow, limpid 
pools fitly symbolize the eye of consciousness, 
freed from passion and looking serenely out upon 
life. It is thus that the Buddhist would pass his 
240 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

existence, contemplating the world, making it his 
own by quiet absorption, — not wearing out his 
spirit in unavailing strife, — and awaiting final 
Nirvana, the rest of the spirit. Though the Chi- 
nese are not so imaginative as other Orientals, 
Buddhism is the only true religion of the Chinese 
masses, as it is of the Japanese, despite the fact 
that the mandarins, whose position depends upon 
upholding the political importance of Confucian- 
ism, affect to despise it. 

The question of greatest moment at the present 
time concerns the influence of Western indus- 
trial, political, religious, and intellectual forces 
on China. Should the empire remain intact, and 
should friendly relations continue to be fostered, 
much of Western civilization would imperceptibly 
creep in and become a part of Chinese life. On 
the other hand, should injudicious political meas- 
ures hopelessly antagonize the Chinese popula- 
tion, such a peaceful union could not be effected. 
It is certain that, should the policy of partition 
which has been advocated in some quarters be 
realized, terrible conflicts between the far East and 
the West must be the result. The broadest inter- 
ests of civilization therefore demand that the 
Western powers should exert all their influence in 
maintaining intact and open to Western thought 
and Hfe the greatest empire of the East. 

Certain pessimistic spirits have already proph- 
esied a conquest of our civilization by Oriental 
ideals. They believe that it is becoming untrue to 
R 241 



WORLD POLITICS 

itself, and is beginning to worship at the shrine 
of Oriental fatalism. There has, it is true, been 
a deepening and broadening of Western thought 
within the last few decades. The influence of 
Indian philosophy and religion on Western life can 
have escaped no one. The days of the shallower 
rationalism and utilitarianism are over, and there 
is instead a return to reverence for the deep, mys- 
terious forces of nature and of life. 

Unhappily, there also goes with this in many 
quarters a discountenancing of scientific methods in 
the field of knowledge and an impatience with lib- 
eral ideas in the field of politics; a return to mystic 
romanticism in fiction, — to a worship of half-under- 
stood symbols which are dealt out to the faithful 
as the essence of knowledge and experience. The 
slow, painful methods of acquiring knowledge by 
scientific investigation are viewed with impatience. 
The electric searchlight which science sends into 
the hidden recesses of existence is not easily or 
willingly borne by weaker eyes. They prefer the 
romantic dusk of Gothic cathedrals and medie- 
val idealism. In politics, progress by patient 
strength, by legitimate industry, by continued 
effort, is too slow. The imperial idea is invoked 
in a movement to endow nations with world domin- 
ion through manifestoes supported by brute force. 
The simple ideals of democracy, of social equality, 
of the cooperation of the governed in matters that 
most concern them, are in some quarters beginning 
to be brushed aside and to give place to a claim 
242 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

of the right of the stronger to govern as he pleases. 
Western civilization has certainly lost its harmony 
and cohesion. 

At this juncture, the East with its swarming 
hordes living a listless life from century to century ; 
the West with its energetic, individualistic impulses, 
but without any consistent philosophy of civiliza- 
tion, meet face to face. That this threatens to 
accentuate the reactionary forces, to strengthen 
autocracy and brute force, and to weaken every- 
thing that bases itself on reason, reflection, and 
individual right, is natural and evident. While 
some presaging spirits cherish the hope that East- 
ern thought will yield a harmonizing principle to 
the life of the West, others abandon themselves 
to the fear that we are destined to be driven back 
into another period of darkness in which intelli- 
gence will slumber and brute force reign supreme. 

The unfavorable influences that are to be ex- 
pected from Oriental civilization may be summa- 
rized briefly as follows : a pessimistic view of life ; 
an undervaluing of individual rights and the power 
of individual initiative ; a caste spirit which looks 
upon men as mere incomplete portions of a larger 
unity in which their existence is entirely swallowed 
up ; the degradation of women, whom Western 
ideals have placed on an equal intellectual and 
moral footing with men ; a lack of sympathy ; the 
preponderance of theocracy ; and absolutism. It is 
paradoxical that, with all its individualism, the West 
is, nevertheless, more sympathetic than the East. 
243 



WORLD POLITICS 

This sympathy is largely a result of the Chris- 
tian rehgion; for before the growth of Chris- 
tianity, the Roman world was dominated by the 
Stoic spirit, to which pity for the sufferings of 
fellow-beings was entirely foreign. Throughout 
the Orient, man is singularly apathetic and un- 
touched by the woes of his fellows. It may be 
said, indeed, by apologists of Eastern thought, that 
sympathy merely increases human suffering a thou- 
sand-fold by making every individual carry the bur- 
dens of thousands of fellow-sufferers, and that it 
leads to a perpetuation of deformities and disease 
by protecting from extirpation the victims of these 
evils. Even so, it cannot be doubted that, when 
we come to consider the feelings and ideals which 
make our life endurable, the bond of sympathy 
with fellow-beings is to be counted among the 
first of these, and that the introduction of Ori- 
ental apathy regarding the well-being of others 
would impoverish our civilization. No one who 
has read the most recent European philosophical 
and critical literature can have failed to see how 
deeply this question is agitating the European 
mind. 

Some favorable influences that may be exercised 
by the meeting of the older and younger civili- 
zations are the gaining by the latter of a deeper 
insight into the mystic elements of Hfe, more se- 
renity, and greater quiet and self-possession. Our 
civilization is too materialistic, and lays too much 
emphasis on mere machinery. The Oriental may 

244 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

well ask, Why do you hurry, and struggle, and 
make inventions, and reduce life to an endless 
scramble, when you have not time left to think 
about the deepest questions of the human soul ? 

If Chinese partition should be made the stepping- 
stone to world control, Western nations would be 
forced to fight for their civilization, and a century 
of terrible conflicts would be imminent. Such a 
struggle could only end in the final preponderance 
of one power in a world absolutism more deadly 
than that of Rome in that there would be left no 
vigorous elements to revive a dying civihzation. 
It is not strange, then, that many should be look- 
ing forward to times which will try men's souls, 
and insisting that we make sure of rallying about 
only the best in our civilization, and of struggling, 
not for material gain and the vulgar glory of the 
hour, but for the permanence of our highest ideals, 
in order that the world may retain an abiding-place 
for truthfulness and honesty in life and thought. 
No one who sees the seriousness of the present 
situation will rashly cry for war and headlong 
national aggrandizement. 

That China would not readily yield to any open 
and forceful imposition of Western civihzation is 
evident. The easiest and surest way of approach 
is that of practical life. The Chinese are intensely 
alive to any real improvements in the every-day con- 
cerns of business and industry, and when practical 
conveniences are brought to their notice they are 
not slow to profit by them, as the multitude of 

245 



WORLD POLITICS 

Celestials who have from the first crowded the 
trains on the railways in Pechili have proved. 
There is no doubt that, with the precedents al- 
ready adopted, Western industrial institutions will 
very rapidly spread and be accepted throughout 
China. The telegraph is already a part of Chi- 
nese life ; the railways will be within a few years. 
Manufactures are rapidly being estabhshed and 
the methods of mining reformed. With such a 
change in the economic basis of life, a change 
in ideas and in customs may also be expected. 
As a matter of fact, the avidity with which large 
numbers of educated Chinese seek every possible 
chance to gain information on Western methods, 
and the rapid spread of the reform propaganda in 
1898, show that a large proportion of the people 
are ready for far-reaching changes.^ 

^ The mandarin Pung Kwang Yeu advises missionaries to ap- 
peal to the upper classes by offering them advanced learning and 
technical information. See " Confucianism," in The World ^s Par- 
liament of Religions, Vol. I., p. 374. 



246 



CHAPTER IV 

General Consequences of the Opening of 
China 

It is a question of great moment how rapidly 
Chinese industries and commerce will develop under 
the new conditions. Most alarming prognostications 
have been indulged in by certain European writers 
who believe that China will rapidly become the 
great centre of industry, leaving Europe a deserted 
mother of nations. The marvellous extent of the 
resources of China has already been touched upon. 
To this we must add the integrity and business ca- 
pacity of her merchant class. At present, Japanese 
houses generally employ Chinamen in positions of 
trust, and the business in Farther India and in the 
Philippines is almost exclusively in the hands of Chi- 
nese merchants. It is not certain, however, to what 
extent they will show themselves fitted for great 
undertakings that call for the power of manipulat- 
ing millions of capital, watching markets of wide 
extent, and forestalling the needs of vast popula- 
tions. In huge industrial undertakings of this 
kind, the Chinese are as yet untried. They have 

247 



WORLD POLITICS 

cheap and abundant labor, — the best, the most 
reliable, and the most frugal in the Orient. It 
must, however, be remembered that, while nom- 
inally cheaper than Western labor, it is at the same 
time less efficient, needing more supervision, and 
accomplishing less in a given time. Thus, visitors 
to a government arsenal found workmen asleep by 
the side of their running machines. With all the 
advantages of cheap labor which the Chinese en- 
joy, the cost of production in the iron industry is 
still much greater with them than would be the 
price of the articles furnished if bought in a 
European market.^ 

But when we picture to ourselves that there is in 
China one-third of the world's population crowded 
into eighteen provinces, many of which in their 
natural wealth surpass, by far, countries like Ger- 
many and France, there is little room for doubt 
that, when the industrial forces of this region have 
once been set in motion, China will in truth become 
the "realm of the centre." Unlike Japan, China is 
most abundantly provided with coal and iron in 
close proximity to each other, so that the distance 
and cost of transportation of the raw material will 
be reduced to a minimum ; and factories can be 
established in localities where fuel, material, and 
labor exist in the greatest abundance. 

The first step in the development of China is the 
providing of transportation, which will redound 
largely to the benefit of foreign commerce. Those 

^ See Consular Reports, 1 898, p. IO53. 
248 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

nations that are most patient and that study most 
carefully the requirements of the market will carry 
off remarkable commercial advantages. It is true 
that the opening of river navigation, from which 
much had been expected, has not proved of con- 
siderable advantage to commerce on account of 
many harassing restrictions. But even in river 
commerce, the door is partly open^and, with a few 
more firm remonstrances at Peking, the advantage 
already gained may be rendered of actual use to 
trade ; whereupon it will undoubtedly be extended 
also to railroad communications. 
sTThe development of manufactures and mines has 
but just begun, although, as we have seen, numer- 
ous concessions have already been granted and 
many manufacturing establishments have already 
been founded. In Shanghai, alone, five great 
foreign cotton mills, and three owned by Chinese, 
have commenced operation since 1895. The Han- 
yang iron foundery, the first monument to the new 
progressive spirit in China, is now turning out large 
quantities of rails for the Chinese roads. ' The 
cost, however, is still considerably above that of 
the same goods in the European market, while the 
quality is inferior and the supply inadequate to the 
present needs, so that large quantities of rails are 
still being purchased from Great Britain and the 
United States. It is doubtless to be expected, 
however, that China will soon become a great 
manufacturing centre for cotton, woollen, and iron 
goods. The cheaper grades of cotton goods are 

249 



WORLD POLITICS 

already manufactured in large quantities, and foi 
these grades, Chinese raw cotton is adequate in 
quality and quantity. Little raw cotton, therefore, 
is imported from America or India for Chinese 
manufacture. > In Japan, the case is quite different. 
During the last year, about twenty-two million 
dollars worth of raw cotton was imported for the 
Japanese cotton mills, and one-third of this came 
from the United States. 

The development of manufacturing industries in 
China will in the first instance bring about a vast 
demand for European and American manufactured 
products. Machinery for cotton spinning, for iron 
works, and for paper manufacture is already being 
imported; and as the number of new industries 
increases, a vast market for these articles will be 
opened. Indeed, no immediate shifting of the 
centre of industry to the Orient need be feared. 
Decades will elapse before China will be able to 
satisfy even the newly stimulated demand of her 
own population for manufactured goods. The 
prophecies which were made in regard to the im- 
pending competition of Japan in the world market 
have failed to be realized in any but the slightest 
degree. On the contrary, Japan, through her com- 
mercial and industrial development, has become a 
far better customer in European and American mar- 
kets ; and the same will undoubtedly be true in the 
case of China, although the latter empire is in a 
far more favorable position for industrial self-suffi- 
ciency than is the Land of the Rising Sun. 

250 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

As China is opening up to commerce, the ques- 
tion of currency becomes one of absorbing impor- 
tance. At present, the fluctuations in the silver 
currency of China are such that even the most 
legitimate business partakes of the nature of 
gambling. The United States consul at Shang- 
hai, in his last report, states that, though eight 
million dollars' worth of American goods had 
entered that port during the fiscal year, prob- 
ably not much money was made by the firms 
handling this business, as the rapid and great fluc- 
tuations in the price of silver rendered impossible 
any accurate calculations. A silver-using country 
would undoubtedly have a great advantage in trad- 
ing with China; but as even Japan has now 
adopted gold monometallism, and is rapidly intro- 
ducing the same system in Corea through her 
commercial influence, all the great nations that 
have important dealings with China are gold coun- 
tries. It is a serious problem as to how this 
great impediment to international commerce can 
be removed. Unless the quantity of gold con- 
tinues to increase rapidly, it seems almost impos- 
sible that China, a vast nation of four hundred mil- 
lion people with constantly expanding commerce 
and industry, can be raised to a gold basis with- 
out entailing dangerous consequences upon the 
money market of the world. This problem, 
though it belongs to economics rather than to 
politics, nevertheless deserves the closest atten- 
tion of thinkers and statesmen in all those nations 

251 



WORLD POLITICS 

that desire their share of the coming vast trade 
with China. 

With the growing importance of China in the 
world of industry, the Pacific is becoming a most 
important highway of commerce, promising to 
outstrip the Atlantic as a centre of maritime inter- 
ests within the not distant future. The countries 
that immediately border upon the Pacific contain 
a population of about 550 millions of inhabitants, 
well-nigh one-half of the total population of the 
globe ; and this mass of humanity is more directly 
dependent on the Pacific Ocean for transportation 
facilities than are the Atlantic peoples on that 
body of water, because railways and canals have 
not been as fully developed in the Orient as in the 
countries bordering on the Atlantic. The whole 
perspective of the industrial world will thus be 
changed : what formerly seemed almost the back- 
yard of the world is now to become the very cen- 
tre of interest. Japan bids fair to rival the great 
island kingdom of the West. Viewed in their 
relation to the Chinese markets, the Philippine 
Islands are in a position of great importance. 
From this standpoint also, the making of a canal 
that will join the Atlantic to the Pacific becomes 
a matter of immediate necessity. The South 
American republics that face on the Pacific Ocean 
are beginning to feel their neighborhood to the 
Oriental world, and Chinese emigrants, excluded 
from the United States, are seeking fields of ac- 
tivity in Latin America. Vast transportation com- 

252 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

panics have recently been formed to connect the 
various shores of this great basin. Thus, the Im- 
perial Japanese line^ is, next to the two great Ger- 
man lines, the largest, richest, and best equipped 
in the world. This whole development, with all 
that it involves, emphasizes the importance of 
navies. Any nation that desires to have its voice 
heard in the counsels of the East must be able to 
support its demands with a strong and efficient 
navy. 

That the United States is most intimately inter- 
ested in the developments here discussed is too 
evident to call for argument. It is especially the 
states of the Pacific slope that may hope to profit 
largely from the developments in China, as their 
vast lumbering resources correspond to one of the 
most strongly felt needs in Chinese industries. The 
day may come when the port of Seattle or of San 
Francisco will show a larger shipping than that 
of New York, because the peoples reached by the 
routes that diverge from these points are so greatly 
superior in numbers to those that border on the 
Atlantic, and are growing constantly stronger in 
their industrial requirements. 

When the starthng import of the events that we 
have been considering first dawned upon the West- 
ern world, there was a feeling of bewilderment 
amounting almost to fear. As the situation be- 
comes more clearly outlined, however, a weight 

^ The Nippon Yusen Kaisha in 1898 owned sixty steamers of 
191,343 tons. 

253 



WORLD POLITICS 

seems to be lifted from Europe ; for not only is a 
wider perspective given to politics, vaster interests 
involved, and greater fields thrown open to the en- 
deavor of European nations, but there is also a grow- 
ing feeling that a grander work of civilization, in 
which all nations can participate, is claiming their 
combined exertions. The narrow jealousies of 
Europe, and the rankling hostilities that were con- 
stantly endangering the world's peace, have given 
way for the time to broader interests, and, although 
these too may be used to kindle the fire of national 
animosities, there is, nevertheless, within them a 
power to create more friendly relations among the 
great countries, and thus to bring about their co- 
operation in a work where all will have ample 
opportunity to employ their best powers and most 
important resources. 

The day of alliances is over. Within the last: 
decade we have had a kaleidoscopic change in inter- 
national affinities. We have had a triple alliance 
and a dual alliance, with secret affinities among 
the various members of the two. We have seen 
Russia, France, and Germany united in opposing 
the projects of Japan after the Chino-Japanese 
war, and aiding Russia to take the place of Japan 
as a friendly civilizer of the Celestial Empire and 
to reap in that way almost all the direct benefits 
of the war. Thus, too, England, Germany, Japan, 
and the United States are inclined to sympathize 
on the question of equal opportunities, while Great 
Britain and the American republic have entered 

254 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

upon a stage of general amity strangely in con- 
trast with their former strained relations. Germany 
and England work together in Africa in the matter 
of the Portuguese possessions around Delagoa 
Bay. France and Russia, even after the first 
enthusiasm of their European friendship has evap- 
orated, find in the Asiatic situation new grounds 
for friendly agreement. France and Italy, long 
inimical, have approached each other in the com- 
mercial treaty of 1898. A rapprochement even be- 
tween Germany and France is indicated by certain 
recent events, such as the interchange of friendly 
messages between the two governments, the em- 
peror's visit to a French man-of-war, and the 
reception accorded the actress Agnes Sorma in 
Paris. 

All these instances tend to show that general 
alliances are no longer the order of the day in 
international politics. Understandings on definite 
points may be reached, but a nation of the first 
rank must be self-centred. It may approach other 
nations and cooperate with them in certain defi- 
nitely prescribed matters, but it must not bind 
itself completely to the policy of any other power. 
The position of France has been decidedly weak- 
ened by her constant subserviency to the policy of 
Russia, as shown especially in China. While, with 
the constant aid and connivance of France, Russia 
practically gained a rich and promising province, 
the former country has obtained only concessions of 
rather doubtful value in the southern part of the 

25s 



WORLD POLITICS 

empire. The state that allows itself to be drawn 
as a satellite into the orbit of another power inevi- 
tably loses prestige and endangers its own national 
interests. 

If the forces at work were only clearly under- 
stood, the result would be rather a strengthening 
of peace than a heaping of additional fuel upon 
the fires of international hostility. There is no 
need of narrow suspicions. The field is vast 
enough to afford room for the exercise of all the 
energies of civilization. The Empire of Great 
Britain, by its most valuable work of policing 
dangerous districts, making them accessible to the 
world's trade, and giving them an equitable system 
of laws, is offering to other nations vast markets, 
the destruction of which no national aggrandize- 
ment on their part would repay. Thus Egypt, 
from being a sink of corruption, has in the short 
period of twenty years been raised to the position 
of a prosperous nation with credit sufficient to 
carry on vast internal improvements. 

Russian advance and Russian efforts to push 
forward the bounds of civilization are likewise of 
value to the whole world. If that nation is actually 
most successful in assimilating Oriental nationali- 
ties, if she, more readily than any other European 
power, can give to them a certain modicum of civ- 
ilization, resistance to her progress must in the end 
prove futile ; and in the meantime such resist- 
ance can serve only to antagonize her and incense 
her into complete hostility to Western methods 

256 



ORIENT AND OCCIDENT 

and ideals. Her progress is slow. Any attempt 
on her part to carry out vast imperial schemes 
without the foundation of true interests would 
result in the collapse of her whole policy. 

Thus, all nations may cooperate as long as they 
expand naturally. What must be prevented at all 
hazards is the ruthless preemption of territories 
not yet demanded by the interests of national ex- 
pansion. Even if the nations grow normally, the 
day may come when they must clash and prove 
their right to survive. But that day is distant in- 
deed. Until then, it is only necessary to repress 
the tendencies that would anticipate natural de- 
velopment, and thus create an artificial spirit of 
contention and competition not based on living, 
actual interests. To oppose the natural growth of 
a strong power is unwise and futile ; to resist the 
artificial preemption of regions not yet necessary 
for national life is the part of statesmanship. 

Ill 

Bibliographical Note 

Albrecht (Max), Riissisch Centralasien. Hamburg, 1896. 
BilbassofF (B. von), Katharina //. im Urteile der Weltlitera- 

tur (translated from the Russian). Berlin, 1897. 
Bloch (J. von), Der Krieg (translated from the Russian). 

Berlin, 1899. 

Bodley (J. E. C), France. New York, 1898. 
Brandes (George), Impressions of Rjissia. London, 1890. 
Clarke (James Freeman), Essays. Boston. 

257 



WORLD POLITICS 

Clarke (Sir G. S.), Russia's Sea Power, Past and Present. 
London, 1898. 

Foulke (W. D.), Slav or Saxon? 2d ed. New York, 1898. 

Haxthausen, Za«(^//6/;^ Verfassiing Rtisslands. Leipzig, 1866. 

Honegger (J. J.)> Russische Literatiir und Cultiir. Leipzig, 
1880. 

Issaeff (A. A.), Emigration and its Importance for the Econ- 
omy of the Russian Nation (Russian). St. Petersburg, 
1891. 

Krausse (A.), Russia in Asia, London, 1899. 

Krapotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutiotiist. Boston, 1899. 

Leger (L.), Russes et Slaves. Paris, 1896. 

Legras (J.), Au Pays Russe. Paris, 1898. 

Leroy-Beaulieu (Anatole), The Empire of the Czars (trans- 
lated from the French). London, 1 893-1 896. 

Pobedonostseff, Reflections of a Russiafi Statesman (trans- 
lated from the Russian). London, 1898. 

Popowski (J.), The Rival Powers in Central Asia. London, 
1897. 

Rawlinson (Sir Henry), England and Rtissia in the East. 
London, 1875. 

Reclus (Elisee), Geographie Universelle. Tome V. Paris, 
1880. 

Renan (E.), Discoiirs et Conferences. Paris, 1887. 

Thompson (H. N.), Russian Politics. London, 1895. 

Tikhomirov (L. A.), Russia, Political and Social (translated 
from the French). London, 1892. 

" Vladimir," Russia on the Pacific, and the Siberian Railway. 
New York, 1899. 

Wallace (McKenzie), Russia. 1877. 



258 



PART IV 
GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 



CHAPTER I 

The Nationalism of Bismarck and the Impe- 
rialism OF William II 

The expansionist tendencies of Germany to-day 
are especially interesting under a twofold aspect : 
as showing the historical development from nation- 
alism to national imperialism, and as illustrating 
the various ramifications which that expansionist 
policy at the present time assumes. Germany 
is the foremost among the nations that have 
realized their unified political existence during the 
nineteenth century, and her whole history up to 
1890, to be rightly understood, must be read in 
this perspective. Even to-day nationalism is the 
firm basis of German policy. Her colonial expan- 
sion began at first as a merely commercial devel- 
opment, political considerations being secondary. 
The change which has been wrought by recent 
events will be best illustrated by a glance at Bis- 
marck's views on colonialism, followed by a more 
detailed study of the expressions and measures of 
the statesmen of a more recent time. 

It was Bismarck's idea that German colonies 
were to maintain a strictly commercial nature. 

261 



WORLD POLITICS 

Thus, he frequently contrasted them with the 
military and administrative colonization of France. 
In discussing in his Memoirs^ the future policy 
of Russia, Bismarck states that progress of that 
power in Asia Minor and Turkey will be favorable 
to Germany by withdrawing the attention of the 
Muscovite Empire from the German border. Ger- 
many, thought Bismarck, had no intention of ex- 
tending her territory, and therefore, of all European 
powers, she had the least interest in the Orient. 
He believed that Germany's policy has always 
been characterized by respect for the rights of 
the other states, and this essential justness he 
ascribes to the objectivity of the German char- 
acter, and also to the fact that Germany does 
not stand in need of an increase of territory. 
According to the Meinoij^s, the nation simply 
desired to realize its political unity, and, this 
having been accomplished, it favors peace and 
the maintenance of existing conditions. In the 
view of the Iron Chancellor, there is no com- 
bativeness or irritability in German politics. He 
states that he never looked upon international con- 
troversies from the point of view of the duellist's 
honor, but that he always rather regarded their 
effect upon the right of the German people to lead 
an autonomous life. Bismarck even favored the 
formation of chartered companies, in order to avoid 
the assumption of political control in connection 
with colonization. 

1 Bismarck, Gedankoi und Eriitneriuigen, Ch. XXX. 
262 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

By the year 1890, German policy had already 
changed materially. Events had proved that com- 
mercial exploitation leads almost inevitably to 
political interference under the necessity of giv- 
ing protection and imparting prestige to national 
undertakings. Thus, the revolts in Zanzibar, in 
1888, had led to far-reaching political interference 
on the part of the German government, and when 
in 1890 the delimitation agreement was concluded 
between Great Britain and Germany, the latter 
empire found herself in the possession of a pohtical 
domain of 650,000 square miles on the African 
continent. With the more recent developments of 
imperial politics, the methods of Germany have 
thoroughly changed, and the principle of the 
necessity of political assistance in the work of 
commercial and industrial colonization has been 
fully adopted. 

How far this principle is carried in practice 
will be examined immediately ; but we may well 
preface that consideration with a few represen- 
tative expressions of opinion on the part of 
the German emperor and other statesmen. Minis- 
ter von Marschall said in the navy debates of 
1897: — 

" German politics is not about to enter on an adventurous 
stage. We must defend our interests, defend the Germans 
in foreign lands. Emigration must be directed into such 
channels that the Germans abroad may be kept German." ^ 

1 Wilhelm Miiller, Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart, 1897, 
p. 49. 

263 



WORLD POLITICS 

The manner in which the opposition views the 
policy of poHtical interference is shown in Deputy 
von Kardoff's answer to von Marschall's speech. 
Among other things, he said : — 

'' Where there are no German warships, there German 
commerce flourishes most. The protection to Germans in 
foreign lands is simply a prelude to a policy of world empire. 
That is a poor diplomacy which can advance only when 
protected by gims."^ 

The utterances of the emperor regarding the poUcy 
to be pursued, are of special significance on account 
of his influence and representative character, for 
his speeches have come to be looked upon as im- 
portant declarations of the government policy ; and 
it is well known that he selects auspicious occa- 
sions to impress his leading views on the citizens 
of Germany and on the world at large. In his 
speech at Cologne, in June, 1897, he said: — 

" We have great duties in the world. There are Germans 
everywhere whom we must protect. German prestige must 
be preserved abroad. The trident belongs in our hands." ^ 

Upon the representative occasion of delegating 
Prince Henry to command the Oriental fleet, the 
emperor took occasion to express himself most 
unequivocally on the new tendencies of world pol- 
itics, using the following words : — 

" The expedition which you undertake is the logical conse- 
quence of what our sainted grandfather and his great chancel- 
lor have politically organized, and what our magnificent father 

2 /did., p. 127. See also supra, Part I., Ch. IV. 
264 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

fought for on the field of battle. It is simply the first realiza- 
tion of the transoceanic ambition of the newly united German 
Empire. It is my duty to follow the new German Hanse and 
to offer it the protection which it has the right to demand of 
the empire and its ruler. We must also protect the German 
brothers whose ecclesiastical duties take them into distant 
lands. Our mission is one of protection, not of aggression. 
We simply wish equal rights for German commerce under the 
imperial banner. Imperial power is sea power. The two are 
mutually dependent. One cannot exist without the other. 
Our citizens abroad may rest absolutely assured that the pro- 
tection of the empire will everywhere be given them through 
the imperial navy. Should any one infringe our rights, then 
use the mailed fist and earn your laurel wreath." ^ 

A Still more significant utterance was made by 
the emperor at Hamburg on October i8, 1899, 
when, at a banquet given in the town hall after 
the launching of a great vessel, he said : — 

"Germany is in bitter need of a strong fleet. This mighty 
emporium of Hamburg shows what the German people can 
do when united, and on the other hand, how necessary to our 
interests is the strengthening of our naval forces. If that 
kind of reinforcement had not been refused me during the 
first eight years of my reign, — refused despite my urgent 
requests and admonitions, refused with scorn and even mock- 
ery, — how different matters would be to-day. We should be 
able to push our thriving trade and commerce over the seas." 

Expressions like these might be cited in a multi- 
tude of instances, but the above suffice to summa- 
rize the policy that is at present governing the 
counsels of the German Empire. When we now 

1 Ibid., p. 195. 

^ Reported in the daily press. 
265 



WORLD POLITICS 

turn to that policy in detail, we find that it illus- 
trates all of the aspects of the new imperialism. 
It emphasizes commercial and industrial interests. 
Political interference and control enter by way of 
the protection needed for industries and for mis- 
sions. The industrial conquest of a country is 
initiated by the building of railways. Actual col- 
onization is everywhere fostered. Chartered com- 
panies are used to develop backward districts, and 
the method of protectorates is in great favor. 

In general, Germany has entered upon a con- 
scious policy of imperial expansion, and with their 
well-known thoroughness of method, the Germans 
have developed a system of imperialism more com- 
plete and well-ordered than that of any other coun- 
try, although not covering so much territory as 
does that of Great Britain or that of France. To 
any one who desires to study the present tendency 
of colonial and industrial expansion, the methods 
pursued by the German Empire are therefore 
highly interesting and instructive. It is chiefly 
as showing the sudden transition from nationalism 
to imperial ideas, and as bringing out clearly the 
manifold methods by which this tendency mani- 
fests itself in contemporary history, that the writer 
presents a review of the most recent developments 
in German colonization. 



266 



CHAPTER II 

The Interests of Germany in Africa and 
Asia 

Germany is interested in widely scattered fields, 
and her methods vary according to the conditions, 
— political, economic, and physical, — of the coun- 
try to be colonized. The South African colonies 
are managed largely on the basis of English prec- 
edent. Although of considerable extent and likely, 
under the recent understanding with Great Britain, 
to be augmented by the accession of a portion of 
the Portuguese possessions in Africa, these colonies 
may be omitted from our consideration, since they 
present elements less characteristic than those 
which may be noted in other parts of the German 
colonial field. It is true that Germany has been 
obliged to solve there many questions of colonial 
policy, such as that of punitive expeditions, of 
treatment of the black races, and of the best 
methods for commercial expansion. But her 
plans and proceedings in other parts of the world 
are so much more interesting and important that 
we shall not dwell upon the African colonies, nor 

267 



WORLD POLITICS 

on those of Oceanica, where the chief rights of 
government are placed in the hands of a chartered 
company. 

It is chiefly the industrial and commercial colo- 
nization of China, Asia Minor, and South America 
that is of interest in this connection. Of course, 
there is such a fluidity of development that it is 
difficult to form hard and fast conclusions, but we 
can gather information enough to apprise our- 
selves of the evident drift of circumstances, and to 
understand better the situation of the world and the 
interests of the various nations at the present time. 

It is often stated that Germany covets the Dutch 
colonies in Asia and South America. There has 
been considerable newspaper agitation and dis- 
cussion of an alliance between Holland and 
Germany, by the terms of which Holland is to 
furnish large additions to the German navy, 
while the empire is to defend the Dutch kingdom by 
its mighty army. The alleged desire of England 
and America for the Dutch colonies is used to stir 
up feeling in favor of such a union, and the Trans- 
vaal complications lend further strength to this 
movement. But it has not as yet passed out of 
the stage of discussion into that of action ; and 
while it may be looked upon as a political possibil- 
ity to be reckoned with, it would be a grave mistake 
to make it a basis of political reasoning as an ac- 
complished fact. 

We have already incidentally discussed the 
position of Germ^any in China, and it will there- 

268 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 



fore be sufficient if in this place we summarize 
what has been said before, merely offering addi- 
tional information on important points. It is, of 
course, well known that the actual seizure of 
Chinese territory was accomplished under the 
guise of retaliation for outrages committed on 
certain missionaries of the Roman Catholic 
Church. It is interesting, in this connection, to 
note the efforts made by the German government 
to obtain the protectorate over Roman Catholic 
missions in the Orient. On account of their 
cohesion and systematic manner of proceeding, 
these missions are more effective agents for 
purposes of political extension than are those of 
the Protestant churches. The French still cling 
to their claim of being the regular protectors of 
Catholic Christians in the Orient ; but a few years 
ago a concerted effort was made to displace 
France from this office, partly or entirely, and to 
substitute instead the German Empire. The move- 
ment was assisted by the German party at the 
Vatican, led by the cardinals Ledochowski, Hohen- 
lohe, and Galimberti,^ which exerted its influence 
to have a portion of the protectorate transferred 
to Germany, using as arguments against France 
the prevalence of religious struggles and the 
power of Masonic organizations in the republic. 
As Cardinal Ledochowski is prefect of the prop- 

1 See article on " La Politique AUemande et le Protectorat des 
Missions Catholiques," in Revue des Deux Mondes, September, 
1898. 

269 



WORLD POLITICS 

aganda, — that is, virtually colonial secretary of 
the Holy See, — he was an important ally of the 
German cause. An attempt had already been 
made in 1 886 to supersede France, at least in part, 
by having a papal nuncio to China appointed. 
In 1 89 1, Bishop Anzer, the head of the German 
missions in China, placed his mission under 
German protection. It was the massacre of two 
of his missionaries that led to the German occu- 
pation. The massacre could not have come at 
a time more suitable for the Emperor William's 
plans, since it furnished occasion for significant 
naval demonstrations, and strengthened the em- 
peror's position in the Reichstag by inducing a 
large portion of the Centrist or Catholic party to 
favor the naval budget.^ German efforts at the 
Vatican not being completely successful, the im- 
perial government has finally declared that, even 
without the consent or expressed wish of the 
Vatican, it will undertake the protection of 
German missionaries and ecclesiastics wherever 
they may be found. 

The territory thus gained in China, — the port of 
Kiao-chow, — is to be made the centre of German 
exploitation of Shantung and the Yellow River 
valley. Within the former province, railroads are 
to be built exclusively with German capital and by 
German engineers ; for a distance of 30 li (about 

1 Telegrams thanking the emperor for the protection afforded 
were received from many prelates, including the archbishops of 
Breslau and Posen. 

270 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

12 miles) from each side of these railways, and 
along their whole extent, the mines are to be devel- 
oped by German subjects. If the Chinese should 
at any time be in need of foreign capital for 
the development of Shantung, German capitalists 
shall, in the first instance, be applied to for loans. 
Necessary machinery and materials, too, are to be 
obtained from German manufacturers.^ In the 
upper Yellow River valley, no such exclusive privi- 
leges have been obtained, though from the agree- 
ment made between German and British financiers, ^ 
it is apparent that the German government intends 
to foster commercial and industrial exploitation in 
this region. 

In this connection, it is interesting to note the 
influence of Chinese affairs on the political affini- 
ties of Germany. The German Empire and France 
assisted Russia in preventing Japan from deriving 
the fullest benefits from her great victory over 
China, and as a remuneration for the good offices 
thus offered to the Celestial Empire, the latter has 
allowed these three nations exceptional concessions 
within her borders. Germany, by joining this tri- 
umvirate in its inception, secured exclusive privi- 
leges to which her former relations with China had 
scarcely entitled her, and she still occupies a privi- 
leged position in the eyes of the court and govern- 
ment at Peking. 

It is not at all to be expected, however, that 
Germany will bind herself in any way to act with 

^ Consular Reports, December, 1S98, p. 558. ^ ggg p_ 12^. 

271 



WORLD POLITICS 

France or Russia in the future. Having now 
obtained a footliold in China, her interests will 
henceforth rather be contrary to those of her two 
former alHes, and more similar to those of the Brit- 
ish Empire. Germany will not act rashly ; she 
will patiently await developments and act at every 
juncture with precision and due regard to her 
interests. It is not certain that she would oppose 
further advance on the part of Russia, if she her- 
self were to receive additional advantages similar 
to those already acquired, and if she were also to 
be assured that her present trade facilities would 
not thereby be diminished. Should the course of 
events inevitably lead to an actual partition, the 
German Empire would demand its share, but it is 
not to be expected that she will consciously take 
any steps toward bringing about such a devel- 
opment. Advances looking to that end can be 
expected only from Russia. 

The interests of Germany in China are primarily 
of a commercial and industrial nature. Her com- 
merce is rapidly gaining upon that of England. 
At Hongkong, the German merchants are most 
prosperous and energetic, and more and more of 
the trade is passing into their hands. Kiao-chow 
must, therefore, not be looked upon primarily in 
the light of a territorial acquisition, but rather as 
a point of support for commercial and industrial 
development. The same is true of the moderate 
territorial concession obtained in the city of Han- 
kow, where also German commerce is rapidly gain- 

272 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

ing.^ When Prince Henry steamed up the Yangtse 
in imperial splendor, his purpose was to impress 
the Chinese mind with the power of Germany to 
afford effective protection to her industrial repre- 
sentatives. From all this it may be judged that 
the interests of the empire in China are already 
large, and constantly and rapidly growing. 

Such being the case, the rational policy of Ger- 
many is one of equal opportunity and opposition to 
exclusive appropriation. Her government is fully 
alive to the vast importance of the Chinese crisis, 
and every incident in that great historical devel- 
opment is keenly watched. Whatever may hap- 
pen, Germany is sure to insist upon her just share 
in any advantages to be obtained. It perhaps may 
be doubted whether she can be counted on to oppose 
an effective barrier to the Russification of north- 
ern China. As long as the markets are left open 
and industrial advantages free, she would not be 
inclined to venture blood and treasure in a strug- 
gle with Russia; but should that country insist upon 
absolute exclusiveness of policy, Germany might 
be relied upon as an ally in the opposition to Rus- 
sian advance. 

The countries of Asia Minor, Syria, and Meso- 
potamia have recently come into prominence as of 
great importance for colonization. We are accus- 
tomed to think of this region as composed of vast 
plains or of mountainous and barren tracts, over 
which nomadic horsemen roam, and which are 

1 See Consular Reports, August, 1899, p. 671. 
T 273 



WORLD POLITICS 

studded here and there with the ruins of the cit- 
ies of former empires. Few have thought of the 
industrial possibilities of this vast region ; and 
yet there can be little doubt that within the next 
few decades it will become a great industrial and 
commercial centre. Though not so immensely 
rich as China, its resources are abundant and 
accessible, while its population is sparse. More- 
over, European colonists could settle here without 
being subjected to the inconveniences or dangers 
of a tropical climate, and without being obliged to 
modify greatly the habits of their homes. They 
could without much change transfer their trade 
and manufactures, and here continue their accus- 
tomed industrial activities. Of all the regions still 
available for European colonization, this is, there- 
fore, by far the most promising. 

It is evident that from the very first the present 
emperor has recognized the importance of Asia 
Minor. Though Bismarck asserted that Germany, 
having no interests there, need not oppose the 
Russian advance in that region,^ the emperor has 
from the beginning taken a decidedly contrary 
view. He has moulded his entire European pohcy 
with a view to gaining the friendship of the Turkish 
government and obtaining from it complete freedom 
in developing the resources of Asia Minor. 

1 Cf. his famous saying, " In the whole Oriental controversy (of 
1876) there are no German interests involved that vi^ould be worth 
the sound bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer." — Speech 
of December 6, 1876. 

274 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

The German missions of that region have also 
been placed under special imperial protection. 
The Steele Fathers, whose Paldstinaverein is a 
most important missionary agency, have placed 
themselves under the shield of the emperor, and 
though Cardinal Kopp's mission to the Vatican to 
obtain the papal sanction for a German protecto- 
rate did not succeed, the emperor has, as has just 
been said, declared his firm purpose to maintain 
the right of the empire to protect her citizens 
wherever found. Besides these German missions, 
there are already in Syria and Palestine important 
industrial, commercial, and agricultural colonies, 
and within the past year a large colonial society 
has been formed for the development of this 
movement. 

Of the greatest significance, however, is the 
emperor's visit to the Holy Land in 1898. Many 
have been inclined to put this visit down to the 
account of the emperor's predilection for splen- 
did dramatic presentations. Taken in its con- 
nection with German policy, however, it is not to 
be doubted that it had a deep political significance. 
For years before the Sultan's friendship had been 
cultivated, and especially during the Greek war, 
did the German government openly evince its 
regard for the Osman Empire. Not only had the 
German officers given the brave Ottoman fighters 
the methods needed for success, but even the 
government itself was prompt in taking steps 
which showed sympathy with Turkey as against 

275 



WORLD POLITICS 

Greece. Some writers have attributed this move- 
ment to Germany's desire for the preservation of 
European peace ; ^ but surely such a desire might 
have been evinced without active manifestations 
of sympathy for the Turkish government. Thus, 
an Armenian professor, Thumajan, who wished to 
speak in Berlin on the persecution of the Armenian 
Christians, was not allowed to give his address, on 
account of his attacks on " our friend, the Sultan." ^ 
Germany's manifestations of sympathy, which were 
of substantial value to Turkey and which were 
highly appreciated by the Porte, were followed by 
the emperor's visit to the Orient. With great 
splendor, which might well be taken as indicating 
a lurking desire on the part of the august monarch 
to figure, at least in the eyes of the impressionable 
Orientals, as a vice-regent of God, the imperial 
" progress " was accomplished.^ The imperial visit 
to Jerusalem, like the visit of Prince Henry to 
Hankow, indicated the purpose of the emperor to 
give political aid to commercial and industrial 
development and colonization. 

As a result of these activities, the Germans have 
assumed a leading role as colonizers in Syria and 
in the southern part of Asia Minor. Their com- 
mercial interests are rapidly expanding, and no 

1 For instance, W. T. Stead, in The Chief Justice of Europe. 

2 Wilhelm Miiller's Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart, 1897, 
p. 28. 

' See Etienne Lamy, " La France du Levant," in Revue des Deux 
Mondes, January, 1899. 

276 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

efforts are spared to study the characteristic 
demands of the market, and to adapt the nature of 
manufactures and of the credit arrangements to 
local conditions.^ In order to give greater impulse 
and unity to the efforts at colonization, a German 
monthly magazine, Der Orient, is being published, 
in both the French and German languages. To 
quote from the opening article : — 

" Its purpose is to strengthen and extend the mutual 
relations of Germany and the countries of the Levant. It 
will contribute to the better understanding of political and 
commercial undertakings in those regions, combat ancient 
prejudices among the Orientals, and prove to them that 
we Germans have no political axes to grind in the Levant, 
but simply desire to be allowed to appear as unselfish friends 
and as pioneers of Western culture. Der Orient will attempt 
to increase German imports into the Levant, as well as the 
exports from there to Germany, and it will strongly advo- 
cate the solidarity and authority of Turkey and the Balkan 
states." 

Development of railway communication in Asia 
Minor is chiefly in the hands of German capital- 
ists. The Anatolian Railway, the trunk line 
intended ultimately to connect Constantinople 
with Bagdad, has already in large part been con- 
structed. In 1888, the German 'Qz.n\i {Die Deutsche 
Bank) of Berlin obtained a concession to build 
and operate for ninety-nine years that part of the 
line between Ismid (near Constantinople) and 

^ See Coitimercial Relatiotts of the United States, 1898, pp. 142, 
1161, 1170, 117S. 

277 



WORLD POLITICS 

Angora, a distance of 485 kilometres. This 
section of the line was built by the German Society 
for the Construction of Railways in Asia Minor, of 
Frankfurt, and was completed in 1892. Two fur- 
ther important concessions were obtained by the 
German Bank in 1893, — for a line between Angora 
and Kaisarieh (425 km.), and for a branch to 
Konia (470 km.). The concession for the part 
of the trunk line between Kaisarieh and Bagdad 
is reported as having also been obtained by Ger- 
man capitalists, in 1899. One great difficulty 
which confronts the railway builder in that country 
lies in the fact that the government wishes the 
roads constructed on strategical rather than on 
commercial lines, and it is therefore often no easy 
or simple matter to arrive at an agreement. 

The resources of this region are of great variety 
and richness. The plain of Hauran, west of 
Damascus, would alone be able to furnish the 
grain necessary for the sustenance of a much 
larger population than that of Syria to-day, and 
there are many other regions of equal promise. 
The mountains are rich in mineral wealth. 

The position of the country promises to make it 
also an important industrial centre. Should the 
great railway line from Alexandria to Shanghai be 
constructed, Palestine would become the junction 
point for the European, Asiatic, and African trans- 
continental lines, a position that would redound 
most favorably to the commercial importance of 
this region. 

278 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

Strategically, too, Syria is of the highest value. 
Commanding both the sea and land routes between 
the continents, it is easily defended on account of 
its partly mountainous character, a condition which 
is certain to give this region vast political impor- 
tance. The power that can control it will thereby 
obtain a material accession to its weight in the 
politics of the world. At present, Germany does 
not aim at anything beyond an industrial conquest. 
But should this be accomplished, it would doubt- 
less lead naturally to the assertion of political in- 
fluence, at least to the extent of the exclusion of 
foreign powers. 

It is here that Russia and Germany are most 
likely to clash. Germany, with her rapidly expand- 
ing population, is looking for fields suitable for 
actual colonization. Hitherto she has lost her col- 
onists, chiefly to English-speaking lands. To avoid 
this in the future is one of the greatest hopes of 
the present government. Nowhere can this hope 
be attained more readily than in Asia Minor, 
where there is no population which would be 
at all likely to absorb the German colonists, and 
where, on the contrary, they would retain their 
national sentiments and keep up their connec- 
tion with the mother country. Should Germany 
succeed in fostering considerable industrial and 
agricultural colonies in Asia Minor, her inheri- 
tance of the political power of Turkey in these 
regions would be only a question of time. She 
might still leave northern Asia Minor to the Rus- 

279 



WORLD POLITICS 

sian Empire, although even that is doubtful. The 
southern part she has clearly marked out as a field 
for her interests, without, however, asserting any- 
present policy of exclusiveness, since such a policy 
would tend to defeat the ultimate realization of 
German purposes. 



280 



CHAPTER III 

German Colonization in South America 

The nature of German colonization in South 
America and the manner in which the imperial 
government views the industrial and commercial 
development of that region are especially interest- 
ing as showing how thoroughly the Germans are 
aware of the true character of modern imperialism. 
Territorial acquisitions are of secondary impor- 
tance, when considered by the side of the necessity 
of providing ample facilities for trade and industry 
throughout the civilized world, and strong and 
efficient protection of the industrial colonists by 
the home government. Throughout South Amer- 
ica, German commerce and industry have made 
rapid strides in the last decade. The advance of 
German enterprises has undoubtedly been exagger- 
ated by interested writers, whose purpose has been 
to add fuel to existing international hostilities. 
The present absolute volume of German trade in 
South America is not so important as that of Great 
Britain, but the significant fact remains that the 
investment of German capital and the formation of 



WORLD POLITICS 

trade relations have increased relatively more 
rapidly than those of any other nation. 

The colonies of Germany in South America 
have a basis which is chiefly commercial. A Ger- 
man merchant settles in some community, extends 
his business relations by founding branch houses 
in neighboring towns, and draws after him to his 
new home other relatives and friends. Then, 
too, by the side of their commercial establishments, 
agricultural colonies are often founded. Finally, 
to facilitate the exchange of products, banking 
operations are carried on between the mother 
country and the colony. The colonists avoid all 
interference in local political affairs, leaving sterile 
politics to the native population, and confining 
their attention to the development of the country's 
wealth. As a consequence, they generally enjoy 
the confidence and esteem of the populations 
among whom they work. They have a very 
clearly expressed purpose to which they tena- 
ciously adhere, — the building up of commercial 
relations between Germany and the fields of col- 
onization. 

In certain parts of Central and South America, 
a very large portion of the trade has come into 
German hands.^ Very important banking corpo- 
rations have been estabhshed to mediate between 
the colonial tradesmen and the mother country. 

1 Thus, for instance, three-fourths of the coffee exported from 
Guatemala goes to Germany. Ahnost all the foreigners in this 
country are Germans. See Statesman'' s Year Book, 1899, p. 706. 

282 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

Thus, the German-Brazilian Bank has a capital 
of $4,000,000 ; the German Transatlantic Bank of 
Buenos Ayres, $5,000,000. Throughout South and 
Central America, and especially in Chile, Brazil, 
and Argentina, there are numerous German bank- 
ing firms, which are of the greatest assistance 
in the development of trade with Germany. It is 
estimated that more than $150,000,000 of German 
capital is invested in Brazil alone in industry and 
large holdings of real estate, German capital is 
interested in Brazilian railroads, and also in the 
Grail Ferrocarril — The Great Railway — of Ven- 
ezuela. In southern Brazil and southern Chile, 
important agricultural colonies have been founded, 
while in the Argentine Republic large numbers of 
the middle class landholders are Germans. ^ 

As it is certain, from utterances of the German 
press and political declarations of the government, 
that Germany has directed its attention to the 
magnificent field opened for commerce and indus- 
trial exploitation in the South American republics, 
it is to be expected that German immigration will, 
in the future, be directed into this channel. 

The political aspect of this expansion becomes 
evident when we consider the protection which 
the mother country feels called upon to afford her 
colonists. As we have seen, the emperor has 
repeatedly declared it to be the intention of the 

1 See Kunz, Chile und die deutschen Colonien, Leipzig, 1891; 
F. Vie, " Les Colonies Commerciales des Allemands," in Revue des 
Deux Alondes, Februaiy, 1899. 

283 



WORLD POLITICS 

government to use its political power to defend 
the civil rights of her citizens wherever found. 
In this connection it should be further noted that 
the Russo-German agreement concerning China 
contains a section referring to South America, by 
which Russia promises to allow Germany a com- 
pletely free hand in following out her interests 
and developing natural resources on that conti- 
nent. We have seen that Bismarck's idea of 
purely commercial imperialism is, in the long run, 
untenable. When populations on different planes 
of social advancement come together, friction can- 
not be avoided, and political interference will often, 
under the dogma of universal protection, be the re- 
sult of purely commercial undertakings. Should 
Germany, therefore, on account of complications in 
South America, find herself called upon to defend 
the rights of her colonists, she would undoubtedly 
take the necessary steps, even though this might 
interfere with the maintenance of the Monroe Doc- 
trine by the United States. 

It is claimed by European powers that the 
Monroe Doctrine is merely an expression of Amer- 
ican policy, — not a part of international law, — 
and that it is justified only so long as it rests on 
actual interests. In other words, they acknowl- 
edge that should the United States actually have 
the paramount interest in South American affairs, 
there would be a just foundation for the doctrine. 
In modern politics, they insist, mere sentimental, 
ideal affinities have lost their strength. Any 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

country, therefore, which has material, actual in- 
terests in South America has, they assert, a right 
to interfere in so far as the protection of those in- 
terests may at any time demand. 

Recent developments in American politics have 
given European nations another argument by 
which to avoid the moral necessity of recognizing 
the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine or line of 
policy established between the Old World and the 
New a certain balance, with a guarantee of mutual 
non-interference, which had an appearance of jus- 
tice. But now, as a matter of fact, the centre 
of Old World political interests lies in China, or, 
more broadly, in Asia. The United States, by its 
avowed intention to play a leading part in Asiatic 
affairs and to foster actively its present and pro- 
spective interests in that region, has left the sphere 
which the policy of the Monroe Doctrine seemed 
to have assigned to it. According to the interpre- 
tation of European writers, the balance of mutual 
forbearance upon which the justice of the Monroe 
Doctrine might have been maintained has, there- 
fore, been destroyed. The United States, according 
to them, can no longer, on merely ideal grounds, 
demand the exclusion of European influence from 
the Western hemisphere. Wherever its legitimate 
interests lead, there a nation has a right to follow. 
If legitimate interests are developed in South 
America, such as may in time necessitate politi- 
cal interference, the Monroe Doctrine will not be 
allowed to stand in the way when that occasion 

285 



WORLD POLITICS 

arises. At any rate, if the United States desires to 
maintain the doctrine, it must be ready to assume 
the responsibility for the security and the protec- 
tion of European interests in South America. 

It should not be understood from this that the 
writer wishes to imply that Germany is actively 
plotting for an acquisition of South American ter- 
ritory. Her policy thus far has been simply one of 
fostering to the utmost possible extent her national 
commerce and industry, by entering regions hith- 
erto unexploited. If the general lust for territorial 
aggrandizement is curbed ; if the United States 
and Great Britain succeed in checking the further 
territorial disintegration of China ; and if, finally, 
they put proper restraints on those elements within 
their own polity which are crying for undue terri- 
torial expansion, — then South America and the 
world in general may, for a long time to come, 
remain an open field for the free and equal ex- 
ploitation by all nations that possess great indus- 
trial power. Should, however, a policy of land 
seizing be continued and exaggerated, great inter- 
national struggles cannot be avoided. 



286 



CHAPTER IV 

General Characteristics of German Imperial 
Politics 

The foregoing considerations have given us a 
vantage-ground from which to view Germany's new 
imperial policy as a whole. It is based on Bis- 
marck's idea of commercial expansion ; its purpose 
is to create a commercial and industrial empire, rest- 
ing on a strong nationalistic basis, — one founded 
for the purpose of giving an outlet to the super- 
abundant energies at home. As far as possible, 
political complications are to be avoided ; but since, 
in regions where there is no civil law, or where its 
administration is unsatisfactory, the colonists may 
need protection, it becomes necessary to build up 
a strong sea power for this purpose. The govern- 
ment aids individual undertakings to the full extent 
of its power by giving them information and pro- 
tection, and within her own protectorates the 
empire gives the preference to German investors. 

An object-lesson in the protection of her citizens 
abroad was given in the case of Hayti in 1897. A 
German citizen had been arrested, fined, and im- 

287 



WORLD POLITICS 

prisoned without due cause. As the president of 
the repubhc disregarded the representations of the 
German ambassador, two ships were despatched to 
support the demands of the government for res- 
titution, — which was immediately afforded.^ This 
case and the seizure of Kiao-chow happening just at 
the time when the imperial government was asking 
for an extensive enlargement of the navy, they were 
made the most of by the government, with the re- 
sult that the grant asked for in the budget, which 
had been repeatedly refused, was finally allowed, 
the navy having thus amply demonstrated its use- 
fulness and even its indispensability. 

The field within which territorial acquisition is 
at present possible has become decidedly limited. 
The German Empire, therefore, confines its atten- 
tion chiefly to the extension of commercial rela- 
tions, — to founding industrial and commercial 
colonies, and maintaining assiduously their con- 
nection with the mother country. A conscious 
effort is made to direct German immigration 
away from its older channels into those that lead 
to regions where the colonist may be expected to 
retain his allegiance to the mother country. Com- 
mercially, such German colonists remain members 
of the empire and extend its sway ; politically, they 
are beginning to look to it for protection whenever 
local political compUcations arise. An exclusive 
policy such as that adopted by Russia would ruin 

1 See Wilhelm Miiller's PoHHsche Geschichte der Gegenwari, 
1897, p. 200. 

288 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

Germany; whatever colonies Germany might ac- 
quire would not afford a sufficiently extensive 
market for her national industries. It is in the free 
exchange of her products with other nations like 
Great Britain and the United States, therefore, that 
the salvation of Germany lies. Of course, if these 
nations should adopt in any extreme form a policy 
of exclusion, Germany would be driven in self- 
defence to the policy of territorial aggrandizement. 

Looking now to the relations of Germany with 
other great powers, we find that the empire, as far 
as affairs of world politics are concerned, has pre- 
served its independence, and has acted as its in- 
terests at any given time have dictated, fostering 
friendly relations with all great powers, but yield- 
ing to none in matters of vital material interest. 

In South Africa, Germany and England seem 
to have come to an understanding with regard to 
the eventual partition of the Portuguese posses- 
sions. The details of this convention are not 
known, but it is at least certain that these two 
great powers intend to work in harmony on the 
continent of Africa, and it is to be hoped that no 
narrow prejudice will succeed in separating two 
nations whose interests are so closely allied in the 
matter of keeping the world open to free trade 
and preventing the victory of a narrower com- 
mercial policy. Though great rivals industrially, 
they are both enriched by having a free opportu- 
nity to supply the world with what their respective 
resources and capacities enable them to produce 
u 289 



WORLD POLITICS 

at the greatest advantage, so that in the policy of 
equal opportunity they may well stand shoulder 
to shoulder. 

It has also been noted that relations between 
France and Germany have of late grown more 
amicable. This rapprochcmejit between nations 
recently so hostile to each other can only be 
explained by the fact that they have come to 
realize the advent of an era of much broader 
interests than those of continental Europe, and 
to recognize that in the great work of opening 
the world's resources there is room for all the 
energies of the civilized world. If this idea can 
be emphasized in the intercourse of the leaders 
and the diplomatic representatives of the great 
powers, it will counteract the narrow, chauvinistic 
nationalism that tends to sharpen unreasoning 
hostilities. 

One of the elements that have favored a recon- 
ciliation between France and Germany is the con- 
sciousness that both countries have many vital 
interests in common, especially as against the other 
great powers, Russia, England, and the United 
States. Should a policy of commercial exclusive- 
ness be more generally adopted, and should these 
latter powers all erect themselves into exclusive 
spheres, as Russia has already done entirely and as 
the United States has done in part, the nations 
of central Europe would be forced to combine for 
self-protection. In colonial matters, there are no 
violent antipathies between France and Germany : 

290 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

in Asia Minor, their capitalists have combined in 
the matter of railway exploitation ; in China, the 
two powers have often acted in common, although 
pursuing different commercial policies. As indicat- 
ing a certain community of interest, it may be noted 
that at the Peace Conference at The Hague, Ger- 
many and France opposed the disarmament plans 
of Russia and the use of the peculiar bullet of 
Great Britain. ^ 

When the opinions of leading publicists of both 
nations were recently sought on the matter, many 
of them, on both sides, favored a reconciliation, 
or, at least, a friendly understanding. Mommsen 
believes that the future of Western civilization 
depends on the realization of such a movement, 
while Professor Schmoller emphasizes the com- 
mon interests of the two nations as against other 
powers.^ Major Marchand, the hero of Fashoda, 
M, Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, and the Baron D'Es- 
tournelles believe in continental federation and 
a friendly understanding with Germany,^ so as to 
permit the republic to carry out her colonial ideas. 

1 This peculiar bullet, the " dum-dum," from the fact that on im- 
pact it spreads out and wounds a greater surface, is justified by 
EngHsh military experts particularly for use against savages who, 
when the other bullets are used, often fight on even where the mis- 
siles have passed through the body or have lodged within it. In 
other words, the older and more commonly used form of bullet 
rather disables than kills, while the " dum-dum " is calculated effec- 
tively to check the onslaught of a savage horde. 

2 See the Deutsch-franzosische Rundschau, 1898. 

8 See article on " The Relations of France and Germany," in the 
National Review, August, 1899. 

291 



WORLD POLITICS 

The idea of a Central European League has 
often appeared in political literature. Count York 
von Wartenburg expresses the matter as follows : 
" There are only four great powers, — the United 
States, England, Russia, and central Europe under 
the hegemony of Germany." More than twenty 
years ago M. de Molinari^ advanced the idea of a 
customs union for central Europe, which has been 
taken up and discussed in detail by Professors 
von Stein, Hasse,^ Brentano, and other prominent 
publicists and economists. The Austrian foreign 
minister, Goluchowski, expressed the basis of this 
political idea in a speech of November 20, 1897. 
He said in substance : — 

" It is a destructive competition which we have already 
entered upon with transoceanic countries, and which will 
increase in the future. This necessitates quick and radical 
retaliation, if injury to the most vital interests of the people 
in Europe is to be avoided. Shoulder to shoulder, they must 
fight the common danger. The sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were given up to religious struggles. In the eigh- 
teenth liberal ideas gained the day. The question of nation- 
ality characterizes the present century. The twentieth will 
be for Europe a period of struggle for existence on the field 
of commerce and industry." ^ 

While it may be said with unhesitating confi- 
dence that the day of political coalitions is over, 

^ See his later book, VUtiion Douaniere de P Europe Cenirale, 
Paris, 1897. 

2 Deutsche Weltpolitik, Miinchen, 1897. 

* Cited in Dehn, Kommende Weltwirtschaftspolitik, p. 80. 
Crispi stands for the same idea. 

292 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

since nations are governed by economic interests 
which will not permit of the formation of perma- 
nent alliances, it is yet entirely within the range of 
possibility that customs unions may be formed. 
Should British imperial federation succeed, and 
the empire adopt a protective policy, it is very 
probable that the countries of central Europe 
would also be drawn into constantly closer com- 
mercial relations, which might even result in the 
formation of a zollverein. Indeed, the commercial 
treaties concluded on the continent during the 
present decade indicate that such a movement is 
already under way. But to look upon this as a 
movement toward political coalition against Eng- 
land and for the extermination of British power is 
an utterly unfounded view. 

The old policy of the most favored nation agree- 
ment has proved too unpliable for modern use. 
Tariff wars are too destructive, and will therefore 
be avoided as much as possible between European 
nations. A policy of differential tariffs has been 
entered upon, by which various nations may estab- 
lish a system of mutually regulated competition. 
It is believed that in this manner sufficient freedom 
will be given to the development of national indus- 
tries and their extension abroad, while at the same 
time an effective weapon for the punishment of 
exclusiveness elsewhere is created. 

It may be well to glance for a moment at Ger- 
many's equipment, and at the preparation which 
she is making for the great struggle of the twen- 
293 



WORLD POLITICS 

tieth century. She has clearly recognized that 
the questions of coming world development are 
those of communication with markets, and that for 
this purpose three things are needed, — a mer- 
chant marine, a navy for its protection, and certain 
territorial bases throughout the world. Coming 
late into the field, Germany has not been fortunate 
in acquiring these territorial points of support. In 
the most important region, — the far Orient, — she 
has, however, acquired Kiao-chow, the Ladrones, 
and New Guinea, so that she is in a position to 
afford ample protection to her trade in those 
parts. 

By the law of 1898, the permanent prestige of 
Germany's fleet is assured. That law marks a 
great change in German politics. In the debates 
which preceded its adoption, the point of view 
seemed to be that Germany could afford to be 
merely a great land power, and that it needed for 
its defence only a highly efficient army. Events 
which happened during the course of the debate, 
however, persuaded a majority of the German 
people that a strong fleet had become a prime neces- 
sity for a great power, not for purposes of warfare, 
but for purposes of protection. The people of the 
empire seemed to realize that the great struggles 
of the future were to be fought, not on their boun- 
dary, but beyond the seas. While, therefore, the 
army is for the present to be kept up to its former 
standard, special attention is now given to naval 
developments. The naval budget at present before 

294 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

the Reichstag involves an ultimate doubling of the 
present size and efficiency of the German fleet.^ 

The progress of the German merchant marine 
within the last few years is especially remarkable. 
In 1 87 1, this portion of the national economic ma- 
chinery was insignificant. Within the next twenty- 
six years the number of steamers rose from 1 50 to 
1125 ; their tonnage from 82,000 to 900,000. Like 
Great Britain, France, and Austria, Germany has 
entered upon a policy of granting liberal subsidies 
to her merchant marine. Two of her lines, the 
North-German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American 
Packet Company, are numbered among the great- 
est and richest in the world. Up to 1896, entries 
at the harbor of Hamburg comprised more Eng- 
lish than German ships. Since that year the 
balance has been reversed, and at present the 
larger portion of German commerce is carried in 
German ships.^ 

Another form of preparation for the intense 
commercial competition which is now beginning, 

1 By 1904, when the provisions of the naval law of 1898 will 
have been carried out, Germany will have 19 ships of the line and 
42 cruisers. The present naval programme calls for the addition 
of two squadrons to the two already existing ; this increase is to be 
completed by 1 920, when the German fleet will have 36 ships of 
the line and 65 cruisers. The cost involved is estimated between 
400 and 500 million dollars. The number of ships of the line in 
the principal navies at present is; Great Britian, 69; France, 40; 
Russia, 24; United States, 18. 

'^ Die Seeinteressen des Deutschen Reiches, Publication of the 
Imperial Navy Department, 1898. See also "Merchant Marine of 
Foreign Countries," Special Consular Reports, 1900. 

295 



WORLD POLITICS 

is found in the excellent technical education 
provided by the German government. The engi- 
neering and commercial schools of Germany pre- 
pare with special reference to participation in 
colonial development. The character and con- 
figuration, the industrial and commercial possibili- 
ties of any country, are well known to the German 
engineer and the commercial clerk. Thorough 
training in all the languages used in colonial under- 
takings is also given, so that the German industrial 
colonist enters upon his work with a full mastery 
of the situation. He is not so dependent as are 
colonists of other nations upon aid from the native 
population. 

In the method of manufactures, as we have 
already stated, the Germans study the markets 
carefully and adapt their products as closely as 
possible to the needs and requirements of their 
customers. They are not satisfied with sending 
catalogues, but send agents and samples, and pre- 
pare exhibitions. They are free from that some- 
what supercilious disdain of foreign eccentricities 
which marks the Englishman. If men wish to 
wear nonsensical and peculiar looking clothing, 
it is their own affair ; and the Germans are glad 
to manufacture and sell to them whatever they 
may desire. The French and the English rather 
expect the natives to be satisfied with the superior 
articles which their industries ordinarily furnish. 
The Germans, on the other hand, not only study 
the special likes and dislikes of their customers, 

296 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

but also turn out vast quantities of cheap, even 
shoddy, goods, which are more within the means 
of poorer populations, and thus crowd out the 
more expensive manufactures of their rivals. 

When, under the English trade-mark law, the 
provision requiring the designation of the origi- 
nal country of manufactures was enforced, many 
merchants in all parts of the world were astonished 
to find that goods which they had before con- 
sidered of English manufacture really came from 
Germany. Without delay, they made inquiries as 
to the more direct sources of supply, and as a 
result much of the commerce between Germany 
and colonial regions, which before passed through 
British hands, is now carried on directly. 

The policy of Germany in general is character- 
ized by great confidence in her national strength, 
and by the apparent purpose of being, so far as 
possible, self-centred. The speech of Colonel 
Schwartzhoff at The Hague expressed this per- 
fectly. The German nation is not, he said, ex- 
hausted by military expenditure, but, instead, feels 
to the full the strength of harmonious develop- 
ment, and the army is really an assistance to it 
in gaining control of its national resources.^ The 
same confidence is also expressed in the utterances 
concerning German policy which we have already 
quoted. 

1 See also W. Blume, Die Grundlagin unserer Wehrkraft, 
Berlin, 1899. 



297 



CHAPTER V 

The Influence of Imperialism on Domestic 
Politics 

In connection with our consideration of German 
consciousness of power, as set forth in the last 
chapter, we have also to note a further fact of 
equal importance but of different bearing. There 
must be noted the tendency to concentrate national 
self-consciousness more and more in the person of 
the emperor. His own view of the proper attitude 
of the nation in the developments that are about to 
take place, he expressed in a speech at Hamburg, 
on October 19, 1899. After remarking upon the 
necessity of strengthening the naval forces, in order 
to afford protection to trade over the sea, he con- 
tinues: — 

" Yet the feeling for these things is only slowly gaining 
ground in the German fatherland, wliich, unfortunately, has 
spent its strength only too much in fruitless factional strife. 
Germans are only slowly beginning to understand the ques- 
tions which are important to the whole world. The face of 
the world has changed greatly during the last few years. 
What formerly required centuries is now accomplished in a 
few months. The task of Kaiser and government has con- 

298 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

sequently grown beyond measure, and a solution will only be 
possible when the German people renounce party divisions. 
Standing in serried ranks behind the Kaiser, proud of their 
great fatherland, and conscious of their real worth, the Ger- 
mans must watch the development of foreign states. They 
must make sacrifices for their position as a world power, and, 
abandoning party spirit, they must stand united behind their 
prince and emperor." ^ 

This ideal of a docile nation led by a trium- 
phant emperor whose intelligence embraces every- 
thing, throws considerable light on the relations of 
imperialism to party government and parliamen- 
tary institutions. In proportion as foreign affairs 
take up a greater share of the nation's attention, 
a decided impatience is felt by the party of expan- 
sion with any criticisms passed on their measures 
by their political opponents. It is claimed by 
them that in foreign matters the nation should 
stand as one man ; that poHcies once entered upon 
by the government should not be repudiated, and 
that criticism should be avoided, as weakening the 
influence of the nation abroad. Unquestioning 
acceptance of the measures of expansion and 
whole-hearted support of the national policy, right 
or wrong, are demanded as patriotic duties. Now 
it is evident that, so long as foreign affairs are of 
only minor importance, such enforced unanimity 
in regard to them will not necessarily break down 
party government, inasmuch as there are in in- 
ternal politics measures of sufficient importance, 

^ Reported in the daily press. 
299 



WORLD POLITICS 

upon which it is permissible and not unpatriotic to 
divide. In the present stage of development, how- 
ever, external relations are taking on constantly- 
increasing proportions, while internal affairs are 
being crowded into the background. It is evident 
that when the most important concerns of a nation 
are thus withdrawn from the field of party differ- 
ence, party government itself must grow weak, as 
dealing no longer with vital questions. In his 
speech, the emperor very frankly accepts this 
interpretation of the proper attitude of a nation 
toward foreign politics ; the people are to place un- 
questioning confidence in the existing government, 
and must avoid weakening the force of the nation 
by dissensions and criticisms. Considering the 
success of Russia in modern politics, such an atti- 
tude cannot be wondered at. In Russia there are 
no parties ; there is no criticism of governmental 
action. The whole force of national life may, 
therefore, be brought by the government to bear 
upon the point where great advantages are to be 
obtained.^ 

There are many other expressions of the em- 
peror which indicate an almost medieval concep- 
tion of his office, a revival of the theory of divine 
right. The emperor beheves that his grandfather, 
had he lived in the Middle Ages, would have been 
canonized, and that his tomb would have become 
a cynosure of pilgrimages from all parts of the 

iFor a further treatment of this matter, see Part V., Ch. II. 
300 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

world. 1 In the speech from which a quotation 
has just been made, referring to the Socialists, the 
" party of revolution," the emperor says : " They 
dare to attack the foundations of the state ; they 
rise against religion ; and do not even call a halt 
before the person of their most high master " (the 
emperor). In a speech delivered at Coblenz on 
August 31, 1897, he speaks of the "kingship by 
the grace of God, with its grave duties, its tre- 
mendous responsibility to the Creator alone, from 
which no man, no minister, no parliament, can 
release the monarch." ^ His brother talked in the 
same strain when he received the emperor's com- 
mission as commander of the Oriental squadron. 
"It is not glory nor laurels," he said, "that 
attract me, but the opportunity of preaching the 
gospel of Your Majesty's sacred person abroad to 
all, whether they are willing to hear it or not." 

Thus, as the importance of the executive is 
enhanced, that of the legislative is lowered, and 
parliamentary action is looked down upon as the 
futile and irritating activity of unpractical critics. 
If the governmental measures are to be adopted 
inevitably, why not dispense with the irritating 
delay of parliamentary discussion ? It is, there- 
fore, the policy of the government to strengthen 
the executive at the expense of the legislative. 
Large branches of governmental activity, hereto- 

^ See Miiller's Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart, 1897, p. 35, 
where he refers to a speech of the emperor at Berlin. 
^ Ibid.,^. 153. 

301 



WORLD POLITICS 

fore under the direct supervision of the parliament, 
are given a permanent institutional form and are pro- 
vided for by the standing portions of the budget,^ 
so that both in foreign matters and in home affairs 
the importance and influence of the Reichstag is 
rapidly decreasing. Among large portions of the 
population, the sentiment seems to be that the 
prime need of the empire is not discussion, but 
action ; not political liberalism, but unity and har- 
mony, with large armies and powerful navies to 
represent the national strength abroad. 

It is not strange, therefore, that the parties of 
moderation, — the liberal parties, — have within 
the last decade grown decidedly weak. Political 
opinions are going to extremes. The parties in 
the German parliament that at present divide the 
power among themselves are the Socialists, the 
party of the Centre, and the Conservative party. 
The last named is a true party of reaction, with 
a strongly nationalistic, anti-Semitic bias. It is 
violently protective, is opposed to modern develop- 
ments like the Rhine-Elbe canal, and is in favor 
of the restoration of a modified form of serfdom. 
The Centrists represent the compact masses of 
Roman CathoUc communities in the south and 
west of Germany, who judge politics constantly 
with reference to ecclesiastical affairs. The So- 
cialists, the party that concentrate their attention 

1 H. H. Powers, "The Political Drift of Germany," Yale Review, 
May, 1899. 

302 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

chiefly on internal reform, are discredited by their 
opponents as revolutionary and nihilistic. 

With parties divided along these lines, the opera- 
tion of party government is out of the question, 
since, to make that system effective, there must be 
a certain amount of mutual respect and under- 
standing. Where there is nothing but distrust, 
contempt, and calumny, a real party common- 
wealth cannot exist. In such cases, on the con- 
trary, party government reduces itself to the more 
or less successful manipulation of factions by the 
government. Light is thrown on the emperor's 
methods of management by the threatened dis- 
missal of some twenty judges who, as members 
of the Prussian Diet, dared to oppose the imperial 
policy of canal extension. 

The same uncompromising extremism may also 
be noted in the political and social theory of 
modern Germany. The philosopher Nietzsche, 
whose writings are now exerting a great influence 
upon the youth of Germany, who is heralded as 
the champion sent to smite the giant of theoretical 
socialism, is an aristocrat of the most pronounced 
type. The main tenet of his philosophy is that 
the masses of humanity exist merely for the sake 
of the chosen few, and that the aim and purpose of 
human existence is, therefore, not the happiness 
of the multitude, but the production of choice indi- 
viduals. These heroes are exempt from all moral 
duties ; theirs are the impulses of victorious beasts of 
prey. Any brief statement of this writer's theories 

303 



WORLD POLITICS 

is entirely insufficient to indicate the true character 
of his writings and the source of their power ; but 
the great vogue and influence of such theories as 
that just mentioned, especially among the leading 
classes, indicate that the intellectual temper of Ger- 
many is largely anti-liberal. 

In summarizing the considerations on the posi- 
tion of Germany at the present stage of world 
politics, we must emphasize the fact that Germany 
is still a national state, and that its politics are gov- 
erned by considerations of nationalism as much 
as by those of imperialism. Its expansion is 
therefore in the main commercial, and it craves 
sea power chiefly in order to protect its trans- 
oceanic industries. Of course, the tendency to 
emphasize the imperialistic side and to gain 
territorial accessions is always present. Still, the 
interest of Germany is rather in commercial oppor- 
tunities than in territorial acquisitions. Extension 
of her commerce into all parts of the world and 
the effective protection of nascent industrial inter- 
ests is the key-note of her foreign policy. Fully 
persuaded of her own national strength, she shows 
no inclination to form permanent alliances with 
any power. Forever on the alert, she is ready to 
take advantage of changing conditions and to act 
as the occasion requires. It cannot fairly be said 
that she is pursuing an aggressive policy : to be 
sure, she is extending her national industries to 
the utmost of her power ; yet she seems to recog- 
nize that there is in the unopened regions of the 

304 



GERMAN IMPERIAL POLITICS 

world sufficient work for all civilized nations. 
While German writers show a natural and pardon- 
able pride in having the German language and the 
German trade extended to all parts of the universe,^ 
the idea of political empire, especially over unwill- 
ing civilized nations, is entirely foreign to the Ger- 
man mind. In the words of M. Leroy-Beaulieu, " It 
is in the interest of civilization that all European 
peoples should place their special impress upon 
some part of the world as yet unoccupied. In 
this manner, the world will preserve a little more 
variety, and will escape the danger of falling 
asleep in a uniformity of methods and concep- 
tions." 

IV 

Bibliographical Note 

Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman : Reflections by //ij>«- 
j^^ (translated from the German). London, 1898. 

Blume (W.), Die Griuidlagen nnserer IVehrh'aft. Berlin, 
1899. 

Bruckner, Jahrbnch der deutschen Kolonial-Politik . Berlin, 
1899. 

Bulletins of the Bureau of the American RepJiblics. Wash- 
ington. 

Dejitsche Kolonial Zeitnng. Published by the Deutsche 
Kolonial-Gesellschaft, Berlin. 

Driault (E.), La Question d'Orient. Paris, 1898. 

Duboc (Julius), Hundert Jahre Zeitgeist in Deutschland. 
Leipzig, 1889. 

Fitzner (R.), Detitsches Kolonial-Handbuch. Berlin, 1896. 

^ Even a broad humanitarian like Hermann Grimm warms to this 
thought in his essay on Goethe, in Die deutsche Rundschau, 1899. 



WORLD POLITICS 

Franzius (G.), Kiautschou : DeiitscJtlands Erwerbung in 

Ostasieti. Berlin, 1898. 
HandbticJi fth' die deutsche Handelsmarine aiif das Jahr i8g8, 

Reichsamt des Innern, Berlin, i8g8. 

Hesse-Wartegg (E. von), Sc/ianiung ufid Deiitsch-China. 
Leipzig, 1898. 

Martens (P.)> •5'm^ Amerika unter besonderer Berucksichti- 

gtmg Argentinietis. Berlin, 1899. 
Meinecke(G.), Koloniales Jahrbuch. (An annual publication.) 
Muller (Wilhelm), Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart. (An 

annual publication.) Berlin. 
Schaffle (Albert), Deutsche Kern- und Zeitfragen. Berlin, 

1894. 
Tischert (Georg), Fllnf Jahre deutscher Hajidelspoliiik. 

Leipzig, 1898. 
Vandelin-Mniszech (Count), Der Spanisch-Amerikanische 

Krieg und seine R'nckwirkung auf die deutsche Flotten- 

n. Kolonial-Politik . Frankfurt, 1899. 
Wippermann (Karl), Deutscher Geschichtskalender. (An 

annual publication.) Leipzig. 
Wilkinson (S.), The Brain of an Army. London, 1895. 
Ziegler (Dr. Theobald), Die geistigen und socialen Str'o- 

mu7igen des Neunsehntenjahrhunderts, Berlin, 1899. 



306 



PART V 

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE 
POSITION OF THE UNITED 
STATES AS A FACTOR IN ORI- 
ENTAL POLITICS 



CHAPTER I 

The Interests of the United States in the 
Far East 

Among all the interesting developments of the 
last decade there is perhaps none more significant 
than the change in the traditional foreign policy 
of the United States. It is a remarkable coinci- 
dence, to say the least, that the United States 
should have entered upon a war, the outcome of 
which placed it unexpectedly in the centre of 
Asiatic affairs, just at the time when the resources 
of the Celestial Empire were first beginning to be 
really opened to foreign enterprise, and when 
European nations were beginning to make terri- 
torial encroachments upon various portions of 
China. It can hardly be imagined that the United 
States would have continued to keep aloof from 
the great current of international politics, even if 
the country had not become involved in the Span- 
ish war. As it was, the events of that contest 
served to direct the attention of the masses of the 
American people toward foreign affairs. This 
change in the attitude of the popular mind came 

309 



WORLD POLITICS 

with the suddenness of a revolution, startling to 
many of the most patriotic citizens, who feel that 
too great attention to foreign matters will atrophy 
the energies of reform, and that, in competing for 
dominion with the great national empires of the 
world, we shall have to adopt their methods, and 
thus become untrue to our real social and political 
mission. 

The change, however, has occurred, and no force 
of logic can reverse the current of history or com- 
pel the national consciousness back into the atti- 
tude where it found itself before the war. In all 
such great popular movements, there is a powerful 
element of passionate, unreasoning enthusiasm, 
which associates itself with symbols, ideas, and 
words, such as "patriotism" and "the flag"; 
very readily takes for granted certain important 
premises ; and looks upon any doubt as to their 
universal validity as indicating a lack of the senti- 
ments proper to good citizenship. At such times 
it is difficult to make the voice of reason heard. 
Happily, a nation is rarely in this condition of over- 
powering enthusiasm. And yet, if its vitality has 
not been exhausted, it must have these periodical 
outbreaks, which are, indeed, to that extent a sign 
of health. But unless they are followed by periods 
of reflection, in which stock is taken of the ele- 
ments in national life and development, purely 
passionate impulses seize upon government, with 
the inevitable result of bringing about a universal 
decadence. A nation that trains itself in sober 

310 



THE UNITED STATES 

reasoning, — in clear, logical analysis of the facts, 
— can well afford an occasional outburst of patriotic 
feeling, without the fear of being driven utterly out 
of its course by the storms of popular emotion. 

That the United States is to play a leading 
part in international affairs, — that she is to be one 
of the five leading world powers, — has been irrev- 
ocably decided by the events of the recent past. 
A nation of our power and resources would be 
untrue to its vocation if it did not sooner or later 
realize its duty in this important position to which 
it has attained. The time has now come for a cool 
analysis of our position and interests, and a care- 
ful selection of modes of policy and action. It 
will not do — it will not be possible — to live for- 
ever on the capital of enthusiasm and patriotism. 
These may be used effectively in great popular 
movements, such as the one we have just seen ; 
but for the actual conduct of political Hfe, a differ- 
ent attitude of mind is needed, and nothing would 
be more dangerous to the state than that the party 
in pov/er should endeavor to invest all its actions 
with the sacred character of a great, irresistible, 
popular movement, and should decry as traitorous 
and unpatriotic all opposition to its policy. We 
shall, therefore, in this discussion, take the present 
state of affairs as the basis upon which to try to 
arrive at a just estimate of the interests and duties 
of the United States. 

Though we have entered upon an active share 
in international politics, it does not follow that we 

3" 



WORLD POLITICS 

must throw to the winds the traditions of the past, 
and become the docile imitators of other nations. 
More than ever before we need rather to empha- 
size those wholesome characteristics of our national 
life that distinguish it favorably from the more 
rigidly stratified societies of Europe ; and, before 
we take any step in international politics, we 
should first consider the influence that it is 
likely to exert on the life within our nation. 

Mere territorial expansion appeals to the un- 
thinking; there is a certain fascination in knowing 
that new territories are brought beneath the sway 
of our national power. There is, therefore, always 
a strong tendency to hoist the flag wherever an 
opportunity offers itself, and as it is considered 
the height of unpatriotic feeling to haul down the 
flag under any circumstances, the nation is often 
forced into undertakings, the scope and bearing of 
which are only dimly perceived by even its best- 
informed members. Whether the sacrifices in- 
volved in taking possession of such territories are 
at all proportionate to the benefits to be derived 
by our nation and by the so-called inferior races 
within the conquered territory, is hardly ever 
considered. It may, therefore, not be amiss to 
endeavor to ascertain where the most important 
interests of the United States now are, and by 
what political action and methods they may be 
developed. 

Our nation has been accustomed to a feeling of 
inexhaustible resources and energy, and has, there- 

312 



THE UNITED STATES 

fore, felt that whatever attracted it could be had, 
regardless of the cost. But as we enter upon 
closer international relations, more calculation 
becomes necessary, since in the great give-and- 
take of the world's politics, a nation, no matter 
how strong, must, if it wishes to succeed, adapt its 
plans to its resources, and not expend blood and 
treasure in mere fantastic undertakings. 

When we consider the present situation and the 
probable future of the Chinese Empire, it seems 
only just to conclude that the share of the United 
States in the development of the resources of that 
country will be at least as large as that of any of 
the European powers. Commercially the United 
States is the nearest neighbor of the Chinese Em- 
pire ; for even when the Siberian railway is com- 
pleted, it will not materially affect the freight traffic 
between China and Europe. At least for bulky 
freight the rates must necessarily be prohibitory, 
so that communication between European Russia 
and China must be carried on by sea, as before. It 
may be said by some that the position of Russia in 
Manchuria, after the development of the resources 
of that province, will enable Russian manufacturers 
to have a controlling share in the trade of China. 
This, however, even if it is to be realized, is a 
development of the future, and cannot therefore 
enter into our estimate of the present condition of 
nations in respect to Chinese trade. 

It is difficult to estimate with accuracy the pres- 
ent state of American trade with China. In the 

3^3 



WORLD POLITICS 

first place, we have practically no merchant marine 
trading with the Orient. Of over 2000 merchant 
vessels entering the port of Shanghai in 1898, only 
50 were American ; at Chefoo, in northern China, 
no American ships entered for five years at a time, 
while in the year 1876 alone, 205 American ves- 
sels passed the custom-house of that port.^ The 
absence of American shipping is noticed by all 
writers on the Orient, and the Chinese themselves 
are reported as asking, when consuls try to impress 
them with the importance of American industries, 
"Where, then, are your ships?" This state of 
affairs is attributed partly to the provisions of the 
opium treaty, proclaimed October 3, 1881, which 
prescribes that American subjects or ships are not 
to import opium into any of the open ports of 
China. It is claimed that this prohibition has vir- 
tually driven the American flag off the Chinese 
coast, as American ships cannot receive a cargo 
which contains even an ounce of opium. 

In addition to this absence of American ship- 

1 See " Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign 
Countries," 1898, Vol. I., p. 989. 

The total percentage of American shipping in Chinese harbors 
for 1898 is given as less than i per cent, while Great Britain has 53 
per cent and Germany 10 per cent. 

The following are the figures for American ships entering the 
port of Chefoo, in the respective years : — 

1868 132 

1876 205 

1884 93 

1888 to 1893 none 

1897 3 



THE UNITED STATES 

ping, there is a great lack of American banking 
and trading facilities. Most of the American 
goods imported into China are handled by British 
firms. Moreover, all imports from Hongkong 
are credited to the British Empire, so that the 
statistics of the imperial customs administration 
cannot be relied upon for accurate information as 
to the actual country of origin of imported manu- 
factures.^ 

Still, we know that the construction of railways 
which has recently been entered upon has brought 
about an important demand for American lumber, 
rails, machinery, and locomotives.^ Indeed, a large 
portion of the construction material needed by the 
Russian and Imperial Chinese railways has been 
supplied from American sources. The president 

1 The estimated value of American imports entering Shanghai in 
1898 was ;^8,ooo,ooo. There was a substantial increase over former 
years in cotton goods and oil. The exports from Shanghai to the 
United States rose from $7,116,000 in 1896 to $11,666,000 in 1897, 
the chief exports being silk, tea, and wool. The total imports from 
the United States to China, according to the custom-house reports 
for 1898, were $11,911,000, an increase of 45 per cent over the 
figures for 1896. When we consider that almost half the total 
foreign trade of China is credited to Hongkong, the reason of the 
uncertainty as to the real country of origin of Chinese imports is 
explained. Out of a total export trade of $225,819,000 for 1898, 
Hongkong is credited with $110,552,000. This also illustrates 
incidentally the importance of Hongkong as an entrepot. For 
further statistics see Consular Reports for September, 1899. 

2 Ties and bridge timbers for the Imperial Chinese Railway (the 
Pechili line), were imported chiefly from Oregon. Of the engines 
used in 1898, 64 were of Chinese make, 38 English, and 24 Ameri- 
can. 



WORLD POLITICS 

of the Great Northern Railway states that he has 
been compelled to refuse a shipment of 60,000 
tons of steel rails and 38,000,000 pounds of cot- 
ton to Asia, because of the lack of transportation 
facilities on the ocean. ^ The great need of lumber 
in the development of China will be supplied 
largely from our Pacific coast, and from the 
forests of the Philippine Islands. Other impor- 
tant articles of American trade with China are 
flour, cotton fabrics, and kerosene. Concerning 
the latter it has recently been reported that the 
American product is rapidly being replaced by 
that of Russia and that of Sumatra, which are of 
an inferior quality and are sold more cheaply. As 
yet the market for other commodities and manu- 
factures has been rather restricted, but notwith- 
standing her lack of financial and mercantile 
facilities, the United States has already conquered 
an important share in the actual trade of China. 

As we have seen, American capitalists are also 
actively interested in the development of Chinese 
resources. For example, the concession for the 
Hankow-Canton line was granted to an American 
syndicate. A regular steamer Hne between Vladi- 
vostok and Canton has been established by Ameri- 
can capitalists and is now being operated by them, 
and in the peninsula of Corea Americans are 
actively and successfully engaged in the exploita- 
tion of gold mines.^ 

1 See "Commercial Relations of the United States," 1898, p. 991. 

2 See Consular Reports, March, 1898. 

316 



THE UNITED STATES 

American manufacturers are just awakening to 
the fact that there is growing up in Siberia an 
important market for machinery and manufactured 
goods, for the permanent control of which the 
United States is most favorably situated. At the 
present time American commerce is still relatively 
unimportant in those territories.^ The fact, how- 
ever, that between 1896 and 1897 American trade 
with Vladivostok increased fourfold shows that 
the Americans are alive to the great opportunities 
awaiting their industries in northern Asia. Public 
attention has recently been directed to the large 
amount of construction material furnished by 
Americans for the Russian railway system in 
Siberia and Manchuria. Railway ties, bridge 
timber, iron work, locomotives, ice-machines, and 
machinery for rolling mills have been imported 
in large quantities. By a special order of the 
Russian government, machinery destined for the 
working of mines is to enter free from duty up to 
January i, 1909. The port of Vladivostok is also 
for the time being free except for alcoholic liquors, 
tobacco, petroleum, sugar, and some unimportant 
articles. 

It seems to be the general policy of Russia to 
encourage friendly commercial relations with the 

^ The trade of Siberia in 1S97 was divided as follows : Germany 
led with 30 per cent, Russia followed with 25 per cent, and then 
came, in order, Great Britain, Japan, and China, and finally the 
United States with 5 per cent. In the trade of European Russia, 
too, Germany leads by a large amount. 



WORLD POLITICS 

United States. Indeed, it is within the range of 
possibilities that special privileges for American 
importation could be obtained for a long period. 
When we consider that our western states face 
directly upon the Russian possessions, while other 
nations can reach them only by roundabout routes, 
and also that Russia, because she is in need of 
our manufactures for an efficient development of 
Siberian resources, is disposed to treat the United 
States very favorably, it will be seen that the field 
here open is one of great promise. 

As we consider these data, they may seem to be 
of less importance or significance than might have 
been expected. And yet we can hardly wonder that, 
with its manufacturing population chiefly on the 
Atlantic coast, and with a vast domestic demand 
to supply, the United States has not yet equalled 
the leading manufacturing nations of Europe, 
and especially Great Britain, in the extent of its 
foreign trade ; but when we look at the advan- 
tageous position and teeming resources of our 
Pacific states, which are just awakening to the 
magnificent possibiUties of commerce across the 
Pacific, we may consider it natural, — even neces- 
sary, — that, if free trade opportunities are main- 
tained in China, we shall soon absorb our full 
share in the commerce of that magnificent market. 

It is in connection with the Chinese and Sibe- 
rian trade that our position in the Philippines 
becomes of special importance. Up to the pres- 
ent our commercial interests in these islands have 

318 



THE UNITED STATES 

been comparatively slight. In the year 1898 the 
total exports from the islands to the United States 
amounted to only $4,099,525, while the imports 
from the United States were insignificant, amount- 
ing, in fact, to only $147,846.^ Up to that date, 
wholesale commerce was largely in the hands of 
Spanish, British, and German firms, while the retail 
trade in the larger towns was almost entirely carried 
on by the Chinese. Very little foreign capital from 

^ See "Commercial Relations of the United States," Consular 
Reports, 1898, p. 140. The following table of trade relations for 
1897 is there also given : — 



Countries. 



Great Britain . 

France 

Germany . 

Belgium 

Spain 

Japan 

China 

India 

Straits Settlements 

New South Wales 

Victoria 

United States . 

Total 



Imports from 
Philippines. 



?6,223 

1,990 

223 

272 

4434 

1.332 

56 

7 

274 

119 



426 
297 
720 
240 
,261 
.300 
137 
.755 
1 130 
550 



4,383,740 



;^i9.3i7.736 



Exports to 
Philippines. 



^2,063,598 

359.796 

774,928 

45,660 

7,972,637 

92,823 

97.717 

80,156 

236,001 

176,858 

178,370 

94.597 



512,173,141 



In 1893 the exports to the United States were ^9,314,235. The 
trade with Hongkong is not noted in the above table; it seems, 
however, to be quite considerable. In 1895 the exports to the 
United States amounted to ^4,731,000; the imports from that source, 
to #119,255. Idid., p. 1064. 



WORLD POLITICS 

any country was invested in the development of in- 
land resources. In general, property was so inse- 
cure, litigation so frequent, and, when entered upon, 
so long-drawn-out and expensive, that few capital- 
ists ventured any extensive investment. 

The future commercial importance of Manila 
and other Philippine seaports is already universally 
recognized. That the former half-forgotten capi- 
tal will rival Hongkong and Singapore as an entre- 
pot for Oriental trade admits of no doubt. When 
we consider that the foreign trade of the Straits 
Settlements is almost as large as that of the whole 
Dominion of Canada,^ while that of Hongkong 
exceeds both these by a considerable amount, we 
gain some conception of what the position of Ma- 
nila is likely to be when Oriental trade really begins 
to develop. It is this that constitutes the chief 
importance of the possession and control of the 
Philippines. Indeed, the people of the United 
States would perhaps, all things considered, derive 
more benefit from the possession of Manila than 
from the permanent ownership and control of all 
the rest of the territory in the islands. 

For various reasons, not so much benefit is to be 
expected from the development of natural resources 
in the Philippines, although these, too, promise a 
bright future. The resources of the islands consist 

* Between 1892 and 1896, the annual average was, for exports, 
Canada, ;^23, 327,000; the Straits Settlements, ;i^2 1,02 1,000: for im- 
ports, Canada, ^f 24,029,000; the Straits Settlements, ;^i 8,562,000. 
StQ /ourftal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXIL, p. 495. 

320 



THE UNITED STATES 

of mineral wealth, rich agricultural lands, and val- 
uable timber. Coal and petroleum are found in 
large quantities in Cebu and Mindoro, and gold and 
iron in Luzon and Mindanao. Cebii coal is a highly- 
carbonized lignite of the Tertiary Age ; analysis 
shows that it has about two-thirds the calorific 
energy of Cardiff coal. The Spanish government 
has been hostile to the development of industrial 
undertakings, and by legal quibbles and unfavor- 
able regulations has prevented any extensive ex- 
ploitation. What mining there has been has not 
been organized, the miners living in isolated dis- 
tricts and selling their produce to Chinese mer- 
chants. A British corporation has for some time 
been carrying on gold mining operations on the 
shore of Peracele Bay. The chief agricultural 
products are hemp and rice, while the forests 
abound in most valuable kinds of wood, such as 
ebony and mahogany. 

Before these resources can be at all successfully 
exploited, the construction of adequate means of 
communication and transportation will have to be 
effected. The Spanish government in the Philip- 
pines degenerated into a mere taxing machine, 
totally unproductive in its character, since practi- 
cally none of the funds collected from taxation 
found their way into internal improvements. Such 
poor roads as actually exist were constructed by 
natives working off their poll-tax under the super- 
vision of shiftless officials. 

A great difficulty that will be encountered in 
Y 321 



WORLD POLITICS 

the efforts to develop the mining resources of the 
islands lies in the fact that labor is not easily ob- 
tained. Laborers are scarce. They must usually 
be brought from a distance, and must be paid a 
considerable sum in advance. The wants of the 
natives are few. They soon earn what they con- 
sider a competency and with it retire to their native 
villages to live their accustomed peaceful life. It is 
said that employers in the PhiHppines have rather 
preferred men who drank, gambled, and played 
the gallera, because such men, having more wants 
to satisfy, would work with greater energy and 
persistence.-^ 

One of the first problems that will have to be 
solved in opening up the islands to modern indus- 
trial methods will be this question of securing a 
sufficient and lasting supply of labor. It would 
be very difficult to induce the natives to work hard 
and long unless forced-labor acts, similar to those 
in use in French China and in South Africa, should 
be adopted. The administration of those laws, 
however, very often leads to terrible suffering and 
great mortahty among the natives ; so that public 
opinion in the United States could not be expected 
to tolerate their enforcement. Another plan would 
be to import gangs of coolies from China and India. 
Although the experience of the French with this 
class of laborers has not been promising, other 
nations seem to have had better success with 
them. It may be that in the case of the French 

1 See Dean C. Worcester, The Philippine Islands. 
322 



THE UNITED STATES 

experiment, the nearness of Indo-China to their 
home caused the Chinese coolies to feel too in- 
dependent of their masters. 

The question of the climate has been discussed 
at length by many writers, most of whom agree 
that for permanent residence, and especially for 
women and children, it is hardly suitable. The 
great profits, however, which await an energetic 
development of resources, would make it possible 
for interested capitalists, by the offer of large sal- 
aries, to induce men to undertake the management 
of their projected industries. 

When the situation is regarded as a whole, it 
seems that the importance of these islands lies 
not so much in their own resources, present or 
prospective, as in their favorable situation on the 
great trade route between China and America, and 
between China and the European colonies in the 
Orient, At this point, therefore, we meet the ques- 
tion of the importance of the direct control of ter- 
ritory in the development of national trade and 
industry.^ It seems that such control is not so 
important as are the assurances of equal oppor- 
tunity of trade throughout the Orient, and the con- 
trol of sea and water communications. Political 
connection can have great importance only where 
a policy of exclusiveness is introduced ; and even 
there it will be difficult, if not impossible, in the 
long run, to interfere with the natural currents of 

1 For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see supra, Part I. 
Ch. II. 

323 



WORLD POLITICS 

commerce. It is clear that in the Philippine Islands 
the United States could not adopt an exclusive 
protective policy, without inviting ruinous repri- 
sals. In order to gain an inferior market in the 
islands, the Americans would have to sacrifice, to 
a certain extent, the superior markets which other 
advanced nations offer; for the extension of the 
American protective system to the islands would 
do more than anything else could do to bring 
forth a universal spirit of hostility to the Ameri- 
can nation, and, by leading other governments to 
a policy of retaliation, it would have a disas- 
trous effect on the natural relations of American 
commerce. 

When we come to the control of trade routes, 
we enter upon a subject of greater actual impor- 
tance than that of the possession of vast tracts of 
territory. The United States, being in possession 
of Hawaii, Tutuila in the Samoan group, Guam 
in the Ladrones, and Manila, will have sufficient 
points of support to protect the routes which her 
commerce in the Orient would take. The building 
of the Nicaragua canal, the laying of a Pacific 
cable, the fostering of the merchant marine, and 
the establishment of banking communications with 
the Orient are, in the vitally important fields of 
commercial and industrial exploitation, the matters 
which should occupy American statesmen first of 
all. When we consider that with a proper develop- 
ment of our relations, American trade with China 
should exceed that with the Philippine Islands at 

324 



THE UNITED STATES 

least tenfold, the true relative importance of the 
actual possession and territorial control of these 
islands appears. This, of course, is no argument 
for their relinquishment ; it is simply intended to 
point out that there are more important interests 
in the Orient, to which the Philippine question 
should be subordinated, and that nothing should be 
done in the Philippine Islands without first making 
sure of its effect upon American political influence 
and trade relations in the Orient in general. 

The United States has thus far wisely refused 
to enter upon any plans for territorial acquisition 
on the Asiatic mainland, at the same time insisting 
upon an unequivocal maintenance of the policy of 
equal opportunity.^ This it is which is the prime 
necessity of American commerce in the East. No 
territorial holding that it would be possible at the 
present time to obtain would compensate the 
United States for the loss of commerce which 
she would sustain by being excluded from regions 
held by other nations. We are most favorably 
situated for developing a great and flourishing 
trade with the entire Pacific coast of Asia. It 
would, therefore, be the height of folly for the 
United States to join in a rush for territorial ac- 
quisition, which could only lead to such a break- 
down of the friendly commercial relations of the 
civilized powers, as would entail upon all of them 
a disastrous loss. 

It appears from the above considerations that 

^ For a fuller discussion of this matter see supra. Part II., Ch. III. 
325 



WORLD POLITICS 

the fundamental principles of American policy 
ought to be the fostering of commercial relations 
and the strengthening of industries at home, rather 
than the acquisition of vast reaches of territory. 
For all the purposes of developing a high civiliza- 
tion, the United States is in a more favorable 
position than any other great power. She has a 
vast territory in the temperate zone, adapted to 
the growth of a homogeneous population. Her 
resources have scarcely been touched, and for cen- 
turies to come internal development can go on 
without any fear of approaching exhaustion. The 
prosperity and freedom of this our home region 
should take precedence of any other considera- 
tions, and it seems clear that we ought to be slow 
to enter upon a policy of ambitious territorial 
expansion, which would weigh down our industries 
with the cost of maintaining an extensive colonial 
service and naval establishment, without any pro- 
portionate gain. 



326 



CHAPTER II 

The Influence of International Politics on 
THE Party System 

A consideration of the new forces in politics 
leads us to inquire how the system of party gov- 
ernment is likely to be affected by the increased 
and continued concentration of public interest on 
foreign affairs. The political experience of the 
last two centuries has proved that free govern- 
ment and party government are almost convertible 
terms. It is still as true as when Burke wrote his 
famous defence of party, in his Thoughts on the 
Cause of the Present Discontents, that, for the 
realization of political freedom, the organization of 
the electorate into regular and permanent parties 
is necessary. Parliamentary government has at- 
tained its highest success only in those countries 
where political power is held alternately by two 
great national parties. As soon as factional inter- 
ests become predominant ; as soon as the stability 
of government depends upon the artificial grouping 
of minor conflicting interests ; as soon as the nation 
lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of 
327 



WORLD POLITICS 

great organizations, the highest form of free gov- 
ernment becomes unattainable. 

It might, therefore, be argued that anything 
which tends to decrease the importance of party 
government contains within it a menace to free 
institutions. But however that may be, however 
possible it may be to develop a substitute for the 
system of party government as we have known it 
during this century, it is, nevertheless, impera- 
tively necessary that we should ascertain the exact 
influence upon that system which may result from 
the new prominence that international relations 
have obtained in political life. It does not admit 
of doubt that modern imperialism tends to withdraw 
public interest from the fields within which party 
government can best exert its influence. Ques- 
tions of international relations, of measures under- 
taken against foreign nations or in concert with 
them, cannot effectively be made the subject of 
party controversies. When the national honor is 
apparently at stake, when the statesmen at the 
helm have once taken a position withdrawal from 
which might be interpreted as national weakness, 
divisions of opinion on questions of abstract justice 
will be of little weight in the balance against the 
powerful passion of patriotism, which will, in such 
cases, support the party of advance and aggres- 
sion. We have an illustration of this in the case 
of the Transvaal war. Before hostilities began, 
the Liberal leaders and the bulk of the Liberal 
party were decidedly opposed to war, and to the 
328 



THE UNITED STATES 

general policy of the Conservative party. When, 
however, the Boers, in sheer self-defence, in order 
to prevent the accumulation of a crushing force 
on their boundary, had been forced to begin hos- 
tilities, the majority of the Liberals began to sup- 
port the party in power, or at least to refrain from 
adverse criticism. Party government deals most 
effectively with matters of domestic concern. As 
soon as the foreign interests of the nation are at 
stake, divergences of opinion have to be reconciled, 
and a common front presented to the foreign rival. 
It has always been the tradition of the English gov- 
ernment that no administration should repudiate 
the acts of its predecessors in relation to foreign 
affairs, and that, while in opposition, a party should 
refrain from undue interference with the inter- 
national policy adopted by its opponent. Inter- 
national matters have thus been largely withdrawn 
from the domain of party politics. 

We find the same principle followed and the 
same influence at work in other nations. In the 
German Empire, matters of colonial expansion, of 
armament, of naval strength, and of foreign rela- 
tions in general, are left largely to the initiative of 
the administration ; and even if there are at first 
marked divergences of opinion, the government 
plans are usually adopted in the end, so that, as 
regards these matters, German politicians have 
come to look upon the Reichstag as little more than 
a burdensome impediment. The Socialists, who 
most frequently oppose the imperial plans, are 
329 



WORLD POLITICS 

promptly read out of the realm of national sym- 
pathy. Their political action is set down as that 
of men who are vaterlandslos, — who have no 
fatherland, — although, in some respects, they 
are really more interested in the country itself 
than are their opponents. They, however, are 
more concerned about the internal affairs, about 
justice in social relations, than about the splendor 
of the army or national prestige abroad. 

In France, all parties have agreed in the matter 
of foreign pohcy. The whole national life there 
has been bent upon the achievement of an inter- 
national task, the rehabilitation of French diplo- 
matic influence and military prestige. Thus, with 
the most important concern of the nation with- 
drawn from the realm of party government, and 
with all the activities of the administration warped 
to the attainment of one end, about which there 
could be no difference of opinion, it is small wonder 
that party government in France has degenerated 
into a mere squabble for occasional position among 
factions of hungry office-seekers. 

The Russian government has never been bur- 
dened with party opposition, and now that all 
the national energies are concentrated upon the 
expansion of the imperial domain, the growth of a 
party system on Western models is less likely than 
ever, — in fact, it is an impossibility. 

We see, then, that in the countries of continental 
Europe, which have to give paramount attention to 
foreign affairs, on account of their exposed frontiers, 

330 



THE UNITED STATES 

party government has never been so prominent 
in national life as in England and the United 
States. In Great Britain, moreover, the system 
was most successful during the decades when the 
national consciousness was concentrated on the 
solution of questions of domestic politics. From 
the time when the dread pall of the post-Napo- 
leonic reaction first began to be lifted from English 
politics, down to the birth of the present im- 
perialistic enthusiasm, matters of domestic policy 
controlled English political life. Reform of the 
representation, corn-law repeal, free trade, church 
disestablishment, manhood suffrage, proportional 
representation, and the reform of local govern- 
ment, — these are the principal topics about which 
the warfare of political parties in Great Britain 
was waged during the century. Only three 
decades ago, even the first great apostle of 
imperialism, — Beaconsfield, — was still so unaware 
of the future trend of politics, to which he him- 
self was to give an impulse, that he looked upon 
the colonies of the empire rather as burdens than 
as a source of strength. " These wretched colo- 
nies," he said, " will all be independent, too, in a 
few years, and are a millstone around our necks." 
While political energy was thus concentrated on 
tasks of internal reform, party government flour- 
ished as never before or since. In fact, the period 
covered by the career of Mr. Gladstone marks 
the zenith of parliamentary and party government, 
and his attitude toward foreign and domestic affairs 
331 



WORLD POLITICS 

respectively is representative of the true political 
spirit of that time. 

In the United States, questions of domestic 
policy have been the predominant ones until very 
recently ; and here, too, with the exception of the 
period of transition after the war of 1812, — when 
for a time there was neither faction nor party, — 
and the second period of transition before the 
accession of Lincoln to the presidency, — when 
there was a time of faction rather than of party, 
— there has been a continued existence of two 
strong and almost evenly balanced parties. 

Of late a very marked decline in the efficiency 
of party government has been noticed, especially 
in Great Britain, but also to some degree in the 
United States. In the former country there has 
been much shifting and rearranging of political 
parties. As long as the old Liberal programme of 
internal reform was before the people and engross- 
ing their attention, parties showed a high degree 
of organization and cohesion ; but since imperial 
and colonial affairs have come into the fore- 
ground, the intensity of party rivalry has de- 
clined. At the present time, the Liberal party is 
disorganized, practically leaderless, and without a 
policy. Its decline is generally attributed to the 
position taken by its older leaders on questions 
of foreign politics. A similar disorganization is 
observable in the Democratic party in the United 
States, although this may be due in part to other 
circumstances. 

332 



THE UNITED STATES 

The question is a pertinent one, whether this 
evident decHne in party government is a result of 
the increased interest now taken in foreign affairs. 
It seems a natural a priori conclusion that the 
withdrawal of national attention from the field 
of domestic reform, where party rivalries may be 
most successfully carried on, to the realm of 
foreign politics, where such party differences are 
often dangerous, or, at least, inadvisable, would 
weaken the organization and efficiency of political 
parties ; but whether this is the primary cause, or 
only a secondary one, it must certainly be true 
that it will tend to accentuate the decline which 
has already begun, although there may still be at 
stake internal interests sufficiently important for 
party controversy to be waged about them. In 
general, however, it seems a safe conclusion that 
the more fully national energy is concentrated 
upon the achievement of ends concerning which 
party controversy is inadvisable, the more com- 
pletely will party government degenerate into 
mere factional intrigue, — perhaps even to the 
point of being replaced by some other system of 
political action. Could a nation always realize 
that its cardinal interests are at home, that national 
worth, welfare, and strength are developed from 
within, not conquered or acquired from without, 
could it always assign to foreign and domestic poli- 
tics their true relative importance, these conse- 
quences would also be avoided.^ 

1 See also Ch. IV. of this Part. 
333 



WORLD POLITICS 

The rationale of the necessity for such unanim- 
ity in external matters is simple enough. Action 
in these cases must be quick and decisive ; shifting 
and changing measures are disastrous, and a policy 
once undertaken by the executive cannot, therefore, 
be easily reversed; national responsibilities incurred 
by authorized agents must be lived up to, and 
that interpretation of national interests, which is 
adopted by the government, is usually conclusive. 
It is generally believed that war can be brought 
about only in answer to a strong demand for it 
by popular opinion, but even in the most recent 
events we have examples that show how easily 
the current of affairs may be turned by the action 
of the executive. Thus, a diplomatic note by the 
government of Mr. Cleveland brought us to the 
verge of war with Great Britain ; and through 
the initiative of Mr. McKinley, the nation has 
been placed in the position which it now occupies 
in the Philippines, without any initial impulse on 
the part of popular opinion. 

A policy once decided upon in this manner, it 
is difficult to abandon or to reverse ; even honest 
criticism in these matters may be dangerous and 
impolitic. Sympathy with an enemy who seems 
to have been unjustly attacked may often render a 
hopeless struggle more extended, — may swell the 
account of bloody sacrifices. Thus, a patriotic cit- 
izen who would have his country realize the ideal 
of justice among nations often finds himself in a 
cruel dilemma. A party that sympathizes with 

Jo4 



THE UNITED STATES 

armed resistance to its own government has never 
yet succeeded in rendering its opposition effec- 
tual. In England, Beaconsfield's policy, though it 
ran counter to the most cherished tenets of liber- 
alism, had yet to be adopted and carried on by its 
opponents, when they in turn came into power. 
We cannot escape the conclusion that, in the pres- 
ent stage of civilization, it is difficult for citizens or 
parties to place themselves on the basis of inter- 
national justice, when decisive action in foreign 
affairs has once been taken. In such instances, 
the positive element ordinarily carries the day, and 
criticisms and resentments have to be suppressed. 
The nation is still to us the ultimate impersonation 
of political justice. When its existence or inter- 
ests are at stake, or when, by its authorized repre- 
sentatives, they are judged so to be, effectual 
opposition to the course of the government by any 
party is usually out of the question. Inner dis- 
cords must be suppressed ; nations must present 
to one another an undivided front, — such seems 
to be the law of our present stage of political 
development.^ 

It seems difficult to escape the conclusion, there- 
fore, that as a nation enters upon an era of inter- 
national interests, and diverts the larger share of 

1 " It may be the highest duty to oppose a war before it is brought 
on, but once the country is at war, the man who fails to support it 
with all possible heartiness, comes perilously near being a traitor, 
and his conduct can only be justified on grounds which in time 
of peace would justify a revolution." — Theodore B. Roosevelt, on 
" Oliver Cromwell,"' in Scribner's Monthly for April, 1900. 

335 



WORLD POLITICS 

its political energies from the workings of party 
government to the promotion of these interests, the 
complete and effectual criticism of governmental 
measures must, to some extent at least, be weak- 
ened. This is one important item in the cost of 
imperialism which must be considered when we 
weigh the compensating advantages. 



336 



CHAPTER III 

The Increased Importance of the Executive 

As we have seen in the case of other countries, 
and particularly in the case of Germany, the rela- 
tive importance of the executive is enhanced by 
the present developments in world politics. In 
Russia, all opposition to the Czar's government 
has disappeared, such opposition having become 
so hopeless that no one is at present fantastic or 
radical enough to undertake it. In Great Britain, 
where Parliament was formerly the cynosure of 
political interest, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Salis- 
bury, the protagonists in the imperial drama, are 
at present monopolizing all attention. And so, 
too, in our own country, the management of the 
most important affairs has, since the Spanish war, 
fallen to the executive, v/hich, for the time being, 
has overshadowed the importance of all other 
departments. In the matter of external affairs, es- 
pecially in the case of international disputes, it is 
necessary to grant great discretionary powers ; and 
when important interests are at stake, the neces- 
sity of quiet and expeditious action is so great that 
z 337 



WORLD POLITICS 

the participation of Congress could hardly be 
invited. It would be well if, with this increased 
power of the executive, we could also have in- 
creased responsibility and a firm guarantee that 
none shall accede to supreme power without hav- 
ing undergone a complete and strenuous test of 
political ability and character. 

The questions which American statesmanship 
has hitherto been called upon to solve have ordi- 
narily not been of overpowering difficulty. They 
have been confined chiefly to matters of internal 
poHcy and tariff legislation, and have generally 
been settled in a rather categorical manner, often 
riding rough-shod over finer distinctions. With 
many administrations, the main problem has been 
that of finding means to expend a treasury surplus 
which threatened to unsettle the financial relations 
of the country. Provided by nature with a vast 
and fertile territory and abundant means, with no 
threatening questions of life and death to solve, 
America has of late enjoyed a freedom from care 
which has made the American statesman rather 
an object of envy to the rulers of Europe. The 
politics of the Old World were vastly more com- 
plex and difficult. Surrounded by rivals who 
are eagerly watching every opportunity to gain 
diplomatic or commercial advantage, their re- 
sources so limited that national life has to be 
carefully fostered in order to support the vast 
expenditures for national defence, these countries 
are so dangerously circumstanced within and with- 

33^ 



THE UNITED STATES 

out that any miscalculation of means is likely to 
bring about immediately disastrous results. Ameri- 
can presidents could look across the ocean to the 
storm-tossed ministers of European governments 
with a feeling of restfulness and general ease. 

That happy state of things is perhaps soon to 
disappear. With our entrance upon imperial poli- 
tics, the intricacy of our governmental relations has 
markedly increased. Our wealth, it is true, still 
seems boundless, but for what we possess of youth- 
ful vigor, the other great nations make up by long 
experience and astuteness in diplomacy. The 
nation, head and body, has felt itself in a very 
helpless state in the matter of the Philippine 
Islands. The nature of that region and the 
general character of Asiatic politics were a closed 
book to American statesmen and citizens. Yet 
if we intend to play a part in the far East, our 
government must put itself into possession of 
knowledge of all the many elements that go to 
make up the life of that marvellous region, and 
must cultivate the methods and tactful expedients 
by which alone any political advantage in that part 
of the world can be gained. We may be able to 
buy, and by brute force to conquer, a good many 
things ; but if we wish to compete successfully with 
other nations, we must begin to calculate the cost, 
and not count on the apparently inexhaustible ex- 
tent of our resources. The time when our states- 
men could rely merely on our material strength is 
forever past. So long as we adhered to the policy 

339 



WORLD POLITICS 

of isolation, this superior attitude of confidence in 
our own power might well have continued, but in 
order to compete successfully with the great powers 
in the government of the world, a policy of less in- 
sistence on mere strength, and the cultivation of 
more tact in the intellectual mastery of political 
affairs, will become necessary. 

When we consider the manner in which we select 
the man within whose hands these enormous in- 
terests of the republic are to be placed, we cannot 
escape the conclusion that our system of govern- 
ment does not give us a sufficient guarantee of his 
ability and fitness. Our method of selection is 
most unscientific, and is open to manifold abuses. 
A crowded popular convention, summoned for a 
few days, cannot develop any organic unity and 
feeling of responsibility ; it will, therefore, be led 
either by political machinations or by merely for- 
tuitous enthusiasms, and it is well known, from our 
history, how rarely statesmen of long experience 
and tried character have secured the nomination 
for the presidency. Another unfavorable element 
in our government is the fixity of tenure of the 
presidency. No matter how great a statesman, 
or how utterly inefficient the president may be, 
he knows that his term is limited, not by his suc- 
cess as a statesman, but by the passage of time. 
Continuity in American political careers is also hin- 
dered by the general custom which prescribes that 
a congressman cannot be elected to represent 
another district than that within which he resides. 

340 



THE UNITED STATES 

The statesman is, therefore, constantly dependent 
upon the whim of a narrow constituency, who are 
often unable to judge of his real services, and are 
guided in their opinion by post-office appointments 
and harbor bill appropriations affecting their 
neighborhood. 

If, for the purpose of comparison, we look now at 
the English government, we shall find that it pre- 
sents a much more scientific and effective system 
for the education and selection of great political 
leaders. Continuity of poHtical life is secured by 
the fact that law and custom permit a statesman to 
stand for election in any district of the kingdom, 
so that no narrow, local jealousies can defeat the 
reelection of a prominent man. It is by virtue of 
this fact that the leaders of both parties are con- 
stantly present in the House of Commons. Young 
representatives of marked promise are first admit- 
ted into the administration as under-secretaries, and 
are thus given an opportunity to study both sides of 
the government, — the administrative and the legis- 
lative. The laws which they assist in making, they 
are bound also to administer. Within Parliament 
there is constantly going on the most vigorous kind 
of natural selection, by which promising men are 
gradually advanced to greater and greater power 
in governmental affairs. Cabinet statesmen are 
here subjected to a fiery test; they have to meet 
the open criticism of their opponents and the silent 
scrutiny of their friends, day after day, as they pre- 
sent measures or engage in parliamentary discus- 

341 



WORLD POLITICS 

sion. Responsibility is so concentrated that the 
nation really knows whom to praise or to blame for 
the effects of any particular measure. The men who 
have passed through this training become so well 
known to the nation, that they are virtually em- 
bodied policies, and it is hardly necessary for them 
to stand on any platform ; their character and 
political record is ordinarily a better assurance of 
their true purposes and principles than any verbal 
declarations could be. 

It is evident that this system is admirably 
adapted to the management of the imperial side 
of politics. Although Parliament cannot keep the 
constant, immediate control of the details of for- 
eign policy, still it has within its hands the selec- 
tion of the men to whom these great interests shall 
be intrusted ; and the people of the nation can, 
through Parliament, hold their agents immediately 
and constantly responsible for the faithful admin- 
istration of their trust. Leaders are thus placed at 
the helm upon whose qualifications the best and 
most experienced public men of the nation are 
agreed. It is impossible that a successful general 
or a brilliant orator without any previous prepara- 
tion should be suddenly placed in control of Brit- 
ish imperial affairs. For two hundred years Great 
Britain has had only one mihtary prime minister, 
the great Wellington, and his administration was 
unsuccessful. Military training does not develop 
those powers of careful and judicious management 
which political life requires. No matter how patri- 

342 



THE UNITED STATES 

otic a general may be, his experience will often 
make him the victim of intriguing factions. The 
firm moderation that subordinates private desires 
to the public weal and the intelligence that divines 
the sober public sentiment and is guided even by- 
opponents, are, both of them, the fruit of civic 
training. 

Public interest in England has always been 
aroused by parliamentary life on account of its 
dramatic character. Debates in Parliament are a 
series of closely fought battles for supremacy, in 
which every point counts and is closely watched 
by the whole nation. Reputation, power, and vast 
interests depend on the turn that affairs may take. 
The electorate may, at any time, by a dissolution 
of Parliament, be called upon to determine the 
questions under discussion, and the incentive to 
keep informed on current parliamentary affairs is, 
therefore, stronger than in other countries, where 
parties are not so closely organized in Parliament, 
and where the dependence of parliamentary action 
on popular opinion is not so direct. Indeed, in 
other countries, where the principal business is 
transacted in committees, the debates, which rarely 
decide anything, fail to attract public attention, and, 
in general, the conduct of congressional business 
has been too uninteresting to attract the popular 
mind. 

Can we draw any practical conclusions from the 
above comparison ? It certainly seems that our 
system does not afford a sufficient guarantee that 

343 



WORLD POLITICS 

the vast powers which an imperialistic policy would 
require us to place in the hands of the president 
shall really be administered by the person most 
fitted for the position. Public opinion can be 
brought to bear upon the president only very 
indirectly, and it is easily conceivable that in the 
present era of the organization of giant trusts, a 
machine might readily be constructed which would 
retain a man in power, even against the best judg- 
ment of the American people. Elections under 
our present system too often reduce themselves to 
a choice between two evils, the doubtful balance 
between them almost driving the conscientious 
elector to distraction. But however desirable a 
structural change in our system would seem to be, 
it is probably out of the question. A conscious 
legislative imitation of the system of another coun- 
try no one would advise. Though such a change 
is practically impossible, we may assist in cultivat- 
ing such a proper sentiment as will be favorable 
to a more natural selection, and we may strengthen 
those political developments that tend to favor 
continuity of political careers, — advancement for 
long experience, and for tried capacity in dealing 
with public affairs, and the refusal of the title to 
supreme power to mere military fame. We ought 
to foster a system of organic, instead of fortuitous, 
selection. We ought to discountenance the em- 
phasizing of anything that merely gives notoriety 
to a name without containing a guarantee of effi- 
cient civil administration. 

344 



THE UNITED STATES 

Some germs of a system of organic selection can 
be observed in the history of the last two decades. 
Thus, the governorship of grea,t states, the chair- 
manship of important congressional committees, 
and prominence in the Senate, have come to be 
considered stepping-stones to the presidential office. 
Again, there has been a tendency to grant second 
terms, and thus to secure a continuous career to 
efficient congressmen and senators. And, finally, 
the former disorganization of the House of Repre- 
sentatives is remedied, to some extent, by the 
growth of the Committee on Rules, which unifies 
and digests the legislative business, and acts as 
a responsible body representative of the party in 
power. 

Tendencies and developments of this kind should 
be consciously strengthened ; for while it may be 
impossible to reconstruct a government, it certainly 
is not outside of the range of legitimate action to 
assist the growth of favorable institutions. It is 
well known that the marvellous English system is 
entirely an unpremeditated growth. Its essential 
elements are the representation of the crown by 
the prime minister ; the solidarity of the cabinet ; 
the responsibility of the latter to Parliament ; the 
power to dissolve the legislative and to create new 
peers ; the fact that the ministers are members of 
Parliament ; and, finally, that a representative may 
stand for any electoral district in the realm : all 
these elements are indispensable to the successful 
working of cabinet government. Yet they were 

345 



WORLD POLITICS 

all developed separately, at periods widely apart, 
with no consciousness at the time of their future 
function in a delicate organism of government. 
No human intellect could have thought it out, yet 
it is certainly no empty coincidence that the Eng- 
lish nation, the people who of all others do their 
own thinking, should also have developed this most 
highly organized and most delicately responsive 
system of political action. 



346 



CHAPTER IV 

The Influence of Imperialism on Home 
Affairs in the United States 

It is to be feared that the present tendency of 
popular interest to become concentrated on impe- 
rial questions and affairs will still further weaken 
the public interest in questions of home politics, 
which are themselves of such a nature as to be 
little attractive to the general public, no matter 
how important they may be. This danger of 
absorbing poUtical energies in outside matters to 
the damage of domestic concerns should at least 
be noticed and guarded against. A nation that is 
rapidly expanding and is directing its energies to 
territorial acquisitions beyond its borders, is quite 
likely to suffer in its social and political well- 
being at home. We need but advert to the example 
of Rome, where, with the successive stages of impe- 
rial extension, there was a growth of social antipa- 
thies and general disintegration; a concentration 
of wealth with a corresponding increase in the city 
proletariat. Similarly, the powerful and brilliant 
monarchy of Spain was ultimately corrupted and 

347 



WORLD POLITICS 

ruined by territorial conquests which were used 
only to draw sustenance for the ever increasing 
luxuries of the home country. 

The danger of withdrawing public attention from 
home affairs and thus giving them over to a reac- 
tionary sj^irit is apparent enough to cause appre- 
hension. We have already noted it in the case of 
Germany. In Great Britain, questions of home 
government have fallen into apparent neglect. 
The older liberalism was concerned mainly with 
matters of political mechanism and structure, such 
as the suffrage, home rule, and disestablishment; 
but it must not be overlooked that the spirit in which 
these policies were brought forward and supported 
was that of fostering the intelligent interest of the 
people in their own affairs; and never has the 
country brought more direct and more strict super- 
vision to bear upon its representatives than during 
the decades in which these structural changes were 
being made. At present public opinion and politi- 
cal action have turned from these matters to ques- 
tions of social reform, but the spirit of politics has 
also changed ; it is now the spirit of a beneficent 
absolutism dealing out protection and certain eco- 
nomic advantages to the dependent classes, rather 
than that of a Uberal policy making its primary 
object the fostering of their independence. This 
is another of those apparent paradoxes in which 
history so abounds. On the surface, the intention 
of governing for the people is avowed, while in 
reality their virtue and their independence are 

348 



THE UNITED STATES 

being undermined. That the masses have an 
instinctive feeling of this is shown by the fact 
that they display their enthusiasm on imperial 
questions rather than on the questions of social 
reform ; for in the former their patriotic feeling is 
a great motive force, while in the latter case poli- 
tical action partakes of the nature of giving alms 
to them as a dependent class. For this reason, 
imperialism, is foremost in the popular mind. 

Turning now to our own country, we also have 
here every indication that popular interest is being 
unduly withdrawn from questions of domestic pol- 
itics. This indifferent attitude of the popular mind 
has emboldened professional politicians to seek to 
strengthen their position by beginning to break 
down the system of civil service reform. The ques- 
tion suggests itself. What will be the relation of an 
imperial policy to civil service at home ? The argu- 
ment has been advanced by Professor Giddings and 
others that increased national responsibility will pu- 
rify the public service and the morale and wisdom 
of American administration. In support of this 
view, the example of Great Britain is appealed to, 
the purity of its civil service being ascribed to the 
tonic effect of continuously expanding responsibility. 

Such a view, however, seems somewhat too opti- 
mistic. In the first place, the primary tendency 
of unchecked expansion would undoubtedly be an 
increase of the speculative spirit and of recklessness 
and corruption in public affairs, though, of course, 
such tendencies may be counteracted by a well- 

349 



WORLD POLITICS 

informed, active, and vigilant public opinion. 
Moreover, it must be noted that English experi- 
ence has not been of the nature suggested in the 
considerations given above. As a matter of fact, 
after two hundred years of expansion, and up to 
the very close of the eighteenth century, English 
civil service and the general political life of Eng- 
land were as corrupt as ever. The great and last- 
ing reform, on the other hand, was effected only 
in the era of liberalism, when public interest was 
concentrated on home questions, and when imperial 
and colonial interests were in the background. 

We can get some indication of the character of 
the influence of colonialism on British politics from 
the utterances on that question of the two most 
advanced statesmen of the eighteenth century. 
Lord Chatham, in speaking of the use of colonial 
wealth in English politics, said : — 

" For some years past there has been an influx of wealth 
into this country which has been attended by many fatal con- 
sequences, because it has not been the regular natural produce 
of labor and industry. The riches of Asia have been poured 
in upon us, and have brought with them not only Asiatic lux- 
ury, but, I fear, Asiatic principles of government. Without 
connections, without any natural interest in the soil, the im- 
porters of foreign gold have forced their way into Parliament 
by such a torrent of corruption as no private hereditary fortune 
could resist." ^ 

And Burke, in his speech of December i, 1783, 
describes the young magistrates who undertake 
the government of India, as follows : — 

^ Cited in Sir Charles Wilson's Clive, p. 210. 



THE UNITED STATES 

"Animated with all the avarice of age and all the impet- 
uosity of youth, they roll in, one after another, wave after 
wave ; and there is nothing before the eyes of the natives but 
an endless, hopeless prospect of new flights of birds of prey 
and of passage, with appetites continually renewing for a food 
that is continually wasting ; for the prey is lodged in England, 
and the cries of India are given to the seas and winds." 

The very fact that an attempt to reform the 
administration of India at that time, however in- 
judicious in particulars the attempt may have been, 
aroused such a storm of opposition as to aid in 
excluding the Whig party from power for twenty- 
five years, is a striking commentary on the relation 
of colonial politics to home affairs during the eigh- 
teenth century. This was the condition of affairs 
after colonial expansion had had an opportunity of 
exercising its beneficent influence on English polit- 
ical life for about two centuries. Colonial admin- 
istration itself was at that time still most corrupt 
and selfish. Even after Haileybury College, with 
its special course of study for the Indian civil ser- 
vice, had been established, the system of patronage 
continued to govern the appointment to office, 
with the result that, as late as 1850, corruption and 
ignorance were common in the colonial service. ^ 
At that time, the agitation for civil service reform 
and the introduction of the merit system had al- 
ready been vigorously pushed, and in 1853 Sir Staf- 
ford Northcote and Sir Edward Trevelyan made 
their famous report. The enlightened liberalism 

^ Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 1 78. 



WORLD POLITICS 

of the reform era was at its height, and within two 
years the merit system was introduced in England; 
in 1853, it had also been put in force in India. 
Colonial reform and home reform both flowed from 
the same source. 

The loss of her great colonial possessions in 
North America exercised a beneficent influence 
upon England, but it was not until the great 
reform movement of this century had purified 
English home politics that colonial administra- 
tion itself became a credit to the English nation. 
Unless a nation trains itself in political character 
and method by the efficient administration of its 
home affairs, it cannot hope to be successful in 
imperial politics, or to escape the detrimental in- 
fluence which expansion is likely to produce. 
England's greatness as a colonizing power is due 
to the fact that her foreign administration for the 
greater part of the nineteenth century has been 
subjected to the criticism of an enlightened public 
opinion at home, trained in judging and dealing 
intelligently with poHtical affairs. It is the habit 
which the British people have acquired of watch- 
ing and controlling their political agents that ena- 
bles them to exercise a beneficial influence among 
inferior nations. Wherever a British officer or 
administrator has worked, he has felt himself 
responsible to a critical and alert public opinion, 
accustomed to dealing strictly with any lapses, 
breaches of trust, or offences against political 
morality. Instead of acquiring purity from a sense 

352 



THE UNITED STATES 

of increased responsibility, as some have argued, 
the efficiency of the English government has pro- 
ceeded rather from home affairs to those abroad ; 
and it is only because, under the regime of liberal- 
ism during the present century, the English people 
have given such minute attention to good govern- 
ment at home, that they have been enabled to 
introduce that blessing among inferior races. If 
the sobriety and justice of Liberal politics are to 
be abandoned, the true greatness of England is a 
thing of the past. 

We should therefore not allow ourselves to fall 
into a feeling of optimistic security, and to expect 
too much of " beneficent reaction." National effort 
must be concentrated on the task of producing a 
pure and efficient administration in domestic affairs, 
and national public opinion must insist upon the 
direct responsibility of all public servants, wherever 
stationed, to the nation at home. 

The same redoubled vigilance must be devoted to 
other affairs of domestic reform. Whatever with- 
draws attention from them is likely to strengthen 
the forces of reaction. It is but natural that 
the central government should to some extent 
strengthen organized interests at the expense of 
the people in general. Even though one admits 
that an honest effort has been made to legislate 
with equal favor, he can hardly avoid the conclu- 
sion that the laws of the United States government 
have been more uniformly favorable to capital and 
its concentrated interests than to the poorer classes. 
2A 353 



WORLD POLITICS 

It is certain that some of the great trusts are in- 
terested in expansion. The part taken by powerful 
trusts in the annexation of Hawaii and the agitation 
in behalf of Cuba, as well as in the recent distress- 
ing episode of tariff legislation for Porto Rico, are 
too well known to call for more than mention. At 
present, the Standard Oil Trust, the Carnegie Steel 
Company, and other great organizations are in- 
terested in a Chinese railway concession. To be 
sure, it is a perfectly legitimate business interest 
that takes them there, and they have the necessary 
capital and influence to open tracts of the Celes- 
tial Empire to American trade ; yet the connection 
between trusts and our national policy cannot be 
too carefully watched. It is the interest of all 
citizens that the central government should not 
be turned into an instrumentahty for advancing 
powerful centraHzed interests. 

Many other matters of domestic government are 
likely to suffer by a withdrawal of public interest 
from them. Among these are the questions of the 
purity of local and municipal government, the 
equitable distribution of property, the administra- 
tive control of monopolies, and the framing of laws 
for equitable inheritance taxation. It would be 
a calamity for the nation to give up the deep 
and careful consideration of these matters, the 
right settlement of which is of prime importance 
to our national life, in order to pursue a policy 
of territorial expansion, attractive, indeed, but of 
doubtful value. In this connection we must also 

354 



THE UNITED STATES 

notice that the relative importance of the govern- 
ment of the states as compared with that of the 
federal government is to be decreased still further 
by present developments, which tend to increase in- 
ordinately the pubhc interest in those affairs which 
are solely in the hands of the central government ; 
for, without detailed explanation, we may simply 
call attention to the fact that imperialism always 
favors centralization. It may be that as one 
result of this centralization added interest will be 
taken in government in general, and that men of 
ability will in larger numbers devote themselves 
to the service of the state. To this end, however, 
steps should be taken to assure efficient public 
servants a continuous career and adequate re- 
muneration. As illustrating the vital importance 
and value of this plan, we need only call to mind 
the work of Lord Cromer, who for fifteen years 
has been enabled to carry out his consistent and 
far-reaching policy with regard to Egypt. 



355 



CHAPTER V 

The Influence of Imperialism on the 

International Relations of the 

United States 

It remains to consider briefly the influence of 
the new developments in international politics on 
the relations between the United States and other 
great powers. A certain feeling of aloofness from 
Old World interests characterized American politics 
up to within the last few years ; but this feeling 
has now entirely disappeared and has given way 
to a sentiment of common interests and of rivalries 
centring about common aims. Many are inclined 
to view this change with a spirit of regret, as if 
the United States had, to some extent, abandoned 
her old ideals and stepped down into the dusty 
arena of selfish and ignoble combats for material 
dominion. 

It is indeed true that, in the eyes of European 
nations, the fair fame of the American Republic has 
suffered in consequence of the results of the late 
war. Not accustomed to grant the validity of purely 
humanitarian and altruistic motives in guiding their 

356 



THE UNITED STATES 

own political action, they set down to the account of 
pure hypocrisy the professions made by America 
before the war, and believe, or affect to believe, that 
those professions were consciously calculated to 
veil a masterful desire for territorial expansion. It 
will probably never be possible to make European 
nations understand the real complexity of motives 
that led the American nation into a war with Spain. 
Especially will it be difficult for them ever to real- 
ize how large a part real sympathy with the suffer- 
ings of a neighboring population, and impatience 
engendered by daily reports of unceasing warfare 
and unrelieved misery, played in bringing about 
the war. Any representations tending to give 
probability to the importance of these factors are 
likely to be discountenanced in consideration of the 
events that have followed the war. It is only by 
strict compliance with the letter and spirit of the 
declarations made when entering upon the war 
that the United States can redeem her reputation 
for honesty and a straightforward policy. For this 
reason, no effort should be spared to allow the 
populations of Cuba and the PhiHppine Islands the 
greatest measure of independence consonant with 
the general peace of the world and the security of 
life and property within those islands. 

There has of late been much conjecture concern- 
ing the international relations of the United States. 
The friendship between Great Britain and the 
American Republic is usually accepted as firmly 
established, and it may be looked upon as one of 

357 



WORLD POLITICS 

the most fortunate results of the late war that the 
unreasoning bitterness and misunderstanding be- 
tween these two great nations have given way, even 
for a time, to a feeling of common interests and 
mutual good will. The best minds of both nations 
have long realized that, with all the commercial 
and industrial rivalry between them, they are at 
one on the essentials of civilization and govern- 
ment. In view of the suddenness of the change of 
attitude among those politicians who were formerly 
most radical in their denunciation of British policy, 
however, it is hardly possible to avoid the conclu- 
sion that much of the enthusiasm in favor of alli- 
ance must be identified with the spirit of desire for 
exaggerated national aggrandizement, and may be 
ascribed to their belief that these two powers can 
without let or hindrance order the government of 
the world according to their own convenience. 

More recently it has been proposed that Ger- 
many should be included within the great Anglo- 
Saxon alliance. The term itself is open to criticism, 
since, although there is a certain racial affinity 
among the majority of the citizens of these three 
countries, the Germans, at any rate, would object 
to being included under the suggested designation. 
Moreover, this racial affinity would not be suffi- 
ciently strong to insure continued political unity, if 
any powerful material interest should arise to sep- 
arate the three nations. Race is scarcely a suffi- 
cient bond for the unity of a single national state, 
much less for an international alliance of many 

358 



THE UNITED STATES 

such states. If we pass by this ethnical element 
and consider the question of social and political 
ideals, there seems to be lacking in these, also, a 
sufficient basis for cooperation among the three 
powers, — for they differ broadly in their views as 
to social customs and political institutions. The 
only motive that may be expected to bind them to- 
gether and to offer a guerdon of continued amity 
is to be found in a common fear of Russia and of 
the apparently irresistible expansive tendencies of 
that power. 

Between Great Britain and Russia, the enmity 
is probably irremediable ; but if the Russian gov- 
ernment will pursue a liberal trade policy in her 
Asiatic possessions, it does not seem improbable 
that friendly relations may be established between 
the Czar's dominions and the other two powers, 
Germany and the United States. Russia has shown 
a tendency to conciliate the United States and to 
give us every reasonable advantage within her 
Asian territory. Our views about Russia, coming 
as they do largely from British sources, are perhaps 
unduly severe as to the Russian civihzation and 
government. Of course, there are many things 
in Russian affairs against which we must always 
protest ; but it would be a calamity if Russia, by 
constant and malign misrepresentation of her 
motives, should be driven into complete hostility 
to all Western social and political ideals. There 
certainly are elements in her civilization that may 
do good service to the world. It is the part of 

359 



WORLD POLITICS 

wise statesmanship for the United States to assist 
in setting firm bounds to the undue expansion of 
Russian political influence ; but it is equally the 
counsel of wisdom and humanity for her to dis- 
countenance the constant aspersions of Russian 
political motives, and to foster friendly relations 
between that great empire and the Western 
nations. 

Germany is already pursuing this policy of fos- 
tering friendly relations with all the great powers, 
while at the same time firmly insisting upon her 
own international rights. The thought that she 
would cast her lot completely with any other 
power is little complimentary to the political 
sagacity of her statesmen. As has been said 
before, the time of one-sided alliances is past. 
Nations at present group themselves as the cir- 
cumstances and interests of the time dictate. But 
there is in the world a growing realization of a 
basis of common interests upon which interna- 
tional amities may rest, and everything that thus 
leads to a better understanding between the na- 
tions should be welcomed as a triumph of human- 
ity over the narrower, blinder forces of nation- 
alism. 

Viewing the whole situation, there is much cause 
for hopefulness in the evident effort of all the 
nations to emphasize their common interests. 
There is room for all in the great work of civiliz- 
ing and developing the world. While we are still 
very far distant from a millennium of peace, — for 

360 



THE UNITED STATES 

international competition, though conducted on a 
high ethical plane, is intense and likely to lead to 
memorable conflicts, — it is none the less reassur- 
ing to note that nations are growing less liable to 
mutual misunderstanding on matters not really- 
vital to their existence. 

In conclusion, a few words to summarize the 
considerations presented in this chapter may be 
not without value. A headlong policy of territorial 
aggrandizement should be avoided by the United 
States, as it would entail the danger of burdening 
our national existence with elements that could 
not be assimilated and would only weaken the 
state. It should be the aim of our nation to 
counteract everywhere, at home and abroad, the 
ambitions of universal imperialism, by fostering 
a spirit of confidence and friendship among the 
nations. Commerce and industry should be de- 
veloped by establishing trade depots and means 
of communication, and by upholding the policy of 
equal opportunity throughout the colonial world, 
rather than by territorial acquisitions. Our policy 
with regard to the Philippine Islands should be 
guided by the broader consideration of Oriental 
politics. In the treatment of the populations which 
through the force of circumstances have been 
intrusted to our care, we should follow the con- 
stitutional and ethical doctrines upon which our 
government is founded. Before all, and above all, 
we should guard the purity of domestic politics, 
lest, while we are gaining great influence in the 

361 



WORLD POLITICS 

affairs of the world, our national life at home 
weaken and deteriorate, and the hopes which the 
best men of all nations have cherished in our 
behalf be deceived. And may we always be able 
to apply to our country the words of Wordsworth 
in praise of his own land : — 

" For dearly must we prize thee ; we who find 
In thee a bulwark for the cause of men." 



362 



INDEX 



Acheen, 55. 

Afghanistan, 233. 

Agricultural settlement, 56. 

Alcock, Sir Rutherford, 189. 

Algeria, 53. 

Alliances, change in the nature of, 

254- 

American China Development Co., 
128. 

Anglo-Saxon alliance, 358. 

Anzer, Bishop, 270. 

Austria, fears allayed by recent de- 
velopments, 227. 

Autocracy, in Russia, strengthened, 
211. 

Balkan states, Russian interest in, 
diminished, 230. 

Beaconsfield, 74, 331, 335. 

Beresford, Lord Charles, 154. 

Bismarck, 4, 274, 284 ; on colonial- 
ism, 261. 

Brodrick, the Hon. St. John, 135, 
172. 

Buddhism, 240. 

Buelow, von, 164. 

Burke, 327. 

Cabinet system, English, 341. 
Canada, tariff of 1898, 38. 
Cape-to-Cairo railway, 65. 
Castelar, Emilio, 215. 
Chamberlain, 59, 155, 337; project 
of an imperial customs-union, 39. 
Chang Chi Tung, 102, 125, 183, 
Chatham, 77. 
Chauvinism, 7. 



China, morality in, 90; conserva- 
tism and formalism in, 90; classes 
in, 92; mandarinate in, 93; ex- 
aminations in, 93 ; official cor- 
ruption in, 95 ; business integrity 
in, 98; lack of patriotism in, 99; 
ideas of western reform in, loi; 
reform movement and its failure 
in, 102; geomancy in, no, 141; 
railway politics in, 114; Russian 
railway concessions in, 115, 133; 
British railway concessions in, 
120, 123 ; German railway con- 
cessions in, 121 ; Belgian railway 
concessions for Peking-Hankow 
Hne, 125 ; American railway con- 
cession in, 128 ; French railway 
concessions in, 135; mining con- 
cessions in, 138 ; statistics of com- 
merce of, 152; public debt of, 
157 ; industrial revolution in, 185 ; 
brigandage in, 187; civil law in, 
188 ; foreign intervention in, 190 ; 
reform through local govern- 
ment, 191 ; duty of Europeans in, 
194; impossibility of forciblfe 
seizure of, 193 ; regulations for 
mines and railways in, 199 ; new 
industries in, 249; currency in, 

251- 

Chinese public debt, 157. 

Chinese as merchants and labor- 
ers, 247. 

Chinese government, railway policy 
. of, 136. 

Civil service, 349. 

Cleveland, President, 334. 



3^3 



INDEX 



Commerce and political protection, 
34 ; and geographical situation, 
35 ; and banking relations, 35. 

Committee on rules, 345. 

Comte, 78. 

Confucius, 91, 93, 99, 103. 

Corea, 175. 

Credit Lyonnais, 138. 

Cromer, Lord, 55, 355. 

Cruelty toward natives, 42, 43. 

Currency in China, 251. 

Delagoa Bay arbitration, 24. 
Destiny, 79. 

Dicey, Professor Edward, 20. 
Domestic policy, influence of im- 
perialism on, 347. 
Dreyfus trial, 20, j'^. 
Dumer, 167. 
Dutch colonization, 54. 

Eternal peace, 23. 

Executive power and imperialism, 

337- 
Expansion, motives leading to, 10; 
and railways, 45. 

Faidherbe, 63. 

Finalism, 17. 

Finland, 70, 211, 227. 

France, as a colonizer, 52; rela- 
tions of, with Russia, readjusted, 
228 ; and Russia in China, 229 ; 
in the Orient, 255 ; and Germany, 
rapprochement between, 290. 

French colonial policy, 167. 

Gauge of railway, 118. 

German banks in South America, 
283. 

German commerce, 51. 

Germany, as a colonizer, 50 ; con- 
scious policy of expansion of, 
227; influence in China and 
Asia Minor, 227 ; in China, 268 ; 
policy of, in China, 272 ; in Asia 
Minor, 273 ; railway concessions 



to, in Asia Minor, 277; in South 
America, 281; one-man power 
in, 300. 

Gladstone, 71, 331. 

Goldie, Sir George, 55, 63. 

Goluchowski, minister, 292. 

Great Britain, an example to other 
nations in colonization, 9; as a 
market for other nations, 37, 
223 ; change from industrialism 
to capitalism in, 40; protectionist 
sentiment in, 224; international 
relations of, influenced by devel- 
opments in China, 225; change 
in anti-Russian politics of, 226. 

Greek Church, 206. 

Hague, Peace Conference, 22. 

Haileybury College, 351. 

Hankow, 166 ; industrial impor- 
tance of, 132. 

Harcourt, Sir Vernon, 72. 

Hay, Secretary, and the open-door 
policy, 176. 

Hayti, 287. 

Hegel, 15, 17. 

High finance nationalized, 44. 

Home rule, 71. 

Hongkong, trade of, with China, 

151- 
Hungarian nationalism, 4. 

Imperial federation, 39, 293. 

India, 234, 239. 

Individual initiative and social 
action, 61. 

Investments for industrial develop- 
ment, 41. 

Italy, policy of, in China, 173. 

Japan and China, 174. 

Java, 54. 

Jews, persecution of, 70. 

Kang Yew Wei, 93, 102, 107. 

Kant, 6. 

Kardoff, Depuy von, 264. 



364 



INDEX 



Kiao-chow, 33, 122, 165, 270, 288. 
Kingsley, Mary H., 42. 
Kipling, 80. 
Kriiger, President, 225. 
Kwang Su, Emperor, 93, 107. 

Ledochowski, Cardinal, 269. 
Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre, 291. 
Liberalism, decline of, 71, 302, 332. 
Li Hung Chang, 121, 125, 127. 
Likin, 96, 149. 

Machiavelli, 14. 

Machiavellian diplomacy, 18. 

MacKinnon, Sir William, 63. 

Manchuria, resources of, 119; Rus- 
sian political rights in, 161 ; im- 
portance of, 208. 

Marchand, Major, 64. 

Marschall, Minister von, 263. 

McKinley, President, 334. 

Merchant marine, German, 295. 

Missions and missionaries, 32, 146. 

Mommsen, Professor, 291. 

Monroe Doctrine, 284. 

Morgan, Pritchard, mining con- 
cessions to, 139, 142. 

Mouravieff, 63. 

Napoleon, 3. 

Nationalism, exaggeration of, 6. 

Navies, importance of, 28, 253 ; 

and democracy, 30. 
Navy, German, 294. 
Nicaragua Canal, 324. 
Nietzsche, 78, 238, 303. 
Nominating conventions, 340. 

Okuma, Count, 181, 182. 
One-man power, 74. 
Organic selection of political lead- 
ers, 344. 
Orient and Occident, 66, 236. 
Oriental characteristics, 243. 

Party system, as affected by im- 
perialism, 327. 



Peace Conference at The Hague, 
22. 

Peking Syndicate, 133, 139, 192. 

Persia, Russia in, 233. 

Philippine Islands, importance of, 
in foreign trade, 320 ; labor ques- 
tion in, 321. 

Plato, 92, 109. 

Pobedonostseff, 212, 213. 

Poland, 5, 70, 211, 227. 

Port Arthur, 116, 161, 162, 209, 

Portugal, colonies of, 289. 

Prince Henry, 164, 264, 276. 

Protection to citizens abroad, 60. 

Railways and expansion, 45. 

Reaction in France, 73. 

Realpohtik, 15. 

Renan, 78, 86. 

Rhodes, Cecil, 63. 

Roman imperialism, 13, 68. 

Rosebery, Earl of, 72. 

Rousseau, J. J., 8, 15. 

Russia, semi-Oriental character of, 
49, 211, 214; and the Roman 
Empire compared, 68 ; religion 
in, 76, 214, 215, 216; representa- 
tive of the Greek Church, 206 ; 
three stages of expansion of, 206 ; 
influence of recent developments 
in China on, 206; attempts of, to 
secure ice-free ports, 207 ; aided 
at present by peace, 209, 221 ; 
power of the military aristocracy 
in, 210; great increase in the 
fleet of, 210; autocracy in 
strengthened, 211; the "bearer 
of the torch," 212; extreme 
nationalism in, 213; recent 
changes in southern part of, 
216; arbitrary methods of, 217; 
measures to foster the merchant 
marine in, 218; manufacturing 
methods in, 219; mining in, 219; 
method of control compared with 

- that of the English, 222 ; com- 
mercial policy of, 317, 359. 



INDEX 



Russian colonization, nature of, 48. 
Russian diplomacy, 19. 
Russo-British agreement of 1899, 
121, 179. 

Salisbury, Lord, 75, 337. 

Schopenhauer, 78, 86, 238. 

Schwartzhoff, Colonel, 297. 

Sea communications, 31. 

Sea power, 27. 

Sebastopol, 216. 

Shanse, resources of, 139. 

Shantung, 122, 270. 

Siberia, immigration into, 117. 

Siberian railway, commercial and 

strategical importance of, 160, 

163. 
Slavophiles, 213. 
Social reform in England, 72. 
Solidarity, national, required at 

present, 70. 
Soudan, 63. 
South African War, 31, 56, 58, 231, 

328. 
1 Spkere of injluence, of interest, 60, 

y^ 113, 184. 

Stevenson, Robert Louis, 4a, 
Tael, value of, 125. 



Transvaal, 31, 56^ 58; war in, 231, 

328. 
Treaty ports of China, 148. 
Turkey, 232. 

United States, commercial interests 
of, in China, 313; with Siberia, 
317; trade with the Philippine 
Islands, 319. 

Vatican and religious protectorate, 
33- 

Walpolc, 77. 

Wei-hai-wei, 170. 

Wellington, 342. 

William IL, of Germany, 60, 76; 
speeches of, 264 ; visit of, to the 
Holy Land, 275; on solidarity, 
398. 

Wolscley. General, 86, 98. 

World state, 12, 23, 69. 

Yellow River, 124, 128. 
•' Yellow Terror," 86. 
Yunnan, French and British inter- 
ests in, 169, 171, 178. 

Zanzibar. 263. 



366 



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